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I. INTRODUCTION
When the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act' (RESPA) was
enacted in 1974, some hailed it as a law that would "ensure that the
costs to the American home buying public will not be unreasonably
or unnecessarily inflated by abusive practices."' 2 Others condemned
it as "a major defeat for consumers and a stunning victory for the real
estate settlement lobby."' 3 Realistically, RESPA merited neither high
praise nor condemnation. RESPA's requirements of distribution of
information booklets to homebuyers and at least twelve days ad-
vance disclosure of the settlement costs payable upon transfer of
title were only a modest effort by the federal government to make the
oftentimes bewildering process of buying and selling a home some-
what less mysterious for the parties to the transaction.
Little more than six months after its effective date, however,
even that modest effort was undone. Following an intensive lobbying
campaign by mortgage lenders, real estate brokers, and title insur-
ance companies,' Congress passed the Real Estate Settlement Proce-
1. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat.
1724 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (1976)).
2. H.R. REP. No. 1177, 93d Cong., 2d Seas. 4 (1974); S. Rap. No. 866, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 3 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 886], reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& An. NEWS 6546, 6548.
3. S. REP. No. 866, supra note 2, at 13 (additional views of Mr. Proxmire),
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONM. & AD. NEws 6546, 6557.
4. This lobbying campaign is described in J. Berry, The Power of Letters from
Home (May 18, 1976) (unpublished newsletter of the Alicia Patterson Foundation).
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dures Act Amendments of 1975,1 which repealed the heart of RESPA.
In its place, Congress substituted a regulatory scheme that requires
mortgage lenders to estimate settlement costs and to disclose these
costs to homebuyers in a form that is of little value and that denies
homebuyers the right to know all of their actual settlement costs until
the date of settlement.
The Congressional finding that led to the enactment of RESPA
is set out in the Act itself:
that significant reforms in the real estate settlement process are
needed to insure that consumers throughout the Nation are provided
with greater and more timely information on the nature and costs
of the settlement process and are protected from unnecessarily high
settlement charges caused by certain abusive practices that have
developed in some areas of the country.
The purpose of this Article is to analyze and evaluate RESPA, as
amended, to determine whether it fulfills this need for significant
reform in the real estate settlement process. In addition, this Article
discusses various alternatives to the method of regulation employed
by RESPA and concludes with a proposal for legislation that would
better accomplish the purpose of RESPA.
An analysis and evaluation of RESPA and its alternatives must
be based on arl understanding of the settlement process; the history
of federal settlement cost regulation; the basic legal, political, and
practical problems inherent in such regulation; and the current theo-
ries of such regulation. The discussion of RESPA in this Article,
therefore, is preceded by a consideration of these background topics.
II. THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS
The settlement process consists of various steps that accompany
the passage of ownership of real property from the seller to the buyer.
The term "settlement costs," as used in this Article, means all
monies paid by the buyer or seller in connection with the purchase
and sale of the property. In addition to the fees charged by partici-
pants in the settlement process for the services described in this
section, the following are considered to be settlement costs: all
charges made by the mortgage lender for mortgage financing, includ-
ing loan discount payments (mortgage points); all items required by
the mortgage lender to be paid in advance and to be deposited into
reserve accounts; all adjustments between buyer and seller for items
such as property taxes; and all state and local recording fees and
transfer taxes.'
5. Pub. L. No. 94-205, 89 Stat. 1157 (1976) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2602-2604,
2607, 2609, 2616-2617 (1976).
6. 12 U.S.C. § 2601 (1976).
7. Professor John C. Payne has classified these costs under four headings: (1)
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In its broadest sense, the settlement process begins when the real
estate broker solicits the owner's listing for sale and ends when the
deed from the seller to the buyer is recorded. Although the individual
elements and participants in the settlement process vary according
to local law and custom, the procedures described below are common
to most residential real estate transactions.8
Most homeowners, upon deciding to sell their homes, list the
property for sale with a real estate broker on the standard listing form
used in the area. If the property is in a new development, the devel-
oper may use a real estate broker, but most often relies on a sales staff
of his own.' When a real estate broker is involved, he almost always
is the agent of the owner, who, therefore, is obligated to pay the
broker's commission."0
Most prospective buyers of existing homes also rely upon the
services of a real estate broker.'" After the real estate broker has
brought buyer and seller together, the settlement services listed
below are performed by one of the following providers: the real estate
broker; an attorney who represents the buyer, the seller, or the lender;
a title insurance company; an abstractor; a mortgage lender; or an
selling; (2) financing; (3) establishing title and security interest; and (4) meeting
statutory charges. Payne, Ancillary Costs in the Purchase of Homes, 35 Mo. L. REV.
455, 460 (1970). Although Professor Payne considers prorated items such as taxes
irrelevant because they are attributable to ownership rather than to the transfer, id.,
this Article includes these prorated costs because they must be paid at the time of
transfer and may, therefore, affect the buyer's financial ability to purchase a home.
8. Several pre-RESPA articles describe and analyze this process in detail. See,
e.g., Gresham, The Residential Real Estate Transfer Process: A Functional Critique,
23 EMORY L.J. 421 (1974); Payne, A Typical House Purchase Transaction in the United
States, 30 CONY. (n.s.) 194 (1966); Payne, supra note 7; Whitman, Transferring North
Carolina Real Estate (pts. 1-2), 49 N.C.L. REV. 413, 593 (1971). See also U.S. DEP'T
OF HOUSING AND URBAN DavELOPmErr & VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, MORTGAGE SETtLE-
MENT COSTS (1972) [hereinafter cited as HUD-VA REPORT], reprinted in Real Estate
Settlement Costs, FHA Mortgage Foreclosures, Housing Abandonment, and Site
Selection Policies: Hearings on H.R. 13337 Before the Subcomm. on Housing of the
House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 735 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as 1972 House Hearings].
9. Based on intermittent local statistics, the National Association of Realtors
estimates that of existing homes, ninety percent are sold by real estate brokers, and
that most new homes are sold by builders. Telephone Interview with Kenneth Kerin,
Director of Research, National Association of Realtors (July 15, 1977) [hereinafter
cited as Kerin Interview].
10. See, e.g., Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 543, 236 A.2d 843,
850-51 (1967); Doria v. Suchowolski, 531 S.W.2d 360, 365 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); Camp-
bell v. Sickels, 197 Va. 298, 302, 89 S.E.2d 14, 19 (1955). See generally Vogt v. Town
& Country Realty, 194 Neb. 308, 314, 231 N.W.2d 496, 501 (1975); Alexander Myers &
Co. v. Hopke, 88 Wash. 2d 449, 454, 565 P.2d 80, 83 (1977); Comment, A Recxamina.
tion of the Real Estate Broker-Buyer-Seller Relationship, 18 WAYNE ST. L. REV. 1343,
1358 & n.86 (1972).
11. Kerin Interview, supra note 9.
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independent escrow agent. Which provider performs each task and
who pays each provider's fee are subject to local variation and also
to negotiation by the parties.12
The settlement services include:
1. Negotiating and preparing the contract of sale. The contract
of sale may be negotiated and prepared by either the real estate
broker or an attorney. It usually is on a standard form drafted by the
local bar association and adopted by the local real estate board.
2. Arranging for financing. Arranging for financing the pur-
chase of an existing home is the buyer's responsibility. If the buyer
does not have his own source of financing, the real estate broker or
the attorney may refer the buyer to a lender.
3. Searching, examining, and assuring the title. The title
search and examination are made to ensure that the seller is able to
convey a marketable title. Title assurance is a means of compensat-
ing the persons who have an interest in the property in the event that
the title turns out to be defective. Five basic methods of establishing
title currently are practiced in the United States: (1) a personal
search of the title records conducted by an attorney, followed by the
attorney's written opinion to the lender and buyer concerning the
state of the title; (2) a commercially prepared abstract of the title
records prepared by an abstractor and examined by an attorney and
the attorney's written opinion to the lender and the buyer concerning
the state of the title; (3) a personal search by the attorney, followed
by certifying title to a title company that issues a policy of title
insurance for the benefit of the lender, or the buyer, or both; (4) an
examination of an abstract plus title insurance; and (5) a-title search
and examination conducted by employees of the title insurance com-
pany plus title insurance. 3
12. See generally Payne, supra note 7, at 458.
13. The HUD-VA report contains a map of the United States that illustrates the
dominant form of title proof in each state. Method (1) is typical in the New England
states; method (2) is typical in Iowa, Kansas, and North Dakota; method (3) is typical
in Ohio, Pennsylvania, and the southeastern states; method (4) is typical in New
Jersey, Florida, and most of the midwestern states; and method (5) is typical in
Illinois, Michigan, New York, the District of Columbia, and the western states. HUD-
VA REPORT, supra note 8, at 45, reprinted in 1972 House Hearings, supra note 8, at
779.
A sixth form of title proof is title registration, sometimes called the Torrens sys-
tem after Sir Robert Torrens, the Australian official who proposed it in 1857. Under
title registration, the sovereign initially examines all titles and then issues the owner
a certificate of ownership, a duplicate of which is kept by the appropriate governmental
official. When title is transferred, title examination and registration do not have to be
repeated. Instead, the title certificate passes from seller to buyer and the transfer is
entered in the official records. Losses due to errors in registration are indemnified by
the government with funds derived from title registration fees. Although title registra-
tion is widely used outside the United States, its use in this country has been vigorously
1979]
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4. Preparing title and loan documents. Documents to be pre-
pared include the deed that will convey the property from the seller
to the buyer, a note or bond evidencing the buyer's personal liability
for the loan that finances the purchase,"4 a mortgage or deed-of-trust
making the property security for the loan, and a settlement statement
summarizing all of the financial aspects of the transaction. The var-
ious documents, most of which are on standard printed forms, may
be prepared by the real estate broker, the attorney for the buyer or
the lender, an employee of the lender, or an employee of the title
insurance company, according to local custom.
5. Conducting the settlement. All of the foregoing tasks, plus
assorted others such as credit checks, surveys, and inspections, are
undertaken with a view to the settlement.'5 The purpose of the settle-
ment is to bring all the interested parties together to execute and
deliver the necessary documents simultaneously with the payment of
the purchase price and the settlement costs. Depending on local cus-
tom, the settlement may be supervised by an attorney for one of the
parties, the real estate broker, a representative of the title insurance
company, or a representative of the lender.
At a typical settlement, the seller must give the buyer a deed and
evidence of good title and perhaps a survey and termite inspection
report. The buyer must give the seller a check in the amount of the
balance of the downpayment and any adjusted items, such as real
estate taxes paid in advance by the seller. The buyer also must give
a check to the lender for any required items, such as deposits into
reserve accounts for real estate taxes or insurance premiums. If the
seller owns the property free and clear of any mortgage, the buyer's
lender makes its check for the balance of the purchase price payable
opposed. Most practicing real estate attorneys and academicians believe that title
registration is unlikely to expand and is of historical interest only. See HUD-VA
REPORT, supra note 8, at 21-23, reprinted in 1972 House Hearings, supra note 8, at 756-
58; Payne, supra note 7, at 457 n.7.
14. In some states, antideficiency legislation eliminates the borrower's personal
liability, either entirely or only as to specific types of mortgage loans. See, e.g., CAL.
CiV. PROC. CODE § 580(b), (d) (West 1976); N.C. GE N. STAT. § 45-21.38 (1976); OR. Rv.
STAT. § 88.070 (1975); S.D. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 44-8-20 (1967). In other states, the
borrower's personal liability is limited to the difference between the unpaid balance
of the loan and the fair market value of the property (as opposed to the foreclosure
sale price). See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 1371 (McKinney 1963); 12 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 2621.1, .6 (1967). Both types of statutes had their origin in the depression of
the 1930s. For a contemporaneous discussion of mortgage relief legislation, including
a state by state list of statutes, see Poteat, State Legislative Relief for the Mortgage
Debtor During the Depression, 5 LAw & CONTEMP. PROS. 517 (1938).
15. In many parts of the country, the settlement is called the "closing" and,
according to Professor Cribbet, the day set for settlement or closing is known as "law
day." See J. CRmBsrr, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 132 (2d ed. 1975). Since
RESPA uses the term "settlement," that is the term used throughout this Article.
[Vol. 63:367
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to the seller. If, as more often is the case, the seller has a balance
owing to his lender, the buyer's lender makes a check to the seller's
lender for the balance due on the seller's loan and a check to the seller
for the seller's equity. The seller gives a check to the real estate broker
for his commission and the buyer gives a check to the attorney for his
services. The payment to the attorney may include, in addition to the
legal fee, an amount for any title insurance and applicable local gov-
ernment costs, such as recording fees and real estate transfer taxes,
that the attorney will disburse.
In some localities, instead of the parties personally appearing at
a settlement, an escrow device is used. Although purists still insist
that the term "escrow" refers to a conditionally delivered instru-
ment, this term, in the context of the purchase of real property, has
come to refer to the process by which the seller, buyer, and lender
deposit the necessary documents and checks, together with instruc-
tions, with a third party. " The escrow agent may be any of the per-
sons who otherwise would conduct a settlement, or he may operate
independently. Generally, when the escrow agent has received all
of the necessary documents and checks, he is authorized to record
the deed. The title is then checked for inclusion of the recording,
and if title is clear in the buyer, the escrow agent disburses the pur-
chase money and other checks. There may be a separate escrow fee
or, if the escrow agent is also providing other services, his fee may
include the escrow fee.
No wonder the buyer is bewildered. As he sits at settlement
writing checks for services he may only vaguely comprehend, he
might well be thinking that if only someone had told him about all
of these settlement costs ahead of time, he might not have been so
quick to sign the contract of sale. The settlement statement, which
shows the allocation of the various charges, is somewhat helpful to
the buyer, but traditionally it has been prepared at or after settle-
ment. From the buyer's standpoint, the very least that he needs is
an explanation of the settlement process, including the identities of
the providers of services and their fees and charges, before he be-
comes bound under the contract of sale. RESPA must, therefore, be
evaluated in light of how well it meets this need.
I. RECENT HISTORY OF FEDERAL SETTLEMENT COST
REGULATION
The settlement process traditionally has been regarded as a mat-
ter to be governed by state law.17 Until recently, federal regulation has
16. Id. at 175.
17. HUD-VA REPORT, supra note 8, at 132 app. H (letter of Allison Dunham),
reprinted in 1972 House Hearings, supra note 8, at 866.
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been limited to homes sold under programs administered by the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)' s and the Vet-
erans Administration (VA). 9 The recent history of federal settlement
cost regulation dramatically illustrates the politically controversial
nature of any attempt by the federal government to regulate the
settlement process.
The federal government's recent concern about settlement costs
grew out of its more traditional concern about mortgage interest
rates. Upon the recommendation of the Commission on Mortgage
Interest Rates," Congress enacted the Emergency Home Finance Act
of 1970.21 Section 701 of this Act deals with settlement costs, and sub-
section (a) authorizes HUD and VA, with respect to housing under
those agencies' programs, "to prescribe standards governing the
amounts of settlement costs allowable in connection with the financ-
ing of such housing in any area." Subsection (b) directs HUD and
18. 24 C.F.R. § 203.27 (1978).
19. 38 C.F.R. § 36.4312 (1977). Mortgage insurance programs administered by
HUD frequently are called FHA programs. When HUD was created as an executive
department in 1965 by the Department of Housing and Urban Development Act, Pub.
L. No. 89-174, § 2, 79 Stat. 667 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3531-3537 (1976)), the
legislation transferred to HUD all of the functions, powers, and duties of the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA). 42 U.S.C. § 3534(a). The legislation requires that
there be within HUD a Federal Housing Commissioner, who shall be one of the Assist-
ant Secretaries and who shall administer departmental programs relating to the pri-
vate mortgage market. Id. § 3533(a).
20. The Commission on Mortgage Interest Rates was created by Pub. L. No. 90-
301, § 4, 82 Stat. 114 (1968), "to study mortgage interest rates and to make recommen-
dations to assure the availability of an adequate supply of mortgage credit at a reason-
able cost to the consumer. .. "
In a 1969 report, the Commission found that
special attention should be given to the question of closing costs associated
with mortgage transactions. These costs at times add significantly to the
burden of acquiring a home since they come on top of whatever down pay-
ment must be made. . . . Buyers sometimes do not learn of these costs until
quite late, and then have no time to shop around for a less expensive deal.
U.S. COMMISSION ON MORTGAGE INTEREST RATES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNrrED STATES AND TO THE CONGRESS (1969) [hereinafter cited as MORTGAGE INTEREST
COMMISSION REPORT]. The Commission concluded that
with respect to closing costs and other fees collected in connection with
mortgage financing, the Commission recommends that FHA and VA: (a)
continue the present administrative practice of reviewing such costs to see
that they are consistent with the accepted standard in each local area; (b)
develop regulations and procedures to assure that prospective borrowers
have reliable estimates of such costs within a reasonable time prior to the
loan closing; and (c) undertake a joint study for submission to the Congress
by mid-1970 recommending steps to reduce and standardize such costs.
Id.
21. Pub. L. No. 91-351, 84 Stat. 450 (1970) (codified in scattered sections of 12,
42 U.S.C. (1976)).
22. Id. § 701(a). Such standards are to "be based on the Secretary's and the
[Vol. 63:367
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VA to "undertake a joint study and make recommendations . . .
with respect to legislative and administrative actions which should
be taken to reduce mortgage settlement costs and to standardize
these costs for all geographic areas."
HUD and VA submitted a joint report on mortgage settlement
costs2' to the Congress early in 1972. Among the findings were the
following:
6. The Buyer seldom decides who will provide settlement serv-
ices for him. If there is a choice, he usually depends upon advice of
the broker, escrow agent, seller, or settlement attorney. Often the
buyer is or believes he is required to deal with a particular source
for some or all settlement services.
7. Competitive forces in the conveyancing industry manifest
themselves in an elaborate system of referral fees, kickbacks, re-
bates, commissions and the like as inducements to those firms and
individuals who direct the placement of business. These practices
are widely employed, rarely inure to the benefit of the homebuyer,
and generally increase total settlement costs.
8. Settlement charges often are based on factors unrelated to
the cost of providing the services. The overall level of charges tends
to be significantly lower when the charge for a service is not directly
related to the sale price of the property.
9. Minimum or recommended fee schedules by local legal or
real estate groups often do not reflect the actual work done and tend
to increase settlement costs.
10. Most public land record systems need to be improved in
Administrator's estimates of the reasonable charge for necessary services involved in
settlements for particular classes of mortgages and loans." Id. § 701(a)(3).
23. Id. § 701(b). Both the House and Senate reports, using identical language,
make clear the purpose of the study:
FHA and VA presently do pay some attention to closing charges, and at-
tempt to protect individual borrowers from having to pay more for a particu-
lar service than is generally customary in the local area involved....
[T]his practice should be continued and . . . procedures should be devel-
oped to provide helpful information about such charges to prospective bor-
rowers....
It is the committee's intent that the study and recommendations on
settlement costs cover not only Government-assisted mortgage transactions
but also all residential real estate transactions, with particular reference to
those transactions involving single-family homes where the unsophisticated
purchaser or seller is often unfamiliar with the complex details of transfer-
ring real estate title. It is hoped that a thorough study will be made toward
developing a simplified method of locally controlled recording and guar-
anteeing of real estate titles to speed up and reduce the costs of title trans-
fers.
H. R. REP. No. 1131, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1970); S. REP. No. 761, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 18, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3488, 3506.
24. HUD-VA REPoirr, supra note 8, reprinted in 1972 House Hearings, supra note
8, at 735-811.
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order to facilitate title search and eventually reduce title related and
other settlement costs.n
Many of the recommendations for immediate action at the federal
level foreshadowed the enactment of RESPA:
HUD and VA will require the use of a single uniform settlement
statement for all HUD and VA insured or guaranteed transactions
. . . . This statement will separately itemize buyer and seller costs
in order to provide full disclosure and assure that costs reported were
actually incurred ....
. . . HUD and VA will require that buyers and sellers receive
detailed estimates of probable individual settlement costs which are
applicable to the transaction.
. . . HUD and VA will require that initial deposits in the mort-
gagee's escrow account should be collected so that when the tax bill
is paid, only 1/12 of the estimated annual tax bill remain in the
escrow account ....
. . . HUD and VA will. . . recommend that the Congress enact
legislation prohibiting all fees for the preparation of disclosure state-
ments.
2
1
The foregoing recommendations caused little comment at the
time they were made. Criticism was directed at the most controver-
sial of the recommendations:
HUD and VA will establish maximum allowable charges for all indi-
vidual settlement costs items paid by both the buyer and seller,
except loan discount payments and costs fixed by State and local
statutes, for identifiable housing market areas. Government insur-
ance or guarantee will not be issued in any case in which charges
exceed any one of the maximums."
In order to implement the HUD-VA Report, HUD, with limited
data and limited capability to collect additional data, embarked on
25. Id. at 2-3, reprinted in 1972 House Hearings, supra note 8, at 738-39. Many
of the findings in the study were corroborated in a series of Washington Post articles
published at about the same time that the HUD-VA report was submitted to Congress.
The articles, which were entitled The Settlement Squeeze, appeared from January 9-
12, 1972. See 1972 House Hearings, supra note 8, at 1-19 (entire series reprinted). The
articles explored the settlement process in the Washington, D.C. area, which includes
several counties in Maryland and Virginia. The articles focused on the interrela-
tionships among real estate brokers, lenders, attorneys, and title insurance companies,
and revealed the existence of kickbacks, referral fees, and other hidden charges flowing
to these parties. The series closed with a comparison of settlement practices and costs
in the Washington, D.C. and Boston areas; costs in the former were found to be double
or triple the costs in the latter.
26. HUD-VA REPORT, supra note 8, at 3-4, reprinted in 1972 House Hearings,
supra note 8, at 739-40.
27. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1972 House Hearings, supra note 8, at 739.
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the difficult task of fixing maximum settlement charges. 1 HUD pub-
lished proposed maximum charges on July 4, 1972.29 Maximum
charges were set for the following settlement services, no matter
which provider performed them: credit report, survey, title examina-
tion, title insurance, closing fee, and pest and fungus inspection."
The proposed regulation did not seek to set maximum real estate
broker commissions.3 '
Public comment on the proposal was overwhelming. HUD re-
ceived over 800 comments, more than it previously had received on
any other subject.32 Nearly all of the comments were critical of HUD's
effort. Congressional reaction was mixed; the Senate version of the
Housing and Urban Development Act of 197233 reaffirmed HUD's role
in setting maximum settlement charges for FHA-insured housing and
expanded HUD's authority to cover some other federally related
mortgages.Y The House Subcommittee on Housing, however, voted
to repeal HUD's authority to regulate settlement costs.3 5 Faced with
these conflicting reactions, HUD never made its proposed regulation
final.
During the next two years, Congress considered numerous settle-
28. For a description of the methodology by which HUD carried out this task,
see note 30 infra and text accompanying notes 94-99 infra. See generally Whitman,
Home Transfer Costs: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 62 GEo. L.J. 1311 (1974).
29. 37 Fed. Reg. 13,185, 13,186 (1972) (codified in 24 C.F.R. § 203.27).
30. Id. at 13,186. Separate schedules of maximum charges were proposed for six
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs): Cleveland, Newark, San
Francisco-Oakland, Seattle-Everett, St. Louis, and Washington, D.C. Id. at 13,185,
13,187. The federal government developed the concept of the SMSA in order to enable
all federal agencies to utilize the same boundaries in publishing statistical data con-
cerning metropolitan problems. An SMSA is an integrated economic and social unit
with a recognized large population nucleus; as such, an SMSA may cross state lines.
BuREAu OF THE BUDGET, STANDARD METROPOLITAN STATISTIcAL AREAs VII-VI (1967).
Presently, SMSAs are officially designated by the United States Office of Management
and Budget (OMB). As of June, 1977, there were 281 SMSAs. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRAcT OF THE UNITED STATES app. II, at 923 (1977).
31. For a discussion of the problems of federal regulation of real estate brokers'
commissions, see text accompanying notes 70-91 infra.
32. Docket Nos. R-72-197 & -198, Rules Docket Clerk, Office of General Counsel,
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Room 10256, 451 Seventh Street,
S.W., Washington, D.C. 20410; see Real Estate Settlement Costs: Hearings on H.R.
9989, H.R. 11183, H.R. 11460 and H.R. 12066 Before the Subcomm. on Housing of the
House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 93d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 59 (1973-1974)
[hereinafter cited as 1973-1974 House Hearings] (testimony of Sheldon B.- Lubar,
Assistant Secretary-Commissioner for Housing Production and Mortgage Credit,
HUD).
33. S. 3248, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 712 (1972). See S. REP. No. 647, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 114 (1972).
34. See text accompanying notes 185-88 infra. The term "federally related
mortgage loan" now has become a term of art. It is defined in 12 U.S.C. § 2602(1)
(1976).
35. H.R. 16704, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. Title IX (1972).
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ment cost bills,3 which represented three different approaches to
federal settlement cost regulation: (1) HUD regulation of maximum
charges for settlement services for all federally related mortgages; (2)
payment by mortgage lenders of all settlement costs attributable to
the transfer and financing of the property; and (3) advance disclosure
of settlement costs.37 In 1974, the House and the Senate passed simi-
lar advance disclosure bills, although, as in 1972, they differed as to
whether or not to repeal HUD's authority to set maximum settlement
charges for FHA-insured housing."8 This question had been the sub-
ject of heated floor debate in both houses of Congress." The House
and Senate conferees, after recognizing that HUD was not using its
regulatory authority, agreed to continue that authority for its deter-
rent effect. According to the conferees, nothing in the Act was
"intended to preclude the Secretary's use of Section 701 authority at
any time he finds it necessary to curb abuses in specific market
areas."4 Once this issue was settled, the other differences were ad-
justed easily. The advance disclosure legislation compromise agreed
to by the conferees was concurred in by both houses,4 and on Decem-
ber 22, 1974, President Ford signed the Real Estate Settlement Proce-
dures Act of 1974.42
RESPA, then, was the culmination of five years of congressional
consideration of settlement costs. Its enactment did not, however,
put an end to the controversy over how, if at all, such costs should
be regulated. In fact, the most heated stage of the controversy had
just begun.
The real estate settlement industry's interest centered on three
provisions of RESPA, as originally enacted: (1) section 6, which obli-
36. H.R. 9989, introduced by Congressman Stephens; H.R. 11183, introduced by
Congressman Moakley; H.R. 12066, introduced by Congresswoman Sullivan. See
1973-1974 House Hearings, supra note 32, at 2, 21, 562. S. 2228, introduced by Senator
Brock; S. 2288, introduced by Senator Proxmire; S. 3164, introduced by Senator Brock;
and S. 3232, introduced by Senator Proxmire. See S. REP. No. 866, supra note 2, at 2-
3, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE & AD. NEws 6546, 6547.
37. The three approaches to settlement cost regulation are discussed in Section
V of this Article, pp. 391-422 infra.
38. The House bill, H.R. 9989, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 102(c) (1974), favored
repeal. See H.R. REP. No. 1177, 93d Cong., 2d Sess 4-5 (1974). The Senate bill, S. 3164,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 10(c), similarly favored repeal, but on July 23, 1974, the full
Senate amended the bill by a vote of 55-37 in favor of continuing HUD's authority.
See S. REP. No. 866, supra note 2, at 8, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6546, 6553; 120 CONG. Rac. 24,742 (1974).
39. 120 CONG. REc. 28,260-83 (1974) (House); 120 CONG. RFc. 24,735-42 (1974)
(Senate).
40. H.R. REP. No. 1526, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (conference report), reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 6569, 6569.
41. 120 CONG. REc. 39,129 (1974); 120 CONG. Rac. 38,583 (1974).
42. 10 WEEKLY CoMP. OF PREs. Doc. 1603 (Dec. 30, 1974). See note 50 infra.
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gated a lender agreeing to make a federally related mortgage loan to
disclose in writing, not later than twelve days prior to settlement, the
amount of each charge for settlement services arising in connection
with such settlement;4 3 (2) section 7, which prohibited a lender from
making a commitment for a federally related mortgage loan on cer-
tain nonowner-occupied property unless the lender confirmed that
the "purchase price of the last arm's length transfer of the property"
and the cost of subsequent improvements to it had been disclosed to
the buyer;4" and (3) section 8, which prohibited the giving and accept-
ing of kickbacks and other unearned fees in connection with settle-
ment of federally related mortgage loans.45
Mortgage lenders complained of the heavy paperwork burden
imposed upon them by section 6 and of delays in settlement caused
by the twelve day disclosure period." As to section 7, lenders pointed
out that the timing was wrong. By the time a buyer would be seeking
a loan commitment, he already had signed a sales contract. Any
information that the buyer obtained, after signing the sales contract,
about the previous sales price of the property ordinarily would not
enable him to rescind." Real estate brokers were concerned that sec-
43. Pub. L. No. 93-533, § 6, 88 Stat. 1726-27 (1974) (12 U.S.C. § 2605, repealed
1976).
44. Id. § 7, 88 Stat. 1727 (12 U.S.C. § 2606, repealed 1976).
45. Id. § 8, 88 Stat. 1727-28 (amended 1976) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 2607
(1976)).
46. See, e.g., Hearings on the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974:
Hearings on H.R. 5352, S. 2327 and H.R. 10283 Before the Subcomm. on Housing and
Community Development of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 132-36 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 House Hearings] (testimony of
William S. Mortensen on behalf of the Conference of Federal Savings & Loans); id. at
227-30 (testimony of Edwin Brooks, Jr., on behalf of the U.S. League of Savings
Associations); id. at 284-86 (testimony of William A. Breasman, Jr., on behalf of the
National Association of Mutual Savings Banks); id. at 338-40 (testimony of Herman
Lerdal on behalf of the American Bankers Association). See also Oversight on the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974: Hearings on S. 2327 and S. 2349 Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 74-
80 [hereinafter cited as 1975 Senate Hearings] (reprints of sample letters in opposition
to RESPA received from around the country).
Feelings about advance disclosure ran so high that Senator Proxmire, attending a
Wisconsin-Michigan football game, was met by people parading around chanting
"down with RESPA." Id. at 1. One lender told the story of a RESPA disclosure that
created such hostility between buyer and seller that one of the sellers armed himself
with a gun and left home in a rage to take revenge on the loan manager. In route, he
went out of control and killed a man. 1975 House Hearings, supra, at 133-34.
47. See, e.g., 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 46, at 140 (testimony of James
D. Rowe on behalf of the Mortgage Bankers Association). Rescission may be available,
however, where the difference between the value of the property and the sales price is
so disparate as to give rise to a presumption of fraud in the transaction. See, e.g.,
Ramsey v. Mading, 36 Wash. 2d 303, 315, 217 P.2d 1041, 1048 (1950). See generally
Kannavos v. Annino, 356 Mass. 42, 49-50, 247 N.E.2d 708, 712-13 (1969); Snell v.
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tion 8 could have been construed to make criminal the traditional
practices of broker cooperation through multiple listing services, out-
of-state broker referral services, and the more recent development of
real estate franchises, whereby small real estate offices join together
under a common name, image, or sales format in order to strengthen
their ability to compete.4 8"
The enormous outcry against RESPA led the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs to hold oversight hearings"
after the law had been in effect only three months,"5 and led the
Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development of the
House Committee on Banking, Currency, and Housing to hold simi-
lar hearings about six weeks later.5
Legislative action quickly followed the respective committee
hearings.2 By December, 1975, both the House and the Senate had
Cornehl, 81 N.M. 248, 249-50, 466 P.2d 94,95-96(1970). Generally, such a presumption
would arise only when the disparity is so great as to shock the conscience of the court.
See Vossen v. Wilson, 39 Wash. 2d 906, 909, 239 P.2d 558, 560 (1952).
Furthermore, the "last arm's length transfer of the property" was not always clear.
Since section 7 was a criminal statute, the Department of Justice had the responsibil-
ity for enforcement. HUD had no authority under RESPA to issue regulations under
section 7. Lenders wanted more guidance than the government was willing to provide.
For an illustration of the problems raised by section 7, see 1975 House Hearings, supra
note 46, at 48-60 (testimony of Robert R. Elliott, HUD General Counsel); 1975 Senate
Hearings, supra note 46, at 21-24 (same).
48. 1975 House Hearings, supra note 46, at 252-57; (statement of Art S. Leitch,
President, National Association of Realtors (N.A.R.)); 1975 Senate Hearings, supra
note 46, at 313-18 (same). Since section 8 applied to all providers of settlement ser-
vices, confusion as to what conduct was proscribed criminally was not limited to real
estate brokers. As with section 7, since the Department of Justice had responsibility
for enforcement, HUD had no authority to issue regulations under section 8. See note
47 supra.
49. 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 46, at 1-3.
50. Although RESPA was signed by President Ford on December 22, 1974, it did
not become effective until 180 days thereafter. Pub. L. No. 93-533, § 19, 88 Stat. 1731
(1974). The 180-day period was designed to permit HUD to adopt implementing regu-
lations and to give providers of settlement services time to adopt procedures in com-
pliance with RESPA.
51. 1975 House Hearings, supra note 46, at 1-2.
52. Most of the witnesses at the hearings spoke on behalf of trade associations
that represent various providers of settlement services and testified strongly against
RESPA.
The strongest support for section 6 came from consumer representatives, who
initially had been unenthusiastic about advance disclosure as a means of effectively
reducing settlement costs. They recognized, however, that 12-day advance disclosure
benefitted prospective homebuyers in at least two important ways: (1) it gave them a
sound basis upon which to compare charges for settlement services; and (2) it enabled
them to know how much cash would be required at settlement. These witnesses ex-
pressed the view that the complaints from lending institutions were greatly exagger-
ated and pointed out that delays have always been part of the settlement process.
RESPA, in their view, provided lenders with a convenient scapegoat on which to blame
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passed legislation to amend RESPA. Among the key provisions were:
(1) repeal of sections 6 and 7; (2) replacement of the twelve day
advance disclosure of actual settlement costs requirement of section
6 with the provision that lenders make good faith estimates of likely
settlement charges; and (3) amendment of section 8 to make it in-
applicable to certain cooperative arrangements of real estate brokers
and to give HUD the authority to promulgate regulations concerning
section 8.51
The difference between the House and Senate provisions con-
cerned the required disclosure of actual settlement costs-and this
difference was minimal. The House provided that such information
such delays. These witnesses opposed any cut-back in the modest level of consumer
protection provided by section 6 of RESPA. 1975 House Hearings, supra note 46, at
399-418 (testimony of Kathleen F. O'Reilly on behalf of the Consumer Federation of
America); id. at 374-99 (testimony of Dale A. Whitman, Professor of Law); 1975 Senate
Hearings, supra note 46, at 203-12 (testimony of Benny L. Kass); id. at 212-21 (testi-
mony of Kathleen F. O'Reilly); id. at 231-42 (testimony of Dale A. Whitman).
Section 7's strongest defender was Congresswoman Leonor K. Sullivan. She
argued that section 7 was necessary in order to prevent unscrupulous real estate specu-
lators from buying old homes at very low prices, adding a few cosmetic touches but
making no real repairs or improvements, and selling them to unsophisticated low and
moderate income homebuyers at greatly inflated prices. See H.R. REP. No. 667, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2460-61
(dissenting views of Rep. Leonor K. Sullivan); 121 CONG. REc. 36,916-19 (1975) (re-
marks of Rep. Sullivan); 1975 House Hearings, supra note 46, at 159-62.
Several witnesses pointed out that the defective timing problem of section 7 could
be remedied by making it apply directly to the seller rather than to the lender. See,
e.g., 1975 House Hearings, supra note 46, at 48-60,383-84; 1975 Senate Hearings, supra
note 46, at 21-24. The General Counsel of HUD submitted a revised section 7 that
made this change and, in addition, added further guidance as to the meaning of the
term "last arm's length transfer." 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 46, at 2.-24. In
addition, thdre was some testimony that section 7 was unnecessary because previous
selling price should not be a factor in determining fair market value at time of sale,
and because the abuses to which Congresswoman Sullivan referred were made possible
by corrupt and inefficient FHA practices. 1975 House Hearings, supra note 46, at 160-
61, 249-52; 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 46, at 311-13, 343.
As to section 8, of course no one testified in favor of legalizing kickbacks and
unearned fees. There was, however, considerable testimony as to confusion on the part
of various providers of settlement services as to the precise meaning of section 8. See,
e.g., 1975 House Hearings, supra note 46, at 61-67, 126, 191-93, 253-57, 273-74; 1975
Senate Hearings, supra note 46, at 129, 135-36, 313-18, 331-32.
53. On October 9, 1975, the Senate passed S. 2327, which would have suspended
sections 4, 6, and 7 of RESPA for one year. Section 8 was left intact with the under-
standing that HUD would work to clarify it. 121 CONG. REc. 32,660-61 (1975). Section
4 of RESPA, 12 U.S.C. § 2603 (1976), required the use of a uniform settlement state-
ment for all transactions involving federally related mortgage loans. On November 17,
1975, the House passed an amended version of S. 2327. 121 CONG. REc. 36,937-38
(1975). This is the version described in the text. The Senate considered the House
amendment to S. 2327 on December 8, 1975 and made one significant amendment of
its own. 121 CONG. REc. 39,049-51 (1975). See text accompanying note 54 infra.
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be "made available for inspection by the borrower at or before settle-
ment" 4 and the Senate provided that such information be "made
available for inspection to the borrower. . . at least one business day
prior to settlement . . . -5 Yet, it took the conferees over a week to
resolve this difference. The compromise destroyed the last vestige of
advance disclosure of actual settlement costs. RESPA now provides
that the obligation of the settlement agent to make the information
available prior to settlement is to be triggered by the request of the
borrower, and that the settlement agent's sole obligation is to make
available only the information known to the settlement agent at the
time of disclosure. Even that information is not required to be made
available any sooner than sometime during the business day imme-
diately preceding the settlement."
In the furor over the amendment of RESPA, what seems to have
been forgotten is the original question of how to lower settlement
costs. That question will, however, soon be considered again. RESPA
requires another study and report to the Congress by June, 1980, on
whether there is any necessity for further legislation.57 The history of
federal settlement cost regulations, therefore, is still in the making.
IV. BASIC PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL REGULATION OF
SETTLEMENT COSTS
Two basic problems traditionally have been viewed as impedi-
ments to federal regulation of settlement costs. First, as a legal mat-
ter, it has been assumed that the Constitution does not empower the
federal government to regulate a transaction as uniquely "local" as
the purchase of a home. Second, as a practical matter, it has been
assumed that the large number of services and providers involved in
the settlement process, and the local variations as to which provider
performs which services, would make federal regulation unworkable.
An analysis of these assumed problems, however, reveals that neither
should be an impediment to effective federal regulation of settlement
costs.
A. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL REGULATION
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar 8 established that the purchase of a home is not
simply a local matter. The Goldfarbs entered into a contract to pur-
chase a home in Reston, Fairfax County, Virginia.Their mortgage
54. H.R. 5352, 121 CONG. Rxc. 36,915 (1975).
55. S. 2327 § 3(4), 121 CONG. REc. 39,049 (1975).
56. 12 U.S.C. § 2603(b) (1976).
57. 12 U.S.C. § 2612 (1976).
58. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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lender required them to obtain title insurance, which required a title
examination. In Virginia, only a member of the Virginia State Bar
may provide that settlement service." The Goldfarbs asked 37 Fair-
fax County attorneys what their fee would be for title examination.
Of the twenty attorneys who replied, not one indicated that he would
charge less than one percent of the value of the property, the rate
provided in the minimum fee schedule published by the Fairfax
County Bar Association and enforced by the Virginia Bar Associa-
tion.
After they paid the going rate for their title examination, the
Goldfarbs brought a class action on behalf of themselves and all other
persons who had purchased homes in Reston, Virginia between Feb-
ruary 22, 1968 and February 22, 1972-about 2,000 homeowners in
all. They alleged that the minimum fee schedule, as applied to fees
for legal services relating to residential real estate transactions, con-
stituted price fixing in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act."0
They sought both injunctive relief and damages.
The district court held that there was a sufficient effect on inter-
state commerce to sustain jurisdiction under the Sherman Act be-
cause a significant portion of the funds and insurance involved in the
purchase of homes in Fairfax County came from outside Virginia."
The court of appeals reversed. 2 On the issue of whether the minimum
fee schedule was a restraint of interstate trade and commerce, the
court of appeals held that "where the impact of the disputed trade
practice upon interstate commerce is 'merely incidental to defen-
dants' local activities' no jurisdiction exists under the Sherman
Act."63
The Supreme Court took a much more expansive view of inter-
state commerce. Rather than stressing the technical separability of
the legal srvices from the interstate aspects of the transaction, as the
court of appeals had done, it noted that a court must view an effect
on interstate commerce in a practical sense." When it viewed the
attorneys' title examination in that sense, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that, since lenders require a title examination as a condition
of making a mortgage loan, "a title examination is an integral part
of an interstate transaction."" And, "[g]iven the substantial volume
of commerce involved,"" the Supreme Court held that interstate
59. Id. at 775 n.1.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
61. 355 F. Supp. 491, 494 (E.D. Va. 1973).
62. 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974).
63. Id. at 18.
64. 421 U.S. at 784 n.11.
65. Id. at 784.
66. Id. at 785.
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commerce had been sufficiently affected to sustain jurisdiction under
the Sherman Act."
Since the Sherman Act is based on the power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce,8 the decision in Goldfarb as to the
meaning of interstate commerce for the purpose of sustaining juris-
diction under the Sherman Act is authority for the scope of congres-
sional regulatory power under the commerce clause.6' At the least,
therefore, Congress has the power to legislate with respect to all set-
tlement services required by the lender as a condition of making the
loan. In addition to title examination, whether provided by an attor-
ney or any other participant in the settlement process, such lender-
required services may include any or all of the following: credit re-
ports, appraisals, inspections, abstracts of title, surveys, title insur-
ance, preparation of documents, and conduct of the settlement, ei-
ther in person or by the use of an escrow-in short, all of the settle-
ment services provided after the execution of the contract of sale.
One important settlement service that is not required by the
lender and that takes place prior to the execution of the contract of
sale is the service provided by the real estate broker from the time
he lists the seller's property for sale until the time he brings buyer
and seller together. RESPA, despite the efforts of real estate brokers
to get this wording taken out of the statute, defines settlement serv-
ices to include "services rendered by a real estate agent or broker
."70 Congress has not, however, imposed any affirmative obliga-
67. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. Id. at
793. Following the remand, the Fairfax County Bar Association and the Virginia State
Bar Association settled by agreeing to pay $20,000 and $200,000, respectively, to the
homeowners. These amounts represent about $85 per homeowner, after deduction for
legal fees and expenses. Goldfarb had estimated the overcharge per homeowner at
$200. Washington Post, June 19, 1976, § D, at 1, col. 6.
68. See, e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 743
n.2 (1976); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940); Atlantic Cleaners &
Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932).
69. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
70. 12 U.S.C. § 2602(3) (1976). As initially proposed, RESPA did not include real
estate brokers' services in the definition of settlement services. This language was
added during congressional consideration of the bill. One of the lobbyists for the
National Association of Realtors has admitted that this inclusion caught the realtors
by surprise. By the time they woke up to what had happened, it was too late for their
efforts to be successful. See J. Berry, supra note 4, at 3-4.
Prior to RESPA, there was some doubt as to whether the real estate broker's
commission was to be considered a settlement cost. When, in the Emergency Home
Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, 84 Stat. 450, Congress used the term
""settlement costs," that term did not have a precise meaning. Congress did, however,
indicate that its purpose was to study ways to protect the "unsophisticated [single-
family home] purchaser or seller who is often unfamiliar with the complex details of
transferring real estate title." H.R. REp. No. 1131, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (emphasis
added), reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3488, 3506; S. REP. No. 761,
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tions on the real estate broker in connection with the sale of a home.
At present, real estate brokers are subject only to the antikick-
back provisions of RESPA. 1 Should Congress deem it appropriate to
extend affirmative obligations to real estate brokers in connection
with the sales of residences, there no longer should be any doubt that
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1970).
The HUD-VA report defines two categories of costs, "closing costs" and
"settlement costs." Closing costs include "all charges paid at settlement for obtaining
the mortgage loan and transferring real estate title." HUD-VA REPORT, supra note 8,
at 7, reprinted in 1972 House Hearings, supra note 8, at 743. These costs are for the
following items: title examination, title insurance, attorneys' services, survey, prepa-
ration of documents, settlement, escrow, credit report, loan origination, inspections,
appraisal, recording, state and local transfer taxes, and miscellaneous items such as
disclosure statements, amortization schedules, photographs, and notary fees. Id. at
7-13, 1972 House Hearings at 743-49. "[Ihe term 'settlement costs' is defined as the
sum of closing cost items, loan discount payments (mortgage points), prepaid items,
and sales commissions." Id. at 7, 1972 House Hearings at 743. (emphasis added).
The distinction between closing costs and settlement costs made in the HUD-VA
report was brought specifically to the attention of Congress. As originally introduced
in the Senate, the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1972 used the term "closing
costs." S. 3248, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 712 (1972). In the 1972 Senate hearings before
the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs, HUD Secretary Romney departed
from his prepared statement to
call attention to the fact that in S. 3248, as reported, and in the report you
refer to closing costs. . . .In light of the definition included for closing costs
in our report, we are uncertain as to whether or not the use of the closing
cost term in the bill and in the report is intended to exclude sales commis-
sions, for example, from the regulation that we have proposed.
I raise that very specifically, because one of the questions we had to
decide was whether or not the language in 701(b) did include sales commis-
sions.
We concluded it did, because the language refers to costs affecting both
the buyer and the seller, but I think this point ought to be clear in whatever
action is taken.
That is why I direct your specific attention to it.
Mortgage Settlement Costs: Hearings on Mortgage Settlement Costs Including S. 2775
Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972
Senate Hearings].
After some discussion among Secretary Romney, Senator Sparkman (then Chair-
man of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs) and Senator Proxmire
(present Chairman of that committee) Senator Sparkman said,
I am glad you brought up that point. We will clarify it.
I can't speak for the whole committee, but I should think that for the
most part the members would be in agreement with the suggestions you have
made.
I think that real estate commissions is one of the items that the commit-
tee should consider in connection with closing costs.
1972 Senate Hearings, supra, at 18.
All subsequent bills contained the term "settlement costs" rather than the term
"closing costs."
71. 12 U.S.C. § 2607 (1976).
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it has the power to do so under the commerce clause." Those who
argue that real estate brokers are engaged in a local activity totally
lacking in interstate characteristics contend that the immobility of
land restricts the geographical range of brokers' activities. They note
that brokers are licensed under state law to operate only intrastate
and that a real estate transaction is subject to the law of the situs of
the property.73 These arguments, however, take an unduly restrictive
view of interstate commerce-and of the power of Congress under the
commerce clause.
The Supreme Court has sustained the constitutionality, under
the commerce power, of a variety of federal statutes that affect acts
done wholly" within a single state." The standards used by the Su-
preme Court are whether such acts either (1) are an integral part of
interstate commerce, or (2) substantially affect interstate com-
merce.75 Acts done by real estate brokers in connection with the pur-
chase and sale of single family homes meet both of these require-
ments.
The real estate broker's solicitation of the owner's listing sets the
settlement process in motion. After the property is listed, the real
estate broker may solicit buyers by interstate use of the mail, tele-
phone," and advertisements in newspapers and magazines that are
circulated outside the state. He may also participate in a nationwide
multiple listing or relocation service. During the congressional hear-
72. Yet, even HUD, in a recent report to Congress, expressed such doubt. See
U.S. DEPT. OF HUD, INTERiM REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON SECTION 15 OF THE REAL
ESTATE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT (1976) [hereinafter cited as INTERiM REPORT].
73. See Austin, Real Estate Boards and Multiple Listing Systems as Restraints
of Trade, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1332 (1970).
74. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 784-85 (1975) (attor-
ney's fees); Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 377 (1973)
(truth-in-lending); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1970) (loan sharking);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301-02 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (civil rights); Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S.
111, 124 (1942) (agricultural marketing); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118
(1941) (wage and hour law).
The Supreme Court's only treatment of the issue in the context of real estate
broker's services consists of dictum in the case of United States v. National Ass'n of
Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950), an action to enjoin the Washington Real Estate
Board and its members from fixing commission rates for their services in the District
of Columbia. The Supreme Court opened its discussion of the legal issues involved in
the case with the observation that "[tihe fact that no interstate commerce is involved
is not a barrier to this suit." Id. at 488. The Washington Real Estate Board's actions
were held to violate section 3 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1976), which prohibits
conduct in restraint of trade in the District of Columbia.
75. Id.
76. See Gateway Associates, Inc. v. Essex-Costello, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1089, 1092
(N.D. Ill. 1974); United States v. Atlanta Real Estate Board, 1972 Trade Cas. 73,825
(N.D. Ga. 1971).
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ings on the proposed amendment of RESPA, it was the real estate
brokers themselves who brought to the committees' attention the
interstate nature of many of the cooperative activities of brokers."
The real estate broker's involvement in interstate commerce does
not end when he has found a buyer. Once the contract of sale is
signed, the broker often assists the buyer in obtaining the necessary
financing, the funds for which frequently come from outside the
state." In addition, he may recommend the buyer's attorney, the title
insurance company, the hazard insurance company, and the settle-
ment agent. The real estate broker works closely with these providers
and actually may conduct the settlement. It would be as artificial to
separate the real estate broker's services from the interstate aspects
of the home purchase transaction as it would have been in Goldfarb
to so separate the lawyer's services. 9
Real estate brokers' activities also "substantially affect" inter-
state commerce. Between 1970 and 1974, over 72,000,000 people
moved, nearly 15,000,000 of them across state lines.8" Furthermore, a
person who works in a single metropolitan area may have a choice of
two or more states in which to live. 1 The cooperative activities of real
estate brokers are designed to facilitate the interstate movement of
families by rendering significant assistance in the purchase of a new
home in a different part of the country. The locations at which such
families purchase their homes are, therefore, likely to be affected
substantially by the nature of the available cooperative real estate
brokers' services.
The real estate brokers' activities, after the contract of sale, in
recommending providers of settlement services also have a substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce. A broker's recommendation of a
mortgage lender, for example, has nationwide implications. Not only
may the lender's funds come from outside the state, but, after settle-
ment, the lender may sell the mortgage loan on the secondary market
77. This was done in connection with their successful efforts to have such activi-
ties specifically excluded from the antikickback provision. 1975 House Hearings, supra
note 46, at 252-57 (statement of Art. S. Leitch, President, N.A.R.); 1975 Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 46, at 313-18 (same).
78. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 783 (1975).
79. See id. at 783-85.
80. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MOBnTY OF THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES:
MARCH 1970 TO MARCH 1974, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, POPULATION CHARAcRis-
'ics, SER. P-20, PUS. No. 273, at 68 (1974). As one author aptly noted, "The emergence
of a peripatetic executive class has introduced into the stream of interstate commerce
a home buying and selling force having significant economic impact." Austin, supra
note 73, at 1334.
81. Of the 159 SMSAs with a population of over 200,000, 29 include parts of two
or more states and five include parts of three states. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRAcT OF Tma UNITED STATES, 926-32 (1977). See note 36 supra.
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to a permanent mortgage investor in another part of the country.Y'
The initial placement of a single family mortgage loan, at the recom-
mendation of the real estate broker, may, therefore, determine
whether such a mortgage loan subsequently is sold in interstate com-
merce, as well as where it is sold. The broker's recommendation of a
title insurance company may also affect interstate commerce. Many
title insurers are engaged in business in more than one state.3 In a
given community, the real estate broker's power to recommend such
interstate title insurers is likely to have an impact on whether title
insurance goes to a local or national title insurance company.
In cases involving price fixing by establishing minimum fee
schedules, several district courts have agreed that the activities of
real estate brokers affect, and are an integral part of, interstate com-
merce. 4 In three cases involving denial of membership in local boards
82. The secondary market refers to the various systems by which a mortgage loan
changes ownership. Mortgage lenders sell mortgage loans originated by them in order
to obtain funds with which to originate new mortgage loans. Purchasers of mortgages
on the secondary market may be private investors, such as other lending institutions,
insurance companies or pension funds; federally chartered corporations, such as the
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae or FNMA) and the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac or FHLMC); or a governmental entity such
as the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginne Mae or GNMA). Billions
of dollars worth of conventional single family mortgages have been sold on the second-
ary market since 1970. For a description of the operation of the secondary market, see
Wiggin, Doing Business in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 5 REAL EST. REV. 84
(1975). See generally text at pp. 414-21 infra.
83. See E. ROBERTS, F. HOLAHAN, W. PAINTER & D. GiLNNELLA, PUBLIC REGULA-
TION OF TITLE INSURANCE COMPANIES AND ABSTRACTORS 3 (1961).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Jack Foley Realty, Inc., [1977] 2 Trade Cas.
61,678 (D. Md. 1977); Oglesby & Barcliff, Inc. v. Metro MLS, Inc., [1976] 2 Trade
Cas. 61,064 (E.D. Va. 1976); Mazur v. Behrens, [1974] 1 Trade Cas. 75,070 (N.D.
Ill. 1972); United States v. Atlanta Real Estate Bd., [1972] Trade Cas. 73,825 (N.D.
Ga. 1971).
Jack Foley Realty, Inc. was a criminal antitrust case in which the government
alleged that six real estate companies and three individuals conspired to fix, raise, and
maintain commission rates for sales of residential property in Montgomery County,
Maryland. Defendants attempted to distinguish Goldfarb on the ground that their real
estate activities were not necessary, essential, or inseparable components of any inter-
state transactions. In rejecting this argument, the court reasoned that, even if "no
single part of the defendants' real estate business had a sufficient nexus to cause their
activities to fall under the Sherman Act," the aggregate effect of their business did.
[1977] 2 Trade Cas. at 72,790. Since the defendants were located in a large metro-
politan area, dealt with buyers and sellers moving into and out of the state, arranged
financing with out-of-state lending agencies, used a multistate referral service, and
advertised in publications with interstate circulation, there was a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. Id.
In Oglesby, the plaintiff, a Virginia real estate broker, alleged that the defendant
corporation, a multiple listing service, had combined and continuously engaged in an
unlawful conspiracy to fix commission fees and otherwise restrain competition in viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The court, using the following analysis and relying
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of realtors, the Eighth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals appear
to have held to the contrary, but these cases are distinguishable. In
Diversified Brokerage Services, Inc. v. Greater Des Moines Realtors,"
the only evidence introduced by the plaintiffs in support of the inter-
state character of defendant's business was that five out-of-state per-
sons had been parties to real estate transactions in the community.
The court held that this evidence, without more, was insufficient to
establish jurisdiction under the Sherman Act.8
on Goldfarb, found the defendant's business to involve interstate commerce and to
have a substantial effect on it:
The business of Metro MLS, Inc. and its brokers-members clearly in-
volved interstate commerce in that 25 to 30 percent of the financing obtained
by buyers to consummate sales were insured under the VA or FHA federal
programs; that the funds available for mortgage loans, insured or otherwise,
came in significant amounts from sources outside the State of Virginia; that
the members of Metro MLS, Inc. advertised in media circulated widely
beyond the limits of the State of Virginia... ; that many of the members
of Metro MLS, Inc. belonged to national referral organizations located out-
side of the State of Virginia and which affected MLS sales to a significant
degree; that a substantial number of the real estate purchasers dealing with
MLS, estimated to be between 20-25 percent, were members of the armed
services moving into Virginia from out of state and purchasing homes here,
or conversely, selling as they moved from military bases in this area to other
bases outside the State of Virginia.
[1976] 2 Trade Cas. at 69,797.
In Mazur, the plaintiffs, real estate sellers, filed a class action alleging antitrust
violations by the defendant real estate brokers and two of their associations. On the
defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint, grounded in part on the plaintiffs'
alleged failure to set forth facts sufficient to afford a basis for federal jurisdiction under
section 1 of the Sherman Act, the court noted that many of the defendants advertised
and solicited buyers and sellers from outside the state. Therefore, some of the defen-
dants represented out-of-state buyers or sellers in a substantial percentage of their
transactions. Therefore, the court concluded, those defendants had voluntarily entered
interstate commerce and were "clearly engaged in interstate commerce," [1974] 1
Trade Cas. at 96,788. On the issue of whether or not the brokers' activities substan-
tially burdened or affected interstate commerce so as to be brought within the purview
of the Sherman Act, the court stated that
it is almost self-evident that the increase of a real estate commission from
6% to 7% (a 16% increase) necessarily burdens the movement of persons and
their effects from state to state. This will also affect the transaction of inter-
state mortgage loans and insurance. It is not essential that an effect on
interstate commerce be alleged or proved, however, since defendants are
clearly engaged in interstate commerce.
[1974] 1 Trade Cas. at 96,788.
85. 521 F.2d 1343 (8th Cir. 1975).
86. The plaintiffs conceded that they had "made no effort to present evidence
that defendants' intrastate activities substantially affect[ed] interstate commerce
and therefore [came] within the purview of the Sherman Act even though they
[were] not interstate in character." 521 F. 2d at 1345 (citations omitted) (emphasis
in original).
Since plaintiffs neither produced any evidence to establish the interstate character
of the brokerage services nor offered any proof of further details concerning any trans-
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In J.P. Bryan v. Stillwater Board of Realtors7 and Income Realty
& Mortgage, Inc. v. Denver Board of Realtors," the court did not
focus on the question of whether the real estate brokerage business,
as engaged in by either the plaintiffs or the defendants, wag an inte-
gral part of interstate commerce or affected interstate commerce.
Instead, the court examined the activities of the respective real estate
boards and their members in excluding the plaintiffs from member-
ship and held that the activities complained of were entirely local in
character and did not affect interstate commerce.8 The Bryan deci-
sion distinguished Goldfarb on the ground that Goldfarb involved a
price fixing conspiracy, which, the court said, violates the Sherman
Act whether the activity is interstate or intrastate in character.? The
court conceded that the plaintiffs' business was engaged in interstate
commerce."
None of these cases, therefore, raises any significant constitu-
tional argument, based on the commerce clause, against federal regu-
lation of real estate brokers.
actions in which the five out-of-state persons participated, the court considered its task
to be limited to a determination of whether the movement of five individuals from one
state to another in order to utilize particular services placed those services in inter-
state commerce within the meaning of the Sherman Act. The court referred to Gold-
farb but held that even an expansive reading of the principles of that case would be
insufficient to establish jurisdiction. Realizing, however, that their conclusion might
appear at odds with that of the Supreme Court, the court painstakingly explained:
In the instant case, the plaintiffs offered no evidence such as that in
Goldfarb that a "significant portion" (or indeed any) of the funds underlying
these real estate transactions came from outside [the state]. Whereas in
Goldfarb the federal government had guaranteed many of the loans made in
Virginia, the plaintiffs in this case produced no evidence showing any guar-
antee of these loans by an out-of-state agency. Furthermore, plaintiffs intro-
duced no evidence of any other interstate commercial aspect to these trans-
actions such as interstate advertising.
We emphasize the limited nature of our holding. Services affecting real
estate, such as brokerage services, may, depending upon the evidence pre-
sented, either constitute interstate activities or have no nexus with interstate
commerce .... In the instant case, plaintiffs presented extremely limited
evidence and failed to show any interstate character to these real estate
transactions. Additionally, plaintiffs chose not to attempt to show that the
intrastate activities of defendants placed any substantial burden on inter-
state commerce.
Id. at 1346-47 (emphasis in second paragraph added).
87. 578 F.2d 1319 (10th Cir. 1977).
88. 578 F.2d 1326 (10th Cir. 1978).
89. 578 F.2d 1326, 1329; 578 F.2d 1319, 1325-26.
90. 578 F.2d 1319, 1324.
91. Id. at 1326.
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B. THE PRACTICALITY OF FEDERAL REGULATION
Legislation concerning the real estate broker's role in listing
property for sale and locating prospective purchasers could be in
terms of direct regulation of the real estate brokers. Since they are
the only providers of such finding services throughout the United
States, local variation would not render such regulation unworkable.
With regard to other settlement services, however, the local vari-
ations as to who performs the services would make regulation of spe-
cific providers impracticable. Since the function of the various settle-
ment services does not vary significantly from place to place,9" in-
stead of framing the issue in terms of whether it should regulate
specific providers, Congress could examine the settlement process to
determine whether it should regulate specific settlement functions.
For example, the term "title assurance" can refer both to an
attorney's written opinion to the lender and the buyer, and to a policy
of title insurance issued by a title insurance company. In an examina-
tion of the settlement process with a view to legislation, Congress
could focus on the function of title assurance in a real estate transac-
tion, rather than on the question of whether it should regulate at-
torneys or title insurance companies. Such a functional approach
would be a practical means of isolating problems in the settlement
process that are capable of federal resolution, while preserving local
customs.
V. THEORIES OF FEDERAL REGULATION OF
SETTLEMENT COSTS
There are three basic theories of federal regulation of settlement
costs:
(1) federal establishment of maximum settlement charges
for settlement services;
(2) federal requirement that the lender pay all settlement
costs attributable to the transfer and financing of the prop-
erty; arid
(3) federal requirement of advance disclosure of settlement
costs.
RESPA follows the third approach but does not foreclose future
congressional reliance on either of the first two theories." This section
analyzes each of the three theories and concludes that the concept of
advance disclosure, although not the manner in which the concept is
carried out by RESPA, represents the best balance among the com-
92. See text accompanying notes 12-16 supra.
93. RESPA itself provides for continued investigation by HUD into the need for
new legislation regulating settlement costs. See 12 U.S.C. § 2612 (1976).
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peting considerations of benefits to homebuyers and burdens imposed
upon other participants in the settlement process.
A. FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT OF MAXIMUM CHARGES FOR SETTLEMENT
SERVICES
Congressional legislation embodying the theory of federal estab-
lishment of maximum charges for settlement services probably would
authorize and direct HUD to establish the maximum charges. When,
in 1972, HUD proposed to exercise its authority to establish maxi-
mum settlement charges with respect to FHA insured loans," its
effort revealed that there are serious difficulties inherent in a rate-
making approach to settlement costs." For the most part, these diffi-
culties stem from the fragmented nature of the providers of settle-
ment services and the local variations in the services furnished by
each provider. This fragmentation and variation gives rise to the
major problems of devising a formula with which to establish maxi-
mum charges under such market conditions, establishing an efficient
means to collect and assemble cost data, and delineating geographic
market areas to be used in setting maximum charges for specific
services.
The difficulty of devising a formula with which to establish max-
imum charges arises from the differences between the settlement
service industry and other industries that are subject to rate regula-
tion. One important difference is that whereas there is little variation
in the manner in which regulated industries operate throughout the
geographic jurisdiction of the agencies that regulate them, the struc-
ture of the settlement service industry and the specific breakdown of
the contents of the settlement service package vary substantially,
according to custom, among geographic areas that often bear no rela-
tion to convenient regulatory boundaries.
Furthermore, many regulated industries are monopolistic, such
as public utilities, or have high barriers to entry. Most often, such
industries are capital intensive. The settlement service industry, by
contrast, is composed of many different kinds of providers of settle-
ment services. None of the markets for these services is monopolistic,
nor are there high barriers to entry. Since most of the industry is
94. 12 U.S.C. § 1710 note, at 305 (1976).
95. Several problems HUD encountered were attributable to the language of
section 701 of the Emergency Home Finance Act. For instance, two important groups
of providers of settlement services, real estate brokers and title insurance companies,
contended that the language of the statute did not authorize maximums to be imposed
on their charges. The real estate brokers argued that they were not covered because
their commission was not a "settlement cost." See Memorandum Brief of the National
Association of Real Estate Boards (April 24, 1972) (on file with the Minnesota Law
Review). HUD, which originally considered real estate brokers to be covered, withdrew
from its position.
[Vol. 63:367
RESPA
service oriented, it is labor intensive. Rate regulation of capital inten-
sive industries ordinarily seeks to establish a reasonable rate of return
on invested capital." This objective would have little, if any, rele-
vance to an attempt to establish maximum rates for settlement
charges in the labor intensive settlement service industry.
Even if a formula could be devised with which to establish the
maximum settlement charge for each settlement service, any such
formula would require actual cost data for its results to be realistic."
It would be necessary to have a substantial bureaucracy in order to
identify, collect, and assemble all of the kinds of actual cost data
that would be needed.
Title insurers argued that they were not covered because section 701 did not
specifically refer to insurance. Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-
1012 (1976), Congress declared the policy that the regulation of insurance is to be left
to the states and that no act of Congress shall preempt state regulation unless it
"specifically relates to the business of insurance." 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976). See
A Memorandum on Behalf of the America Land Title Association 14-15 (Oct. 15, 1972)
(on file with the Minnesota Law Review). HUD recognized that its attempt to regulate
title insurance rates immediately would become mired in litigation, with no benefit to
consumers in the interim. See Memorandum from Eugene A. Gullege, Assistant Secre-
tary for Housing Production and Mortgage Credit-Federal Housing Commissioner, to
George Romney, Secretary of HUD (Jan. 19, 1973) (on file with the Minnesota Law
Review).
A further concern for HUD was the limitation of its power under section 701 to
setting cost limits only with respect to FHA-insured mortgage loans. HUD feared that
imposition of limits on FHA loans would only accelerate the shift of lenders and
builders away from FHA and toward conventional (non FHA-VA) financing, with
resultant loss of consumer protection and possible higher financing costs. Id. See also
Whitman, supra note 28, at 1311, 1320. These concerns, coupled with adverse public
and congressional reaction, caused HUD to abandon its effort. See notes 28-35 supra
and accompanying text.
96. See generally Whitman, supra note 28, at 1324 n.65.
97. HUD's attempt to establish maximum settlement charges illustrates the
difficulties involved when the regulatory agency lacks actual cost data about the regu-
lated industry. Professor Dale Whitman, who participated extensively in HUD's 1972
rate-making proposal, has analyzed HUD's effort in light of traditional rate making.
Whitman, supra note 28, at 1315-16, 1323-29. HUD took as its starting point the prices
actually paid by consumers for settlement services. It developed an econometric model
that attempted first to compare the general costs of doing business in areas of the
country in which settlement charges were high with the general costs of doing business
in areas of the country in which settlement charges were low. Then, based on this
comparison, HUD attempted to establish "reasonable" charges for settlement services
for areas of the country in which settlement charges were high. The model was seriously
and justifiably criticized for taking insufficient account of all relevant differences
between the areas in which charges were low and the areas for which maximums were
proposed because charges were found to be unreasonably high. For example, although
the model did contain a factor for wage rates in the various state real estate and
insurance industries generally, it did not consider specific wage rate data from the title
insurance industry. Nor did the model contain factors such as different costs of renting
commercial space or differences in promotional expenses, as to which there might well
be wide variation.
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An agency that had all of the relevant cost data still would face
the formidable task of establishing appropriate geographic bounda-
ries for settlement services areas within which rates for specific ser-
vices should apply. The initial burden of establishing the s6ttlement
services areas would be great because settlement services customs do
not respect the boundaries of convenient political subdivisions. Al-
though a statewide settlement services area may be appropriate in
some states, there are other states in which settlement customs differ
among Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) or among
other political subdivisions within the state. 8 An SMSA composed
of two or more states, such as the Washington, D.C., SMSA-which
includes several counties in Maryland and Virginia-would create
additional problems. Furthermore, it is not reasonable to assume that
just because one settlement services package is customary within a
settlement services area, however defined, the rate fixed for each
service within the package should be uniform throughout the area.
For example, the cost of searching title might well vary from county
to county within a single settlement services area, depending on the
condition of the county's land records. It would be unfair to an
otherwise efficient title search provider (whether an attorney, title
insurance company, or abstracting company) who searches titles
only in a county that has an inefficient recordkeeping system if the
maximum charge for title search is based on actual costs of a title
search in other, better organized, counties in the settlement ser-
vices area. 9
A federal bureaucracy is unlikely to be able to engage success-
fully in the kind of "fine-tuning" that establishment of maximum
charges for specific settlement services would require in order to pro-
tect homebuyers while, at the same time, being fair to providers.
Consequently, Congress should reject the theory of federal estab-
lishment of maximum settlement charges for settlement services.
B. FEDERAL REQUIREMENT THAT LENDER PAY ALL SErrLEMENT COSTS
ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE TRANSFER AND FINANCING OF THE PROPERTY
Senator William Proxmire and Professor Dale Whitman are the
principal proponents of federal legislation that would require the
mortgage lender to pay all settlement costs attributable to the trans-
fer of title and the financing of single family homes. 10 Professor Whit-
98. See generally notes 30, 81 supra.
99. It might be argued, however, that such a limitation on charges would cause
title search providers in that county to bring pressure to bearfor reform of that county's
recordkeeping system.
100. Prior to the enactment of RESPA, Senator Proxmire, Chairman of the Sen-
ate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, introduced legislation em-
bodying this concept. S. 3232, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); see 120 CONG. REC. 8091
(1974) (introductory comments by Sen. Proxmire). See also Whitman, supra note 28,
at 1346-59.
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man states the essential elements of the "lender pay" proposal in the
following paragraphs:
(1) Mortgage lenders would be required by federal law to pay all
costs, both those attributable to the transfer of the property and
those related to financing.
(2) Mortgage lenders would be required to provide for home buyers
title and settlement services equivalent in quality to those services
obtained by lenders for their own benefit, and in all events meeting
federally-prescribed quality standards.
(3) Mortgage lenders would not be permitted to charge to home
buyers or sellers any fees, discounts, or other charges except simple
interest. All loans would be required by law to be made "at par"
from the borrower's viewpoint; the full face amount of the loan
would be disbursed to the borrower to be applied toward the pur-
chase of the property. 10
The key to lender pay is the mutual interdependence of para-
graphs (1) and (3)-paragraph (1) would require that lenders absorb
or pay all the costs and paragraph (3) would prohibit lenders from
collecting front-end fees and charges of any kind to compensate
themselves for these costs.
Under paragraph (1), the costs that mortgage lenders would have
to absorb or pay include all of their own expenses of loan origination
plus the charges for settlement services required by the lender as
conditions to making the mortgage loan, such as title search and
assurance, survey and other inspection of boundaries, appraisal or
other estimations of value, certification or inspection of the condition
of structures, preparation of loan and title documents, provision of
government or private mortgage insurance, and conduct of settle-
ment.' The costs of many of these lender required settlement ser-
vices now are paid by homebuyers directly to the providers of the
various services. In order to understand fully the significance of
lender pay, however, it is necessary to consider those settlement ser-
vice costs that the homebuyer now pays only indirectly, through the
lender.
Some of the services for which costs are covered by paragraph
(1)-particularly those relating to loan origination, such as taking an
application and checking credit-ordinarily are performed by em-
ployees of the lender. Others of these services, such as appraising
the property, preparing loan and mortgage documents, and conduct-
ing the settlement, may be performed either by employees of the
lender or by third party providers of settlement services, depending
on the custom in the area or the lender's method of doing business.
Many lenders now impose a variety of fees and charges that are
101. Whitman, supra note 28, at 1346.
102. Id. at 1359.
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intended as compensation for the services of their own employees
in originating a mortgage loan and placing it on the books, and for
settlement services that are performed in-house rather than by
third party providers.'1 Some lenders make no such charges while
others collect separately for such things as applications, credit re-
ports, appraisals, inspections, photographs, amortization schedules,
preparation of documents, notarizations, handling escrows, and con-
ducting settlements. Until specifically prohibited by RESPA,0 4
some lenders charged a separate fee for preparation of the truth-in-
lending statement. ' Many lenders charge an origination fee in addi-
tion to, or in lieu of, the above described specific charges. This fee,
which is in the nature of a charge for general overhead, is fixed as a
percentage of the loan amount, usually between one and two percent.
Paragraph (3) would prohibit mortgage lenders from charging all of
the above described fees for lender overhead and for services per-
formed for the lender by third party providers.
Paragraph (3) also would prohibit mortgage lenders from charg-
ing loan discount points, which are nothing more than a means by
which the lender increases its rate of return on a mortgage loan. 16 On
conventional home mortgage loans, discount points are paid by the
buyer-borrower. In the case of FHA-VA loans, however, regulations
prohibit the lender from charging the borrower any points in excess
of a one point origination fee."0 7 The situation is complicated by the
maximum interest rates established by the federal government on
FHA and VA loans," 8 which ordinarily are below the market inter-
est rate on conventional home loans. Since lenders will not lend at
interest rates below the market, and since they cannot collect loan
discount points from FHA-VA borrowers, they collect such points
from sellers. The seller generally attempts to recoup these points
paid on the borrower's loan by increasing the sales price of the prop-
erty if the sale is with FHA-VA financing. Professor Whitman's
lender pay proposal apparently would not prohibit lenders from col-
103. Id. at 1340-46.
104. 12 U.S.C. § 2610 (1976).
105. See HUD-VA REPORT, supra note 8, at 13, 72, reprinted in 1972 House
Hearings, supra note 8, at 749, 806.
106. A point is equal to one percent of the principal amount of the loan. Under
the rule of thumb generally used by mortgage lenders, each point of discount collected
in advance is the equivalent of an additional one-eighth of one percent interest over
the life of the loan. See MORTGAGE INTEREST CoMMssION REPORT, supra note 20, at 28.
This rule of thumb applies to mortgages on single family residences on which the
interest rate is between seven and nine percent and for which the term is 25 to 30 years.
It is based on the experience of mortgage lenders that such loans are paid in full at
the end of twelve years.
107. 24 C.F.R. § 203.27(a)(2)(i) (1978) (FHA); 38 C.F.R. § 36.4312(d)(2) (1977)
(VA).
108. 24 C.F.R. § 203.20(a) (1978) (FHA); 38 C.F.R. § 36.4311 (1977) (VA).
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lecting discount points from the seller, since he recognizes that his
proposal might exacerbate the existing problem of distortions in
the residential mortgage market caused by this practice.'" Professor
109. Whitman, supra note 28, at 1350-51. It is not entirely clear from Professor
Whitman's proposal whether mortgage lenders would be prohibited from collecting
loan discount points from the seller as well as from the buyer. Section 3 of his proposed
statute provides that "no lender who makes a federally-related mortgage loan shall
impose upon the borrower any fees or 'points' at the time or as a condition of the
making of the loan, or any charge for settlement services or any other services related
to the origination of the loan." Id. at 1360 (emphasis added). His summary of the
elements of his proposal states that "mortgage lenders would not be permitted to
charge to home buyers or sellers any fees, discounts, or other charges except simple
interest." Id. at 1346 (emphasis added).
If, under lender pay, mortgage lenders are not prohibited from collecting loan
discount points from sellers, the distortion now existing in the FHA-VA mortgage
market is likely to be aggravated with respect to that market and to be carried over
into the conventional market as well.
In the FHA-VA mortgage market there is a distortion because the maximum
allowable interest rate ordinarily is below the market interest rate on conventional
home loans, and because the lender may not charge the borrower any points in excess
of a one point origination fee. In order for a lender on an FHA-VA loan to bring its
yield up to the market interest rate for conventional loans, it collects loan discount
points from the seller of the home. Discounts of ten to twelve points or more are not
uncommon. Obviously, a seller who must pay such points in order for his buyer to
obtain financing does not absorb them; he adds them td the price of the house. Sellers
often list two asking prices, a lower price if the buyer obtains conventional financing
and a higher price if the buyer relies upon FHA-VA financing. The FHA-VA buyer does
not pay the higher price as part of his downpayment; the lender's appraisal, which
takes account of the purchase price, is stretched to accommodate the loan discount
points included in the price within the "value" of the property upon which the loan-
to-value ratio is based. Guttentag, Changes in the Structure of the Residential Mort-
gage Market: Analysis and Proposals, in 4 1. FRIEND, STUDY OF TH SAVINGS AND LOA
INDUSTaY 1497, 1497-1501 (1969). Thus, the FHA-VA mortgage is distorted in two ways:
(1) the mortgage interest rate is artifically low in relation to the market interest rate,
and (2) the principal amount of the mortgage is artificially high in relation to the value
of the property. If the lender already is lending at the maximum allowable FHA-VA
mortgage interest, then in order for the lender to maintain the same rate of return
under lender pay it would have to collect an additional two points from the seller. This
would further distort the interest rate and principal amount of the borrower's mortgage
loan.
In the conventional mortgage market, loan discount points ordinarily are paid by
the homebuyer-borrower and the distortion is of another kind. If the lender calculates
its yield and establishes its discount rate based on the assumption that the loan will
be prepaid in full after twelve years, a borrower who prepays his mortgage loan prior
to the end of twelve years will have paid the equivalent of interest at a rate above the
market rate, when the loan discount points are added to the interest paid as part of
his monthly installments. Lender pay would eliminate this distortion but, in order
for the lender to maintain the same rate of return, it would have to either indrease the
interest rate paid by the borrower or collect loan discount poli'ts from the seller. An
attractive alternative for the lender would be to collect such points from the seller
because this would preserve for the lender all of the benefits of front-end fees and
interest collected in advance. Therefore, unless lender pay prohibited lenders from
collecting fees and loan discount points from sellers, the distortions in the borrower's
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Whitman does, however, favor both the elimination of the FHA-VA
interest rate ceilings and the prohibition of all discounts."'
If all loan discount points were prohibited, no matter by whom
they were paid, lender pay would have a two-pronged effect on mort-
gage lenders: (1) it would increase their initial costs of loan origina-
tion by the amounts they would be required to absorb or to pay for
settlement services performed by third party providers, including
amounts for items now paid by homebuyers directly to such pro-
viders, and (2) it would reduce to zero the amount attributable to
loan origination and settlement costs that they could collect at the
time of making the loan. The only means by which lenders could be
compensated for such costs required to be absorbed or paid by them
would be by interest collected over the life of the loan. It is inevitable
that lender pay would cause long-term mortgage interest rates to
rise. Professor Whitman estimates that the increase would be from
one-quarter to three-eighths of one percent.",
1. The Advantages and Disadvantages of Lender Pay: Professor
Whitman's View
Professor Whitman's lender pay proposal deserves careful analy-
sis and evaluation, since the consumer advantages he claims for it are
appealing and his approach has the support of Senator William
Proxmire, who chairs the Senate committee responsible for settle-
ment cost legislation.' The following summary of the advantages
and disadvantages Professor Whitman sees in the proposal provides
a convenient frame of reference for this analysis and evaluation.
Professor Whitman's vigorous promotion of lender pay is based
on his belief that two major benefits would accrue to home buyers:
(1) the opportunities for homeownership would be increased, and (2)
interest rate and mortgage amount now existing in the FHA-VA mortgage market
'would be carried over into the conventional market. That is, to the extent that the
seller has to pay loan discount points on the borrower's mortgage loan to reflect
mortgage origination and settlement costs that the lender was unable to pass through
directly to the borrower, the amount of such points would be included in the price of
the house, in the appraisal, and, ultimately, in the amount of the buyer's mortgage
loan.
110. Whitman, supra note 28, at 1350-51.
111. Id. at 1349, 1352; 1975 House Hearings, supra note 46, at 377. Professor
Whitman arrived at this estimate by assuming that the aggregate of charges paid by
the lender would amount to two percent of the mortgage loan. Whitman, supra note
28, at 1349. Under the usual rule of thumb, then, the lender would have to increase
the interest rate by one-quarter of one percent in order to recoup this amount over
the life of the loan. See note 106 supra. The two percent figure is likely to vary de-
pending on customs in the locality and on the extent to which lenders can achieve
reductions in the settlement costs payable by them.
112. See note 100 supra.
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the total cost of homeownership would be reduced."3
Opportunities for homeownership would be increased, Professor
Whitman says, because the initial cost of acquiring a home would be
reduced by an amount approximately equal to the loan origination
and settlement costs required to be paid or absorbed at the outset by
mortgage lenders. Such a reduction would benefit those who other-
wise would be unable to purchase a home because they do not have
sufficient cash to pay loan origination and settlement costs in addi-
tion to the required downpayment, although they do have sufficient
earnings to make the montlily payments on a mortgage loan at a rate
of interest fixed to compensate the lender for such costs.
The total cost of homeownership would be reduced, according to
Professor Whitman, because lenders would use their powers to reduce
the cost of settlement services and would pass their savings on to
home mortgage borrowers. Lenders would, he thinks, reduce settle-
ment costs in several ways. Because lenders are in a position to
bargain more effectively than homebuyers, they would obtain lower
prices from settlement services providers. Lenders would realize fur-
ther savings, Professor Whitman predicts, by making increased use
of their own employees to perform settlement services now performed
by third party providers."' In addition, if lenders could not pass
the cost of settlement services directly through to homebuyers, they
would, he suggests, be likely to eliminate unnecessary services or
services of a higher quality than necessary. 15 He expects still more
cost savings and increased efficiency as lenders press for reforms in
land title recording systems.
Lenders would pass these settlement cost savings to homebuyers,
in Professor Whitman's view, in order to compete with each other to
make home mortgage loans. Since collection of all front-end dis-
counts, fees, and charges would be prohibited, any price competition
by lenders would be through interest rates charged to homebuyers,
which rates would reflect the settlement cost savings. Therefore, Pro-
fessor Whitman concludes, although interest rates would rise slightly
to reflect the costs paid by lenders, such an increase, when paid by
113. Whitman, supra note 28, at 1346-49, 1351, 1356, 1357.
114. For example, lenders could hire staff attorneys, rather than outside counsel,
to prepare mortgage documents and search titles. In some states, still further savings
might be realized by permitting lay employees of the lender to prepare documents,
although in some states such action would be considered the unauthorized practice of
law. Compare State v. Pledger, 257 N.C. 634, 127 S.E.2d 337 (1962) (no unauthori-
zed practice), with Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Central Ky. Enterprises, 503 S.W.2d
483 (Ky. 1972) (held unauthorized practice).
115. For example, a lender might not require a title search beyond the previous
transaction if title had been searched and some form of title assurance obtained on
such transaction; or a lender might not require a new survey when a visual inspection
would suffice.
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the homebuyer over the life of the loan, would be less than the settle-
ment costs now required to be paid in advance.
Professor Whitman sees some lesser benefits to lender pay, as
well. Homebuyers would be saved the inconvenience of shopping for
providers of settlement services,"' and they might be more likely
to retain independent counsel if their other front-end costs were re-
duced."7 As an extra sweetener, homebuyers would be able to deduct
for federal income tax purposes settlement costs and fees and charges
for lender services paid in the form of interest, whereas such sums are
not deductible if paid directly."'
Professor Whitman discusses two objections to lender pay: (1)
conflict with state usury laws,"' and (2) inequity between short-term
and long-term borrowers.2 0 The first he regards as something of a
blessing in disguise; the second he dismisses as insubstantial.
Conflict with state usury laws would occur because of the one-
fourth of one percent to three-eighths of one percent increase in long-
term interest rates necessary for lenders to recover the costs imposed
by lender pay. Professor Whitman regards usury laws as not in the
best interests of prospective mortgage borrowers because such laws
make mortgage credit unavailable as funds are diverted elsewhere
during periods of high interest rates.'' He therefore welcomes the
pressure for changes in the usury laws that lender pay would create.
The short-term and long-term borrowers between whom lender
pay would create inequity are those who pay off their mortgage loans
early in the life of the loan, ordinarily upon the sale of the home, and
those who do not pay in full until the loans are close to or at maturity.
Since the short-term borrowers would prepay their loans before the
lender recovered its loan origination and settlement costs through the
increased interest, they would, in effect, be subsidized by the long
term borrowers who would pay the increment of mortgage interest
over a longer period of time. Professor Whitman notes that prepay-
ment penalties could alleviate this problem, but that such penalties
currently are in disfavor. He considers this inequity to be outweighed
by the social utility of reducing front-end costs.
2. The Advantages of Lender Pay: A Closer Look
Lender pay would have far reaching application and effects. It
would impose a uniform, nationwide rule on an industry in which
116. Whitman, supra note 28, at 1349.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1349 n.161, 1350.
119. Id. at 1352-53.
120. Id. at 1353-54.
121. Id. at 1352 n.171.
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local customs historically have played an important role. This rule
could precipitate substantial structural changes in the home mort-
gage lending market, both at the primary and secondary levels, and
in the various markets for settlement services. Such changes might
be justified if lender pay would, in fact, increase the opportunities for
and reduce the costs of homeownership. There are, however, at least
two substantial reasons to believe that opportunities for, and costs of,
homeownership would remain unchanged. First, lenders would be
likely to require larger downpayments in order to offset the increased
risks to which they otherwise would be exposed. Second, costs of
homeownership would be reduced only if lenders actually would com-
pete to make loans by offering lower interest rates to homebuyers.
Given the nature of the mortgage money market, however, price com-
petition among lenders cannot be counted on to reduce consumer
costs.
The homebuyer and the mortgage lender in effect are co-
investors in the homebuyer's property, with the mortgage lender's
investment by far the greater of the two. The amount of downpay-
ment required of the borrower as his investment is determined by the
loan-to-value ratio at which the mortgage lender is willing to lend.
The loan-to-value ratio is the relationship between the amount of the
mortgage loan and the purchase price or value of the property, ex-
pressed as a percentage." For any mortgage loan, the loan-to-value
ratio depends upon the regulatory constraints to which the mortgage
lender is subject '" and upon the mortgage lender's assessment of the
risks of the borrower's credit and the security value of the property.
As the loan-to-value ratio increases and the size of the downpayment
correspondingly decreases, the lender's risks increase in two ways: (1)
a higher loan-to-value ratio means higher monthly payments,l2
which would increase the possibility that the mortgage loan might go
into default; and (2) a smaller downpayment means that a small drop
in the value of the property could eliminate the owner's equity and
leave the lender with a secured property that, upon foreclosure and
sale, would bring less than the unpaid balance of the mortgage loan.
Lender pay, by requiring that mortgage lenders initially absorb
all loan origination and mortgage settlement costs, would further
122. This percentage will vary, of course, depending on which definition of the
term "value" is used, for example, appraised value, cost, or replacement value. Se
C. HAR, FEDERAL CREDIT AND PRIVATE HOUSING 60 (1960).
123. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 371(a)(1) (1976) (national banks); 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-
1(a) (1978) (federal savings and loan); CAL. FIN. CODE § 7153.2 (West Supp. 1978)
(state-chartered savings and loan association); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 168, §§ 35.6A-.6B
(Michie/Law Co-op 1977) (state-chartered mutual savings bank); N.Y. BANmno LAw
§ 103.4(a) (McKinney 1977) (state-chartered commercial bank).
124. On a loan term less than the maximum permissible, however, the loan term,
instead of the monthly payments, could be increased.
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increase both the above described risks: (1) the increase in the inter-
est rate necessary to recover these costs over the life of the loan would
mean still higher monthly payments; and, more importantly, (2) the
amount of front-end costs absorbed would increase the amount that
the lender had "invested" in the property to a sum in excess of the
unpaid balance of the mortgage loan. This would result in a greater
risk that upon foreclosure and sale the secured property would not
bring enough for the lender to recover its investment. If, in the ab-
sence of lender pay, the loan-to-value ratio represents the lender's
judgment as to the maximum risk it would be willing to take on a
particular mortgage loan, then, in order to maintain the same level
of risk under lender pay, the lender would have to increase the re-
quired downpayment by an amount approximating the loan origina-
tion and mortgage settlement costs absorbed.
This result, moreover, would be most apt to occur with respect
to prospective homebuyers most in need of expanded opportunities
for homeownership, because mortgage lenders already are lending at
a loan-to-value ratio of as high as 95% on smaller mortgage loans. If
the lender were required to absorb initially mortgage origination and
settlement costs on the order of two percent of the mortgage loan, '12
its margin of safety would be very thin, indeed.
Typically, mortgage loans made at loan-to-value ratios of 90%
and 95% are covered by private mortgage insurance, which insures
mortgage lenders against losses due to borrower default.2 The exist-
ence of private mortgage insurance should not, however, affect the
above analysis. Since any increased risk of default on an insured loan
would be borne by the private mortgage insurance company, it is
reasonable to suppose that such companies would, under lender pay,
require mortgage lenders, as a condition of obtaining private mort-
gage insurance, to increase their downpayment requirements in order
to maintain the present level of risk.
Unless lender pay legislation contained provisions regulating
downpayment requirements, it would not, for most homebuyers, re-
duce the amount of cash needed initially to purchase a home. The
form that such legislation would take is hard to imagine since it
125. See Whitman, supra note 28, at 1349 n.158.
126. Most private mortgage insurance policies provide that, in the event of de-
fault, the insuring company either will pay the claim in full, take title to the property
and arrange for its sale, or will require the lender to foreclose its lien on the property
and then pay the lender's loss, up to a maximum of 20% or 25% of the amount of the
insured loan. In 1975, a typical policy covering a 90% to 95% loan for losses up to 25%
carried a first year premium of one percent of the loan plus $20. After the first year,
the policy could be renewed for one-quarter of one percent of the loan. S. MAISEL & S.
RoULAc, REAL ESTATE INvESTE AND FNANcE 214-15 (1976). The initial premium
ordinarily is charged to the homebuyer as a settlement cost and therefore would be
required to be absorbed initially by the lender under lender pay.
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would have to override the lender's assessment of risk.
It is reasonable to assume that the cost of settlement services
would be reduced if lenders were required to absorb them initially
since lenders are in a better position than homebuyers to bargain
effectively with independent providers of settlement services. Lend-
ers would be likely to eliminate unnecessary services or services of a
higher quality than necessary, and would be likely to make increased
use of their own employees to perform settlement services now per-
formed by third party providers.'" But a reduction in the cost of
settlement services would not reduce the costs of homeownership
unless lenders passed their settlement cost savings through to
homebuyer-borrowers.
Professor Whitman's assertion that mortgage lenders would pass
settlement cost savings to borrowers is based on the assumption that
the market in mortgage interest rates is "quite competitive." ' , This
assumption seems overly optimistic in light of the dearth of evidence
about the competitive behavior of home mortgage lenders with re-
spect to the lending side of their activities. 12'
Over 22,000 major financial organizations make mortgage loans.
They include such diverse institutions as savings and loan associa-
tions, mutual savings banks, commercial banks, mortgage banking
companies, life insurance companies, pension funds, real estate in-
vestment trusts and various state and federal agencies.' 3 Of these
institutions, the first four are the most significant lenders of mortgage
money on one-to-four family homes. Three of these four institutions
have only limited ability to compete in the home mortgage loan mar-
ket, because their sources of funds are limited; and two of these four
institutions have enough flexibility in their investment powers so that
they need not compete to make home mortgage loans if other invest-
ments are more attractive. The ability or willingness of each of these
four types of lending institutions to compete on the basis of interest
rates charged to home mortgage borrowers must, therefore, be consid-
ered separately.
Since 1971, the thrift institutions-savings and loan associations
and mutual savings banks-have originated approximately sixty-five
percent of all conventional home mortgage loans.'3' Both types of
127. See notes 114-15 supra.
128. Whitman, supra note 28, at 1348 & n.156.
129. There is, on the other hand, considerable empirical evidence that savings
and loan associations and mutual savings banks, which together make most conven-
tional hom6 mortgage loans, are extremely competitive in their efforts to attract sav-
ings deposits. Everyone who reads the newspapers or listens to the radio is exposed to
vigorous advertising for deposits by these thrift institutions, each claiming to pay the
highest allowable interest rate on savings.
130. S. MAISEL & S. RouLAc, supra note 126, at 21-22.
131. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, MORTGAGE BANKNG 1976:
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institutions, however, are able to compete in making such loans only
within constraints that restrict their capabilities to obtain capital to
lend. Savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks obtain
most of their capital from numerous small savings account depositors
and lend most of their funds on real estate mortgages. Their ability
to attract deposits is hindered because of limitations on the
amount of interest they may pay. These limitations are imposed by
governmental regulations'32 and, more fundamentally, by their asset
structures. Even if there were no governmentally imposed deposit
interest rate ceilings, thrift institutions still could not afford to raise
their deposit interest rates significantly in order to attract new depos-
its. They would have to pay the higher interest rates on existing
savings accounts as well as new savings accounts, but their interest
earnings, derived from long-term mortgage loans made at an earlier
time at fixed and generally lower interest rates, would remain rela-
tively constant.1'
When interest rates on such short-term securities as United
States Treasury Bills rise above interest rates on savings account
deposits, not only are thrift institutions unable to attract new depos-
its, but existing depositors withdraw their deposits and invest di-
rectly in such higher yielding short-term securities. This process is
known as disintermediation.134 During periods of disintermediation,
LoANs CLOSED AND SERVICING VOLUME, TRENDS REPORT No. 21, at 5 (1977) [hereinafter
MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATON OF AMERICA] (origination over the period from 1971-
1976 ranged from a low of 61.9% in 1974, to a high of 70.6% in 1976). In 1977, savings
and loan institutions and mutual savings banks originated 69.1% of conventional mort-
gage loans. See MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION OF AMERiCA, MORTGAGE BANKING 1977:
LOANS CLOSED AND SERVICING VOLUME, TRENDS REPORT No. 23, at 7 (1979).
132. See 43 Fed. Reg. 46,845 (1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 526.3) (savings
and loan associations); 43 Fed. Reg. 21,438 (1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 329.7)
(mutual savings banks).
133. Between 1950 and 1967, the spread between what savings and loan associa-
tions paid for money and what they received in interest dropped almost fifty percent.
Interest rates paid to savers virtually doubled, while rates earned on assets increased
about twenty percent. Kessel, The Allocation of Mortgage Funds, in 2 1. FRIEND, supra
note 109, at 659, 664-65 (1969).
134. See S. MAISEL & S. RouLAc, supra note 126, at 162. In order to ameliorate
the effects of disintermediation, as of June 1, 1978, thrift institutions were authorized
to offer savers nonnegotiable certificates with minimum deposits of $10,000 and matur-
ities of six months at a rate of return equal to one-quarter of one percent above the
discount yield on the most recently issued six-month United States Treasury Bills. 43
Fed. Reg. 21,436-38 (1978) (mutual savings banks); 43 Fed. Reg. 21,438-39 (1978) (to
be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 526.5(a)(8)) (savings and loan associations); as of the same
date, commercial banks were authorized to offer similar certificates at a rate of return
equal to the Treasury Bill rate. 43 Fed. Reg. 21,435-36 (1978) (to be codified in 12
C.F.R. § 217.7(f)); 43 Fed. Reg. 21,436-38 (1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. §
329.6(b)(5)).
Depending on the week in which they were issued and the method of compound-
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the concern of thrift institutions is not how to compete to make home
mortgage loans, but rather how to ration their limited funds. 5 Occa-
sionally, during such periods, mortgage money is unavailable from
thrift institutions altogether. 3
The ability of mortgage banking companies to lend money also
is limited by periodic shortages of funds. Mortgage banking compa-
nies' principal activities are making loans secured by mortgages on
real estate, selling these loans in the secondary market to permanent
investors, and then servicing the loans for these investors.137 Since
1971, mortgage banking companies have originated approximately
seventy percent of all FHA insured and VA guaranteed home mort-
gage loans.3 ' Although mortgage banking companies disburse funds
from their own accounts to close loans, these are borrowed funds.
Mortgage banking companies do not provide savings deposit services
and they have only a small amount of their own capital to lend. They
ing, thrift institutions have paid up to almost 10.5% interest on these certificates.
The highest rate will be paid at the maturity of certificates issued during the week
beginning December 28, 1978, when the certificate rate was calculated with reference
to an average Treasury Bill rate of 9.85%. The additional one-quarter of one percent
paid by thrift institutions brought the rate up to 9.38% and continuous compounding
increased the maximum rate payable to 10.4801%. Telephone conversation with Pierre
Ellis, Research Department, U.S. League of Savings Associations, (Mar. 26, 1979). As
of March 15, 1979, the regulatory agencies acted to reduce the profit squeeze on thrift
institutions that has resulted from such high rates. For all certificates issued after that
date, whenever the Treasury Bill rate exceeds nine percent, thrift institutions may not
add an additional one-quarter of one percent interest and no compounding of interest
is permitted on any certificates. 44 Fed. Reg. 15,476-77 (1978) (to be codifed at 12
C.F.R. § 329.7(b) (7)) (mutual savings banks); 43 Fed. Reg. 15, 478-79 (1978) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 526.3(a)(8)) (savings and loan associations). Although the certi-
ficates have "sold" well, only a small percentage of the money has been used to make
new mortgages. There are two major reasons for the apparent failure of these certifi-
cates to provide additional funds for housing. First, the bulk of the money that has
gone into these certificates at thrift institutions has come from regular savings ac-
counts. Little "new money" has flowed into thrift institutions by virtue of the certifi-
cates. Second, many thrift institutions have placed the new money that did come in
into large negotiable certificates of deposit at commercial banks at even higher interest
rates in order to cover their own higher costs.
135. See MORTGAGE INTEREST COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 22, at 25; Boorman
& Peterson, Instability of Savings Flows and Mortgage Lending by Financial
Intermediaries, 40 S. EcoN. J. 297, 309 (1973); Dhrymes & Taubman, An Empirical
Analysis of the Savings and Loan Industry, in 1 I. FRIEND, supra note 109, at 67, 110.
136. See, e.g., Gibson, Deposit Demand, "Hot Money," and the Viability of
Thrift Institutions, [1974] BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIc AcnIvrry 593, 630; Swan,
The Markets for Housing Services, in 5 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 960, 962 (1973);
Wallich, Discussion, in FED. RES. BANK OF BOSTON, CONF. SER. No. 8, PoLICIES FOR A
MORE COMPmTIVE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 173, 175 (1972).
137. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 131, at inside front
cover.
138. Id. at 5. During that same period, mortgage banking companies' share of
conventional home mortgage loans was less than five percent.
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obtain funds with which to make loans principally by borrowing short
term from commercial banks. When money is tight in general, such
short-term money often is unavailable,'' thereby limiting mortgage
banking companies as effective competitors in the mortgage market.
Commercial banks, in addition to providing short-term credit to
mortgage banking companies, also lend some home mortgage money.
Since 1971, they have originated over twenty percent of all conven-
tional home mortgage loans. 4' Their effectiveness as competitors is,
however, limited for several r~asons. Historically, commercial banks
have been involved principally in short-term commercial lending and
their governing regulations, particularly in the case of national banks,
severely restricted the amount and terms of real estate mortgage
loans they could make.' Even though these restrictions now have
been eased, commercial banks tend to be more conservative in their
lending practices than other home mortgage lenders. They tend to
lend at a lower loan-to-value ratio and for a shorter term.' Although
their interest rates, loan fees, and prepayment penalties are thus
generally less than those ordinarily charged by savings and loan
associations, a home mortgage loan from a commercial bank is feas-
ible only for a limited segment of the homebuying public: those who
have enough cash for a downpayment so that they do not need a loan
at the highest permissible loan-to-value ratio, and those who can
meet the higher monthly payments required by shorter amortization
periods.4 3 Commercial banks cannot, therefore, be viewed as effective
competitors in the market for mortgage loans to the homebuyers
about whom the supporters of lender pay are most concerned.
The flexibility that commercial banks and, to a lesser extent,
mutual savings banks have in their investment powers limits their
willingness to compete to make mortgage loans. In periods of rising
interest rates, putting money into single family mortgage loans be-
comes less attractive to them than other investments. Part of the
problem arises because of state usury laws"' and interest rate ceilings
imposed by the federal government on FHA insured and VA guaran-
teed loans.'45 When interest rates obtainable on other investments are
above the rates that could be obtained from making home mortgages,
lenders who have alternative choices do not lend mortgage money.
139. S. MAISEL & S. RouLAc, supra note 126, at 211.
140. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 131, at 5.
141. S. MAISEL & S. RouLAc, supra note 126, at 197.
142. Id. at 197-98.
143. Id.
144. For a state-by-state survey of these laws, see [1978] 1 CONS. CRED. Guma
(CCH) T 510.
145. 44 Fed. Reg. 24,554-55 (1978) (VA ceiling 10%); 44 Fed. Reg. 24,547 (1978)
(FHA ceiling 10%).
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Even if there were no interest rate ceilings, however, commercial
banks still would be unlikely to make many mortgage loans during
periods of tight money. When businesses seek financing from their
banks during such periods, it is reasonable to assume that lenders
would prefer to lend their limited funds to their regular commercial
customers, with whom they have ongoing relationships, rather than
to home mortgage borrowers.'"
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, the structural con-
straints upon the ability and willingness of mortgage lenders to com-
pete to make home mortgage loans are strictest during periods of
tight money. Unfortunately, in recent years such periods have been
occurring with increasing frequency and their effect on the mortgage
market has become increasingly severe. One commentary warns that
the real estate industry can expect to encounter a depression about
every three and one-half years."7 Since during periods of tight money
there frequently is more demand for mortgage funds than there are
funds available, mortgage lenders have no incentive to compete on
the basis of price in order to make home mortgage loans. Under such
circumstances, if lender pay were in effect, it is unlikely that mort-
gage lenders would pass settlement cost savings through to borrowers
by reflecting such savings in the interest rate. Indeed, it seems more
likely that mortgage lenders would retain such savings in an effort to
cover the higher costs of obtaining funds during tight money periods.
Although the structural constraints on mortgage lending are
ameliorated when home mortgage money is available more readily,
it does not necessarily follow that mortgage lenders engage in price
competition during such periods. Since the federal government lowers
the maximum allowable interest rate for FHA insured and VA guar-
anteed loans when the money supply eases, that rate tends to become
the floor as well as the ceiling. Borrowers are encouraged to believe
that the government has set the rate rather than the maximum
146. See Clauretie, Interest Rates, the Business Demand for Funds, and the
Residential Mortgage Market: A Sectoral Econometric Study, 28 J. FINANCE 1313, 1324
(1973).
147. S. MAISEL & S. RouLAc, supra note 126, at 153. Lending on residential
mortgages fell by more than fifty percent from the high to the low quarters in 1965-66,
1969-70, and 1973-74. Such periods also were characterized by increases in home
mortgage interest rates-from 5.4% to 6.8% in 1965-66 and from 7.5% to 10.1% in
1972-74. Although some of the decline in lending may be due to a lessening of demand
as interest rates increase, most of the decrease occurs because fewer funds are avail-
able from the various types of mortgage lenders. Id. at 163-64. The effect of an increase
in mortgage interest rates on the demand for mortgages is unclear. Compare Dhrymes
& Taubman, supra note 135 (one percent increase in mortgage rates is associated with
a two percent decrease in demand), with Huang, Effect of Different Credit Policies on
Housing Demand in 3 I. FRIEND, supra note 109, at 1211, 1236 (effect of the costs of
mortgage borrowing appears to be insignificant).
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rate."' There is very little information available to determine how
lenders establish mortgage interest rates on conventional home mort-
gage loans.'49 That there is some variation in conventional interest
rates and that such rates are not always at the usury limit indicates
that lenders could be engaging in some price competition. Econo-
mists have, however, attributed much of the interest rate variations
to the urban-as opposed to rural-location of the property and the
lending institution,' 0 the size of the lending institution,'5 ' and the
terms of the mortgage loan, most particularly the loan-to-value ratio.
The higher the loan-to-value ratio, the less the interest tends to vary
among lending institutions.' 2 There have been conflicting findings
on the relationship between interest rates and the number of mort-
gage lending institutions in an area.' Studies give no indication that
lenders attempted to attract home mortgage borrowers by advertising
lower rates.
It is not surprising that mortgage interest rates are not well ad-
148. J. GUTTENTAG & M. BECK, NEW SERIES ON HoME MORTGAGE YIELDS SINCE
1951, at 76 (1970); Guttentag, The Behavior of Residential Mortgage Yields Since 1951,
in 1 EssAYs ON INTEREST RATS 29, 71 (1969). There is some evidence that under such
circumstances mortgage lenders tend to view rate cutting as an unethical practice.
H.A. Schaaf, Federal Interest Rate Policy on Insured and Guaranteed Mortgages 135
(1955) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, on file in University of California at Berkeley
Library), cited in J. GurrENTrAG & M. BECK, supra, at 76 n.15 and Guttentag, supra,
at 71 n.48.
149. Economists who have attempted to study credit conditions in the residential
mortgage market have been hampered by lack of reliable data. See, e.g., J. GuTrENTAG
&M. BECK, supra note 148, at 3-4, 88; S. KLAMAN, THEPOSTWAR RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE
MAKErT, at xxiv, xxviii-xxix (1961); Benston, Savings Banking and the Public Interest,
4 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 133, 200-01 (1972); Jung, Terms on Conventional
Mortgage Loans on Existing Houses, 17 J. FNANC E 432, 432 n.1 (1962).
150. J. GurrENTAG & M. BECK, supra note 148, at 115; Alberts & Jung, Some
Evidence of the Intra-regional Structure of Interest Rates on Residential Mortgage
Loans, 46 LAND ECON. 208 (1970); Peterson, Some Evidence on Intra-regional Differ-
ences in Yields and Costs of Mortgage Lending, 49 LAND ECON. 96 (1973).
151. Jung, supra note 149, at 433, 443 (1962).
152. Id. at 435, 443; Jung, Terms on Conventional Mortgage Loans-1965 vs.
1960, 3 NAT'L BANKING REV. 379, 382-84 (1965).
153. Compare Friend, Changes in the Asset and Liability Structure of the Sav-
ings and Loan Industry, in 3 I. FRIEND, supra note 109, at 1355, 1384 (virtually no
relationship), with Aspinwall, Market Structure and Commercial Bank Mortgage In-
terest Rates, 36 S. ECON. J. 374, 382 (1970) (strong statistical association between
mortgage interest rates and both concentration and number of lenders). An interest-
ing aspect of Jung's findings in the studies cited at notes 149 & 150 supra, is that
when, in 1960, commercial banks could pay only 3% on savings deposits and could
lend only up to 75% of appraised value for no more than twenty years, they tended to
charge lower mortgage interest rates than savings and loan associations; whereas, in
1965, when commercial banks were permitted to pay 4% on savings deposits and could
lend 80% of appraised value for 25 years, the interest rate differential between commer-
cial banks and savings and loan associations virtually disappeared. Jung, supra note
152, at 384.
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vertised, since most homebuyers do not shop around for mortgage
loans. Instead, they rely on other participants in the settlement pro-
cess, principally real estate brokers and builders, to arrange mortgage
financing for them.' Some mortgage lenders have estimated that
they receive between seventy-five and ninety percent of their home
mortgage loan applications from real estate brokers and builders.55
Competitive efforts by mortgage lenders are, therefore, directed pri-
marily at these persons, rather than at homebuyers. Prior to RESPA,
such reliance on referrals rather than on price competition frequently
involved "an elaborate system of referral fees, kickbacks, rebates,
commissions and the like."'' 8 Although payment and receipt of such
inducements now are illegal,'57 given the cyclical nature of the mort-
gage lending industry, the referral of homebuyers to lenders by real
estate brokers and builders is mutually beneficial even in the absence
of payment. In periods of ready availability of mortgage money, real
estate brokers and builders are likely to refer mortgage borrowers to
particular lenders in the hope that such lenders will, during periods
in which mortgage money is tight, make mortgage loans to borrowers
"sponsored" by such real estate brokers and builders.
Recently, the official publication of the United States League of
Savings Associations, whose members hold 99% of savings and loan
association assets, extolled the virtues of aggressive, innovative tech-
niques of competing for home mortgage loans. 51 Most of the tech-
niques discussed by senior marketing officials from various associa-
tions involved the means by which to establish closer relationships
with real estate brokers and builders. Generally, the marketing offi-
cials downplayed the desirability and effectiveness of consumer ad-
vertising, particularly marketing by rate.5 9
In light of the foregoing, it seems unlikely that lender pay would
cause mortgage lenders to change their loan marketing procedures
and engage in active price competition by passing settlement cost
154. HUD-VA REPoRT, supra note 8, at 15-16, reprinted in 1972 House Hearings,
supra note 8, at 751-52; S. MAISEL & S. RoULAc, supra note 126, at 164; Loan Market-
ing: It's Not What It Used to Be, SAVINGS AND LoAN NEWS, June 1977, at 90 [herein-
after cited as Loan Marketing]; see Herman, Conflict of Interest in the Savings and
Loan Industry, in 2 I. FRIEND, supra note 109, at 763, 806; Vernon, Savings and Loan
Association Response to Monetary Policies, 1953-61: A Case Study in "Availability,"
31 S. EcoN. J. 229, 235 (1965).
155. Loan Marketing, supra note 154, at 91, 92.
156. HUD-VA REPORT, supra note 8, at 15-16, reprinted in 1972 House Hearings,
supra note 8, at 751-52.
157. 12 U.S.C. § 2607 (1976).
158. Loan Marketing, supra note 154.
159. Id. The vice president of one association expressed what appeared to be the
prevailing attitude when she said, "If rates are the same and the deal is essentially
the same, people want to do business with friends, people they are comfortable with
and who give them the best service." Id. at 92.
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savings through to borrowers. Although lender pay would make it
easier for a prospective borrower to compare costs because the long-
term interest rate would be the only cost of borrowing, loan-to-value
ratio and length of term differences would be likely to remain. The
psychological barrier involved in approaching bankers for a loan
would continue to deter comparison shopping, and homebuyers still
would be likely to rely on real estate brokers and builders to arrange
their mortgage financing.
Furthermore, in order to pass through settlement cost savings,
lenders would have to make more precise adjustments in the home
mortgage interest rate than is customary. Mortgage lenders seldom
change interest rates by less than one-quarter of a percentage point.6 '
Since it is estimated that all the expenses that would be absorbed
under lender pay would require an interest rate increase of between
one-quarter and three-eighths of one percent,' the savings that lend-
ers could effect by dealing with providers of settlement services di-
rectly undoubtedly would be less than one-quarter of one percent.
There would, therefore, be a very small margin within which to adjust
interest rates to reflect settlement cost savings. Without a significant
change in the shopping habits of homebuyers, lenders probably would
not make this adjustment in order to attract borrowers. Unless such
adjustment were made, lender pay would not reduce the total costs
of homeownership.
Of the lesser benefits that Professor Whitman sees in lender pay,
the deductibility for federal income tax purposes of settlement costs
paid in the form of increased mortgage interest is the most trouble-
some.6 2 It is presented as an extra sweetener for homebuyers, without
regard for its detrimental effects upon the income tax system as a
whole. However innocent sounding, deductibility of settlement costs
paid in the form of increased mortgage interest would increase reve-
nue losses to the Treasury in an amount that would exacerbate exist-
ing tax inequities between homeowners and renters and between
high-bracket and low-bracket homeowners.
160. S. KLAMAN, supra note 149, at 78.
161. See text accompanying note 111 supra.
162. Mortgage interest is deductible under I.R.C. § 163. When the borrower pays
a fee to the lender at the time of obtaining the loan, its deductibility depends on
whether it is a fee paid for the use of money, or a fee paid as compensation for services
rendered by the lender. 26 C.F.R. § 1.163-1 (1978). The former is deductible as interest,
Rev. Rul. 69-582, 1969-2 C.B. 29; Rev. Rul. 69-188, 1969-1 C.B. 54, while the latter is
not. Rev. Rul. 67-297, 1667-2 C.B. 87. If lenders were not permitted to collect any fees
at the time of origination, a portion of the mortgage interest collected over the life of
the loan might be considered as nondeductible compensation for services rendered.
Professor Whitman thinks that the administrative burden involved in determining the
nondeductible component of interest makes it unlikely that the Internal Revenue
Service would undertake partial disallowance of mortgage interest deductions. Whit-
man, supra note 28, at 1350 n.161.
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Revenue losses from the deduction by individuals of mortgage
interest on residences were estimated as averaging nearly five billion
dollars per year for 1975 through 1977.63 This sum, sometimes catego-
rized as a tax incentive or tax expenditure, 1" is in effect a federal
government subsidy to homeowners. Present tax law does not control
the amount of revenue lost by virtue of this subsidy, since the deduc-
tion is available to all homeowners who finance their homes, regard-
less of their income levels, the cost of the homes, or the number of
homes owned.' An increase in mortgage interest of one quarter of one
per cent to reflect origination and settlement costs required to be
absorbed initially under lender pay would add to these revenue losses.
Since the mortgage interest deduction is not available to renters,
there is inequality of tax treatment between owners and renters who
have similar gross incomes. 6 ' The increased mortgage interest deduc-
tion available because of lender pay would exacerbate this inequality.
The inequality between high-bracket and low-bracket homeowners
would also be increased by these factors.'67 First, each dollar of tax
deduction is worth more to a higher-bracket taxpayer than to a lower-
bracket taxpayer. Second, higher-bracket taxpayers are more likely
to be homeowners and also are more likely to own higher-priced
homes with higher mortgages. Finally, higher-bracket taxpayers are
more likely to own more than one home. At the extremes, by permit-
ting a deduction for interest that otherwise would have been non-
deductible loan origination and settlement costs, the federal govern-
ment would, in essence, subsidize seventy percent of these costs for
the highest bracket taxpayer but absorb only fourteen percent of
these costs for the lowest bracket taxpayer. 66 Such a result hardly can
be considered reasonable settlement cost reform.
3. The Disadvantages of Lender Pay: A Closer Look
Not only has Professor Whitman overstated the advantages of
lender pay, but he also has minimized what he considers to be the
163. SENATE COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 94TH CONG., 2D SESs., TAX EXPENDIuRES:
COMPENDIUM OF BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS 75 (Comm. Print
1976).
164. Id. See also TAX INSTrrUTE OF AMERICA, TAX INCENTIVES 3-29 (1971); Surrey,
Tax Subsidies as a Device for Implementing Governmental Policy, 3 TAX ADVISER 196
(1972).
165. See I.R.C. § 163.
166. It may be, however, that the housing market has adjusted for these deduc-
tions. For example, landlords may have passed tax savings from their mortgage
interest deductions through to their tenants in the form of lower rents. Alternatively,
the price of homes may have increased to compensate for this tax benefit. See R.
GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 122 (1976).
167. S. SURREY, PATHwAYS TO TAX REFORM 232-36 (1973).
168. I.R.C. § 1.
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disadvantages: possible conflicts with some state usury ceilings and
inequity between short-term and long-term borrowers. These disad-
vantages should not be dismissed so lightly.
Although many states have raised their mortgage interest rate
ceilings during recent periods of credit shortage, the newly raised
ceilings still may not be high enough in some jurisdictions to avoid
diversions of money from the home mortgage market during periods
of generally high interest rates."' To the extent that lender pay would
cause an increase in home mortgage interest rates to account for
initially absorbed origination and settlement costs, the maximum
statutory interest rate would be reached sooner and the problem of
home mortgage interest rate ceilings would be intensified. Although
it may be argued that an increase in home mortgage interest rates
would create additional pressure for changes in the usury laws, it is
difficult to predict what effect such additional pressure might have.
Even if the usury limits ultimately were raised, prospective buyers
of homes would have suffered from the unavailability of mortgage
credit in the interim. Because of the current dramatic increases in the
cost of housing,"' when mortgage money finally became available,
homebuyers likely would find not only that the interest rate had been
raised, but that the price of housing had increased as well.
Professor Whitman's view-that the inequity of having long-
term borrowers pay the increment of interest attributable to origina-
tion and settlement costs over a longer period of time than that of
short-term borrowers is outweighed by the social utility of reducing
front-end costs-cannot stand for several reasons. First, as was dem-
onstrated previously, it is unlikely that front-end costs would be re-
duced in many instances, particularly for those homebuyers who al-
ready must borrow at high loan-to-value ratios."'
Second, to the extent that homeowners sell their existing homes
in order to "trade-up" to more expensive homes, the unrecovered
settlement costs would be borne by the persons who are least able to
169. For a summary of increases in state usury rate ceilings between 1966 and
1973, see Whitman, supra note 28, at 1352 n.171. Since 1973, a number of states have
increased their maximum allowable rates of interest. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. §
45.45.010(b) (Supp. 1978); Amz. REv. STAT. § 44-1201(B) (Supp. 1978); COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 5-12-101 to -103 (Supp. 1976); DEL. CODE tit. 6, § 2301(a) (Supp. 1978); GA.
CODE ANN. § 57-101.1(a) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 74, § 4(2)(a)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. § 16-207(a) (Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
408.030(1) (Vernon 1978); NEB. Rav. STAT. § 45-101.03 (Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-1-1(b) (West Supp. 1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-8-11 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
24-1.1(A) (Michie Supp. 1977); S.C. CoDE § 34-31-30 (Supp. 1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
9, § 41(f) (1978).
170. House Prices Are Marching to the Beat of Inflation, N.Y. Times, May 29,
1977, § 8 (Real Estate), at 1, cols. 4-5 (N.J. ed.).
171. See text accompanying notes 122-27 supra.
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afford them. Consider the common situation of a new development
in which many of the buyers are young families acquiring their first
homes. The developer may have arranged for permanent mortgage
financing with a particular lender at a stated interest rate for all
homes in the development, which rate, under lender pay, would in-
clude an increment for origination and settlement costs. After a few
years, those families whose incomes had risen the fastest probably
would be the first to move. Their less financially successful neigh-
bors who remained would continue to pay the loan origination and
settlement costs increment throughout the life of the loan.7 "
Finally, borrowers whose loans were terminated early by reason
of default and foreclosure would be subsidized as to their origination
and settlement costs by borrowers whose loans were in good standing.
This inequity would be heightened because most foreclosures occur
during the early years of a loan.17 3 The imposition by the lender of a
prepayment penalty could not overcome this inequity because such
a penalty is meaningless in the foreclosure context.
Although the disadvantages of lender pay mentioned by Profes-
sor Whitman and discussed above are important, the most significant
disadvantage is one not mentioned by Professor Whitman: Lender
pay could cause substantial structural changes in the primary and
secondary home mortgage lending markets that could adversely
affect the availability of mortgage money.
At the primary market level, there would be risks that commer-
cial banks might curtail their home mortgage lending activities sub-
stantially and that mortgage banking companies might be driven out
172. This inequity could be overcome by a variant of lender pay under which the
lender would add the origination and settlement costs to the principal amount of the
mortgage, rather than recover them by an increase in the mortgage interest rate. It
should be noted, however, that this variant of lender pay also probably would cause a
lender to increase its downpayment requirement, in order to keep its risk at an accepta-
ble level in light of its increased investment in the security. In addition, this variant
of lender pay might, for psychological reasons, add somewhat to the inflation of the
cost of housing. Within market limitations, a homeowner who wants to sell his present
home sets an asking price and decides whether or not to accept an offered price based
in some measure on what he will net on the sale. If the homeowner's mortgage balance
included loan origination and settlement costs, he might well raise his asking price and
his minimum acceptable selling price in order to achieve an acceptable level of net
proceeds. The homeowner might be less likely to make such pricing decisions based
on amounts paid for loan origination and settlement costs at the time of acquisition
of the property, because under such circumstanes his net cash proceeds at the time of
sale would not be affected.
This inequity also could be overcome by use of a prepayment penalty fixed so as
to approximate the unrecovered origination and settlement costs. But this, too, might
cause a homeowner to increase the price of his home since the prepayment penalty
reduces the seller's net.
173. S. MAISEL & S. RouLAc, supra note 126, at 302.
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of the home mortgage market altogether. The departure of these two
types of lenders from the home mortgage market would have a sub-
stantial negative impact upon the availability of money for home
mortgages.
Commercial banks, which have the most flexible investment
powers of the four types of home mortgage lenders, might curtail their
home mortgage lending because, as the initial costs of home mortgage
lending increased, commercial loans would become more attractive
by comparison. The diversion of funds that otherwise would-go into
home mortgage loans would become most acute when money was
generally tight and home mortgage interest rates were at the usury
limits, since the commercial banks could not then recover the origina-
tion and settlement costs by an increase in the interest rate.
Funds taken out of home mortgage lending by commercial banks
could not be replaced easily. Thrift institutions could put additional
funds into the market only if they could obtain additional savings
deposits or sell mortgages from their existing portfolios in the second-
ary market. The ability to attract new savings deposits would, how-
ever, be most difficult whenever they were most needed, during peri-
ods of tight money. The ability to sell mortgages in the secondary
market in addition to mortgages already being sold by thrift institu-
tions in that market would require either increased purchases by
existing secondary market investors or the attraction of new types of
investors to that market. Only if commercial banks were to purchase
in the secondary market home mortgages equal in amount to those
they otherwise would have originated, would the additional funds
available to thrift institutions approximate the amount taken out of
the primary market by the commercial banks.
Whereas commercial banks might leave the mortgage market
voluntarily in response to lender pay by investing their funds else-
where, many mortgage banking companies could be driven out of
business altogether if they were required to absorb initially all origin-
ation and settlement costs. The disappearance of mortgage banking
companies as a source of funds for home mortgages would have an
effect on the mortgage market out of proportion to the percentage of
single family loans originated by them. Although from 1970 through
1976, mortgage banking companies originated between 17% and 21%
of all single family loans, these originations accounted for between
68% and 78% of all FHA insured loans, between 61% and 75% of all
VA guaranteed loans, and only between 1.5% and 6.5% of all conven-
tional loans.' Since FHA and VA loans ordinarily are made to home-
buyers of lower income than those who borrow on conventional loans,
the impact of any decline in mortgage money available from mort-
174. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 131, at 6.
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gage banking companies would fall most heavily upon the very group
of prospective homebuyers that lender pay was designed to assist.
Many mortgage banking companies might be forced out of busi-
ness under lender pay, because without substantial changes in the
way that these companies operate they would be unable to pass on
the loan origination and settlement costs. Ultimately, therefore, they
would have to bear these costs as increased operating expenses.
When a mortgage banking company originates mortgage loans
with short-term funds it has borrowed from commercial banks,' it
pledges the mortgage loans as collateral to secure the short-term
commercial bank credit. The mortgage banking company carries
these closed mortgage loans in its inventory for a short period during
which it arranges for their sale in the secondary market to a perma-
nent investor. This is known as "warehousing." As the mortgages are
sold, the mortgage banking company uses the proceeds from the sale
to pay off its commercial bank loans. The commercial banks may
then advance new short-term credit and start the cycle again. During
the term of the mortgage loans, the mortgage banking company ad-
ministers or services them for the permanent investors. Servicing
consists of collecting and accounting for the monthly payments,
maintaining escrow accounts for payment of property taxes, handling
foreclosures, and doing all other things with respect to the loan that
otherwise would have to be done by the permanent investor.
There are four stages in the above described process at which the
mortgage banking company has an opportunity to receive income:
origination, warehousing, resale, and servicing. Origination income
consists of loan origination fees and any other front-end fees charged
by the lender for specific services such as appraisals, credit checks,
or escrow or closing services performed by the lender. Warehousing
income is the difference, if any, between the interest rate on the
mortgages in the mortgage banking company's inventory and the
interest rate on its short-term commercial credit, the proceeds from
which it used to originate the loans warehoused in its inventory.
Resale income is a markup in the price of the loans sold to permanent
investors. Servicing income is a fee on the order of three-eighths of
one percent of the mortgage amount per year. 78
On residential loans, origination fees usually are less than the
cost of origination to the mortgage banking company, resulting in a
loss on origination that must be recouped from other sources of in-
come. 17  Since lender pay would prohibit home mortgage lenders from
charging any front-end fees and would, at the same time, increase
175. See text accompanying notes 137-42 supra.
176. Wiggin, supra note 82, at 93-95.
177. MORTGAGE BANKERs AssoCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 131, at inside front
cover.
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their origination expenses by requiring that they absorb initially all
mortgage origination and settlement costs, mortgage banking compa-
nies' origination losses would increase substantially.
The first problem that mortgage banking companies would face
under lender pay would be where to obtain the funds with which to
pay the origination and settlement costs initially, since most of these
companies do not have sufficient capital to pay these costs out of
their own funds. Obtaining these funds from their short-term com-
mercial lenders would not be a reasonable solution because it would
only postpone the problem. If such short-term borrowing were relied
upon, the mortgage banking company would have to borrow enough
both to originate mortgage loans and to pay the origination and set-
tlement costs associated with those loans. When the mortgage bank-
ing company sold the mortgage loans to permanent investors, unless
the proceeds were sufficient to cover the origination and settlement
costs in addition to the principal amounts of the mortgage loans sold,
the mortgage banking company would have to find another source
of funds with which to repay the portion of the short-term loans
attributable to origination and settlement costs.
Even if an initial source of funds to pay origination and settle-
ment costs could be found, the mortgage banking companies' prob-
lem would not necessarily be solved. Lender pay presupposes that,
over time, mortgage lenders would recoup the amount of origination
and settlement costs absorbed initially by collecting increased inter-
est over the life of the mortgage loans. Mortgage banking companies,
however, would be unable to pass these origination and settlement
costs through to borrowers in this fashion since they do not retain in
their own investment portfolios the mortgage loans that they origi-
nate. Higher interest rates on the loans would therefore accrue to
the benefit of mortgage banking companies only if those incremental
amounts were retained by them when the loans were sold to perma-
nent investors in the same manner that the mortgage banking com-
panies now retain the servicing fee of three-eighths of one percent,
or if the permanent investor were willing to pay a higher price for the
loan because it carried a higher interest rate. But the yield required
by the permanent investor, which would determine the price at
which the investors would buy the loans, bears no necessary relation
to the origination and settlement costs incurred initially by the mort-
gage banking company. The problem is compounded because fre-
quently the maximum allowable interest rate on FHA and VA mort-
gage loans is low in relation to market interest rates. There simply
might not be enough of a difference between the rate of interest on
the mortgage loans and the yield required by the permanent investor
to allow either for retention by mortgage banking companies of the
right to sufficient interest to compensate for origination and settle-
ment costs over the life of the loan, or for a price high enough to en-
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able the mortgage banking company to recoup the origination and
settlement costs upon resale.
In addition to the increased losses upon origination that mort-
gage banking companies could incur under lender pay, these compa-
nies also might incur losses on resale of loans to permanent investors.
Mortgage banking companies now may make a profit on the sale of
loans to permanent investors by originating the loans at a discount
and selling the loans at a lesser discount, but because of the require-
ment that all home mortgage loans be originated at par, no such
discount points would be permitted under lender pay.
Assume, for example, that the maximum allowable interest rate
on FHA-VA mortgage loans is eight and one-half percent 17 8 and inves-
tors require a yield of nine percent before they are willing to invest
in mortgage loans. Apart from the costs to the mortgage banking
company of originating the loans, if it is to break even on the sale of
the loans it will calculate the discount at which it must originate the
loans as follows: The first step in the calculation is to determine the
price, expressed as a percentage of the par value of the loans, that a
permanent investor would be willing to pay for the loans in order to
earn his required yield. For purposes of this calculation, each point
of discount from the par value of the loans would increase the perma-
nent investor's yield by one-eighth of one percent over the life of the
loans. This is the same rule of thumb used by mortgage lenders when
they charge loan discount points upon origination of a loan." 9 Since
the mortgage loans bear interest at the rate of eight and one-half
percent and the mortgage banking company will retain three-eighths
of one percent as a servicing fee, the investor who requires a yield of
nine percent will pay a price of only 93% of par for the loans. Of the
seven points of discount, three points represent the mortgage banking
company'g servicing fee and four points represent the amount neces-
sary to increase the permanent investor's rate of return from the eight
and one-half percent interest rate on the mortgage notes to the nine
percent yield required by him in order to invest in home mortgage
loans. If the mortgage banking company is to break even on sale of
the mortgage loans, it must charge the borrowers seven discount
points at the time it originates the loans, and, if it is to make any
profit, it must originate the loans at less than 93% of par.
178. Since 1973, the maximum interest rate on FHA-VA mortgages has ranged
from a low of six percent to a high of ten percent. 38 Fed. Reg. 18,373, 20,616, 22,891,
23,519, 24,637 (1973); 39 Fed. Reg. 3249, 3258, 14,505, 14,698, 17,441, 18,094, 26,153,
27,320, 30,037, 32,026 (1974); 40 Fed. Reg. 2800, 4143, 6647, 6954, 12,076, 13,208,
19,643, 21,472, 42,190, 47,105, 58,133 (1975); 41 Fed. Reg. 1277, 1913, 14,509, 14,869,
47,049 (1976); 42 Fed. Reg. 28,883 (1977); 43 Fed. Reg. 22,717, 23,713, 29,001, 29,113
(1978); 44 Fed. Reg. 24,547 (1979).
179. See note 106 supra.
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Under lender pay, since the mortgage banking company would
have to originate all home mortgage loans at par, it would make a
profit on the sale of loans only if it could sell the loans to investors
at a premium. This would never happen so long as the maximum
allowable interest rate on FHA-VA mortgages were at or below the
yield required by investors before they would purchase such mortgage
loans.'"' If, as is likely, investors continued to purchase such loans at
a discount, mortgage banking companies would incur losses on sale
of the loans in addition to incurring losses on origination.
Of the four stages in the operation of a mortgage banking com-
pany at which it has an opportunity to receive income, two of
them-origination and resale-would result in losses under lender
pay. Servicing and the income received therefrom likely would re-
main unchanged. Warehousing might result in increased income to
mortgage banking companies under lender pay, if the mortgages in
inventory bore interest at an increased rate that reflected the origina-
tion and settlement costs required to be absorbed and if the cost of
short-term credit were unaffected.
If such warehousing income were insufficient to offset the origin-
ation and resale losses, changes in the secondary market, particularly
with respect to the operations of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Association (Fannie Mae or FHLMA) and the Government National
Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae or GNMA), might be required in
order for mortgage banking companies to continue to have a role in
home mortgage lending. Secondary market purchasers, because they
have capital to invest and because they generally hold mortgages in
their investment portfolios over the terms of the mortgages, are in a
position to absorb initially the costs of home mortgage loan origina-
tion and settlement and to recoup such costs through the increased
rate of interest on the mortgages. A major obstacle to this possible
solution, however, is the requirement under lender pay that all home
mortgage loans be originated at par. If the mortgage banking compa-
nies must originate the loans at par, in order for the secondary market
purchasers to absorb the settlement costs, they would have to buy
such loans at a premium. Ginnie Mae regulations now prohibit pur-
chase of mortgage loans at a premium' and Fannie Mae will not
purchase mortgage loans at a price in excess of par.'
As noted above,' 3 buying loans at a premium would be a problem
so long as the maximum allowable interest rate on FHA-VA mort-
180. There are additional problems involved when mortgage loans are purchased
at a premium. These problems are discussed in the text accompanying notes 181-87
infra.
181. 24 C.F.R. § 340.13 (1978).
182. FNMA, SELLING AGREEMENT SUPPLEMENT § 207(a) (Feb. 23, 1976).
183. See text accompanying note 180 supra.
[Vol. 63:367
RESPA
gages were at or below the yield required by investors before they
would purchase such mortgages. The problem would not be solved
even if the interest rate on the mortgages were high enough to cover
the mortgage origination and settlement costs and to assure the sec-
ondary market purchaser an adequate yield. Secondary market pur-
chasers would continue to resist buying loans at a premium because
they would incur a loss on a loan whenever it was paid in full at a
time earlier than the average life of the loan that was used to calcu-
late the premium. This loss would occur in the year that the loan was
paid in full because the secondary market purchaser would not have
fully amortized the premium. Thus; the amount that the investor
would receive upon payment of the loan in full would be less than the
amount at which the loan was carried on the investor's books.
In effect, if the secondary market purchaser must buy loans at a
premium, its risk on each loan is increased because it has a greater
investment in each loan than it would have if it were to buy the same
loan at par or at a discount. When a loan purchased at a premium
goes into default, even if a foreclosure sale were to bring an amount
equal to the outstanding principal balance, the permanent investor
nevertheless would sustain a loss equal to the unamortized premium.
Secondary market purchasers might demand an additional yield in
order to compensate for this risk, which would put an upward pres-
sure on home mortgage interest rates.
Another way in which secondary market purchasers could com-
pensate for this risk would be to shift part of it to the borrower under
the terms of the loan. In the event the loan were paid in full prior to
maturity, the borrower could be required to pay an amount equal to
the unamortized premium; in the event the loan went into default,
the amount of the unamortized premium could be added to the prin-
cipal balance. Under this system, although the permanent investor
would be protected against loss from prepayment, it would still bear
the risk that a foreclosure sale would not bring enough to pay the
augmented principal balance. If the mortgage were insured by FHA
or guaranteed by VA, unless changes were made in those programs,
the portion of the loss attributable to unamortized premium would
not be covered by the insurance or guarantee. This, too, is an addi-
tional risk that could cause secondary market purchasers to demand
an additional yield.' 8'
Even if the secondary market were to adjust to compensate for
the increased risks involved in buying home mortgage loans at a
184. The requirement that the borrower pay an amount equal to the unamortized
premium upon prepayment of the loan also would have the same inflationary effect
on the resale price of existing housing as would the addition at the outset of origination
and settlement costs to the principal amount of the mortgage or the imposition of a
prepayment penalty. See note 172 supra.
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premium, the question of how to calculate that premium raises an
additional difficulty. Through a variety of programs, Fannie Mae and
Ginnie Mae are involved in the purchase of over half of the home
mortgage loans originated by mortgage banking companies.' 5 An
important aspect of these programs is that they operate on a nation-
wide basis. The price at which mortgage loans or mortgage backed
securities are purchased depends upon the interest rate on the mort-
gages; it does not vary according to the location of the underlying
properties. Since settlement costs vary from locality to locality,' 6 if
Fannie Mae and Ginnie Mae were to absorb them initially by setting
a uniform nationwide premium, mortgage banking companies in
higher cost areas would be disadvantaged even if they were operating
as efficiently as possible, and mortgage banking companies in lower
cost areas would receive a windfall that would not necessarily reflect
the efficiency of their operations. If, on the other hand, Fannie Mae
and Ginnie Mae were to fix different premiums for different geo-
graphical areas, in addition to the complications that this inevitably
would cause for an otherwise uniform nationwide market, unless
these premiums were calculated on the basis of reasonable costs in
each area there would be no incentive for mortgage banking compa-
nies to reduce settlement costs. To establish premiums based on
reasonable costs would require an effort much like HUD's ill-fated
attempt to establish maximum settlement charges,'87 which the sec-
ondary market institutions are even less equipped to undertake.
Even if a satisfactory means of establishing the premium were
found and mortgage banking companies continued to operate in the
home mortgage market with the secondary market purchasers ab-
sorbing initially the loan origination and settlement costs, the
amount of home mortgage money made available through the re-
sources of the secondary market would, under lender pay, either pur-
chase fewer home mortgage loans or purchase the same number of
mortgage loans at lower loan-to-value ratios than under the present
185. For description of the various programs, see Wiggin, supra note 82, at 84-
95. Both Fannie Mae and Ginnie Mae purchase mortgages to hold in their own portfo-
lios. In addition, Ginnie Mae guarantees the payment of principal and interest on
home mortgages that underlie mortgage backed securities issued by mortgage banking
companies. Under this program, the lender packages a pool of FHA or VA home
mortgages bearing the same rate of interest that has an aggregate face amount of at
least one million dollars. After obtaining Ginnie Mae approval, it sells securities to
investors, in face amounts of at least $25,000, which are backed up by the principal
and interest payments on the underlying mortgages and the Ginnie Mae guarantee.
Id. at 90. In 1976, over forty percent of the mortgage loans originated by mortgage
banking companies were purchased by investors in pools of mortgage backed securi-
ties. MORTGAGE BANKERS AssOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 131, at 9.
186. HUD-VA REPORT, supra note 8, at 37-40, 51-63, 93-118, reprinted in 1972
House Hearings, supra note 8, at 771-74, 785-97, 826-51.
187. See notes 28-35 supra.
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system. Because lender pay would in no way increase the amount of
money available from the secondary market, the funds used as prem-
iums to pay origination and settlement costs would be funds that
otherwise would have been available to purchase additional mortgage
loans.
Mortgage money available from savings and loan associations
and mutual savings banks would be affected similarly, although
lender pay would not necessarily require a change in the relationship
of the thrift institutions to their secondary market purchasers.' s
Since savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks receive
deposits that they lend as mortgage money, these institutions would
not be faced with the necessity of finding a source of funds with which
to pay the costs of loan origination and settlement. In order to meet
these front-end costs, however, they would have to use funds that
otherwise would be available to make home mortgage loans. The
result would be either fewer home mortgage loans or the same number
of home mortgage loans at lower loan-to-value ratios.
Since it appears that lender pay would neither increase the op-
portunities for homeownership nor lower the costs of homeownership,
but could reduce the amount of money otherwise available for home
mortgage loans, Congress should reject the theory of settlement cost
regulation by enacting a federal requirement that the lender pay all
costs attributable to the transfer and financing of the property.
C. FEDERAL REQUIREMENT OF DIScLOsuRE OF SETTLEMENT COSTS
The third alternative means of regulating home mortgage settle-
ment costs-a federal requirement of disclosure of such costs-is the
approach embodied in RESPA. An analysis of RESPA shows, how-
ever, that the present provisions of the Act make a mockery of the
term "disclosure." Experience to date under RESPA, therefore, does
not provide an accurate basis on which to evaluate the efficacy of a
disclosure approach to federal settlement cost regulation. In light of
the steps a prospective homebuyer must take as part of the settle-
ment process, if federal regulation of settlement costs based on the
concept of disclosure is to be of any assistance to him, it should serve
the following purposes:
1. It should enable a prospective homebuyer to deter-
mine, based on estimates of loan origination fees and settle-
188. An important institutional secondary market purchaser of home mortgage
loans originated by savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks is the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac or FHLMC), which, like
Fannie Mae and Ginnie Mae, operates its various home mortgage loan purchase pro-
grams on a nationwide basis. Under its current programs, Freddie Mae does not pur-
chase home mortgage loans at a price in excess of par. FHLMC, SELER'S GumE,
FHA/VA Mortgages, § 3.101b, Conventional Mortgages, § 3.101b (Nov. 3, 1978).
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ment costs, whether he can afford to buy a particular home
with the amount of cash he has initially available.
2. It should provide the prospective homebuyer with
sufficient information to determine whether he should hire an
attorney to negotiate the contract of sale on his behalf. If he
decides not to hire his own attorney, it should provide him
with enough information to negotiate the contract of sale
effectively on his own behalf, including negotiation as to
which party will bear any specific loan origination and settle-
ment costs.
3. After the contract of sale has been entered into, it
should facilitate comparison shopping by the homebuyer for
a mortgage loan and for settlement services. It should facili-
tate evaluation by the homebuyer of any recommendation of
mortgage lender or settlement services provider made by the
real estate broker or builder and any requirement imposed by
a mortgage lender that the homebuyer pay the fees for settle-
ment service providers selected by the lender.
4. Reasonably in advance of settlement, it should re-
quire that the homebuyer be told the amount of actual settle-
ment costs he will be required to pay at settlement and, if
that amount is significantly in excess of the amount of esti-
mated settlement costs, it should contain a mechanism that
will enable the homebuyer to complete the transaction and
pay the excess settlement costs at a later time.
5. It should reduce loan origination and settlement
costs.
RESPA, in its present form, serves none of these purposes well,
if at all. This does not mean, however, that cost disclosure cannot be
an effective means of regulating settlement costs.
The next section of this Article points out the fundamental defi-
ciencies of RESPA disclosure. The section following it proposes
changes in the RESPA scheme that will correct its deficiencies. The
changes proposed would serve well each of the first four purposes
described above. In addition, to the extent that high settlement costs
are the result of inefficient and non-competitive practices by provi-
ders of settlement services, the proposal should help to stimulate
price competition in the markets for various settlement services in
which such competition previously has not existed. The proposal also
would avoid the substantial federal interference with local methods
of doing business that is inherent in both federal establishment of
maximum settlement charges and a federal requirement of lender
pay.
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VI. RESPA: THE REFORM THAT NEVER WAS
RESPA entitles a homebuyer to four different disclosures: (1) a
special information booklet; 89 (2) good faith estimates of charges for
specific settlement services; 9 ' (3) actual settlement costs known on
the business day immediately preceding settlement; 9' and (4) settle-
ment costs actually paid.'92
The lender must provide the first two disclosures-the special
information booklet and the good faith estimates-within three busi-
ness days'93 after the homebuyer submits an application for a feder-
ally related mortgage loan.'94 The special information booklet, enti-
tled Settlement Costs, was prepared by HUD. 9' Part I of the booklet
describes the settlement process and the nature of settlement charges
and suggests questions for the homebuyer to ask the various settle-
ment services providers. 9 ' It also contains information about the
homebuyer's rights-such as the right to good faith estimates-and
remedies under RESPA, and alerts the homebuyer to unfair or illegal
practices.'97 Part II of the booklet is an item-by-item explanation of
settlement services and costs, with sample forms and worksheets to
assist the homebuyer in making cost comparisons.
The good faith estimates may be given "as either a dollar amount
189. 12 U.S.C. § 2604(a), (b) (1976); 24 C.F.R. § 3500.6(a) (1978).
190. 12 U.S.C. § 2604(c) (1976); 24 C.F.R. § 3500.7 (1978).
191. 12 U.S.C. § 2603(b) (1976); 24 C.F.R. § 3500.10(a) (1978).
192. 12 U.S.C. § 2603 (1976); 24 C.F.R. §§ 3500.8(b), 3500.10(b) (1978).
193. 12 U.S.C. § 2604(d) (1976); 24 C,F.R. § 3500.6(a) (1978).
194. RESPA is applicable to every transaction that involves a "federally related
mortgage loan," the definition of which depends on both the nature of the property
secured by the loan and the existence of a "federal connection" with respect to either
the lender or the loan. 12 U.S.C. § 2602 (1976); 24 C.F.R. § 3500.5 (1978). The loan
must be secured by a first lien on residential real property, including individual units
of condominiums and cooperatives, that is principally for the occupancy of from one
to four families. 12 U.S.C. § 2602(1)(A) (1976). The requisite federal connection of the
lender may be that its deposits are insured by the federal government, that it is
regulated by any agency of the federal government, or that it is a creditor as defined
in the Consumer Credit Protection Act. See 12 U.S.C. § 1602(f), 2602(1)(B)(i), (iv)
(1976). The requisite federal connection of the loan may be that it is insured, guaran-
teed, or assisted in any way by any agency of the federal government, or that it is
intended to be sold ultimately to Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae, or Freddie Mac. 12
U.S.C. § 2602(1)(B)(ii), (iii) (1976). The vast majority of home purchases are financed
with federally related mortgage loans. Telephone Interview with Richard Patterson,
HUD Real Estate Practices Staff (June 21, 1978).
195. OFFICE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRs AND REGULATORY FUNCTIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, Sa- LEMENT COSTS: A HUD GumE (rev. ed. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as SmrrLEMENT COSTS], reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT, REAL ESTATE SETrIEMENT PROCEDURES Act: STATUTE, REGULA-
TIONS, SPECIAL INFORMATION BOoKLET (1977).
196. Id. at 4-10.
197. Id. at 11-16.
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or range for each charge""' 8 for a settlement service that the home-
buyer is likely to incur. These estimates cover: the real estate bro-
ker's commission, in the event that the commission is an obligation
of the buyer; items payable in connection with the loan, such as loan
origination fee, loan discount, appraisal fee, credit report, lender's
inspection fee, and mortgage insurance application fee; items re-
quired by the lender to be paid in advance, such as interest that
accrues on the mortgage loan from date of settlement until the be-
ginning of the period covered by the first monthly payment and
mortgage insurance premium; title charges, such as settlement fee,
abstract or title search, title examination, title insurance, prepara-
tion of documents, notary fees, and attorney's fees; government re-
cording and transfer charges; and miscellaneous additional settle-
ment charges, such as survey, pest and fungus inspection, structural
soundness inspection, and homeowner's warranty coverage."'
The good faith estimates do not, however, cover all items that
the homebuyer will be required to pay in cash at settlement. Among
the items not required to be disclosed as part of the good faith esti-
mates are various deposits required by the lender itself. These items
include any hazard insurance premium required by the lender to be
paid in advance and any reserves required to be deposited with the
lender for such things as hazard and mortgage insurance premiums,
property taxes, and special assessments.2 Other items for which no
amounts are required to be disclosed, although the homebuyer may
have to pay some of them in cash at settlement, are adjustments
between the buyer and seller for property taxes and special assess-
ments paid by the seller in advance."0 '
If the lender requires that a particular provider be used to pro-
vide legal services, title examination, or title insurance, or to conduct
the settlement, and requires the homebuyer to pay the cost of such
services regardless of the interests represented by the provider, the
lender must base its good faith estimate upon its knowledge of the
amount charged by such provider and must state whether or not the
provider has a business relationship with the lender. 2 In the common
situation in which the lender selects an attorney to represent its inter-
ests, the homebuyer is advised to select his own attorney to protect
his interests.0 3 There is no requirement for disclosure of what such
independent representation is likely to cost.
The last two disclosures-the actual settlement costs known on
198. Id. at 11.
199. Id. at 11, 24-29.
200. Id. at 11, 27.
201. Id. at 36-37.
202. Id. at 12.
203. Id. at 12-13.
[Vol. 63:367
RESPA
the business day immediately preceding settlement and the settle-
ment costs actually paid-are given to the homebuyer by the person
conducting the settlement."4 If the buyer so requests, the person
conducting the settlement must permit the homebuyer to inspect the
settlement statement, completed to the extent of those items known
by the person conducting the settlement, on the business day imme-
diately preceding the date of settlement. There is, however, no re-
quirement that any settlement cost items be known and available for
inspection on that day. The completed settlement statement must be
delivered to the homebuyer at settlement, unless the homebuyer
waives in writing the right to such delivery, the homebuyer or his
agent does not attend the settlement, or the person conducting the
settlement does not require a meeting. 25
When measured against the purposes that a properly drawn
scheme of federal regulation of settlement costs based upon the con-
cept of disclosure should serve,2 6 the RESPA disclosures are inade-
quate for two reasons: they come too late in the settlement process
and they are too incomplete to be of significant assistance to the
homebuyer.
From the standpoint of the homebuyer, the settlement process
begins when he first thinks about purchasing a home. One of the first
decisions he must make is whether he can afford to buy a home with
the amount of cash he has available. If he has not purchased a home
previously and is not otherwise familiar with the settlement process,
he is likely to calculate his initial cash requirements by reference to
the amount of down payment he would have to make at the prevailing
loan-to-value ratio, without taking into account any loan origination
and settlement costs. Although undoubtedly many real estate brokers
give prospective homebuyers some information about the initial costs
involved in purchasing a home, a real estate broker who is eager to
consummate a sale might well fail to volunteer information about the
magnitude of the total costs until the prospective homebuyer has
entered into a contract of sale. The special information booklet and
the good faith estimates now required by RESPA would enable the
prospective homebuyer to calculate some of the front-end costs, but
204. These disclosures must be made on the Uniform Settlement Statement
(HUD-1), which is the standard real estate settlement form required to be used in
all transactions that involve federally related mortgage loans. 12 U.S.C. § 2603 (1976);
24 C.F.R. §§ 3500.8-.10, app. A (1978). HUD-1 contains all of the settlement costs as
to which good faith estimates are required, plus hazard insurance premiums required
by the lender to be paid in advance, reserves required to be deposited with the lender,
and adjustments between the buyer and seller.
205. 24 C.F.R. § 3500.10 (1978). In these situations, the person conducting the
settlement must mail or deliver HUD-1 as soon as practicable after settlement.
SETTLEMENT COSTS, supra note 195, at 11.
206. See text at pp. 421-22 supra.
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RESPA does not require that this information be made available
until after the homebuyer has signed the contract of sale and applied
for a mortgage loan.
Even if RESPA required these disclosures to be made at the
precontract stage, they still would be inadequate because the good
faith estimates do not include all items that the homebuyer will have
to pay in cash at settlement. The items as to which good faith esti-
mates are not required, such as hazard insurance premiums, reserves
required to be deposited with the lender for future hazard and mort-
gage insurance premiums, property taxes and special assessments,
adjustments between buyer and seller for property taxes and special
assessments paid by the seller in advance, and legal fees for indepen-
dent representation of the buyer, easily could total in excess of a
thousand dollars.
Although the special information booklet does contain descrip-
tions of the items not required to be disclosed and instructions on how
to calculate them,"' RESPA puts the task of obtaining the figures
and making the calculations on the homebuyer. This allocation of
responsibility is inconsistent with the concept of disclosure regula-
tion. RESPA is, therefore, wholly inadequate to serve the first pur-
pose of disclosure regulation: It does not enable a prospective home-
buyer, prior to the time he becomes contractually bound, to deter-
mine whether he can afford to buy a particular home with the amount
of cash he has available.
Once the prospective homebuyer has found a home, typically he
will ask the real estate broker for advice as to how much below the
listing price the owner actually is willing to sell. This puts the real
estate broker in an awkward position. He may have worked closely
with the prospective homebuyer over an extended period of time
trying to find a suitable property, but he is the agent of the owner.
Although he has an obligation to deal fairly with the buyer,"0 8 the real
estate broker may be considered to have breached his duty to the
owner if he discloses the owner's minimum acceptable price."9
The homebuyer may realize quickly that he is on his own with
respect to price negotiations, but he is less likely to be cognizant of
all the factors other than price that he should consider before making
an offer to buy. Often, the homebuyer has been told that certain
settlement costs are the obligation of the buyer but has not been told
207. Sm rm"Er CosTS, supra note 195.
208. See, e.g., Zichlin v. Dill, 157 Fla. 96, 25 So. 2d 4 (1946); Treadway v. Piazza,
156 So. 2d 328, 330 (La. App. 1963); Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528,
236 A.2d 843 (1967).
209. See, e.g., Alford v. Creagh, 7 Ala. App. 358, 62 So. 254 (1913); Haymes v.
Rogers, 70 Ariz. 257, 219 P. 2d 339, rev'd on rehearing, 70 Ariz. 408, 222 P. 2d 789
(1950).
[Vol. 63:367
RESPA
that he can negotiate with the seller as to who will pay any specific
cost. It is almost certain that the homebuyer will be given a standard
form sales contract to sign. Such a form contract will have been
drafted by the local bar association and adopted by the local real
estate association. It is therefore likely to be seller oriented. Since
there is no one in the picture who represents the homebuyer's inter-
ests, he will have no independent advice as to whether the contract
adequately protects him unless he obtains his own counsel before
signing.
The RESPA special information booklet contains some impor-
tant points for the homebuyer to consider regarding the contract of
sale, including the suggestion that the homebuyer may want to ask
an attorney to review the proposed agreement."' This section of the
booklet is prefaced with the statement: "If you have obtained this
booklet before you have signed a sales contract with the seller of the
property, here are some important points to consider regarding the
contract." '' The concluding paragraph tells the homebuyer that
"once signed, the contract is binding on [him] and the seller.2 12
This information, when provided by the lender in accordance with
the RESPA timetable, gives the homebuyer nothing more than hind-
sight and may well leave him thinking that he got a bad deal-an un-
happy thought with which to begin the process of ownership of a new
home. RESPA, then, is wholly inadequate to serve the second pur-
pose of disclosure regulation: It does not provide the homebuyer
with sufficient information in time for him to determine whether he
should hire an attorney to negotiate the contract of sale on his be-
half, including negotiation as to which party will bear any specific
loan origination or settlement costs.
After the homebuyer has entered into the contract of sale, he
generally has, under the agreement, a limited period within which he
must obtain financing. If mortgage money is tight, his source of funds
may be limited to a lending institution with which he has a relation-
ship or (particularly if the new home is in a new locality) with which
the real estate broker or builder has a relationship. If mortgage money
is readily available, the homebuyer who shops among mortgage lend-
ers for the best terms is likely to find-in addition to any differences
in interest rate, loan-to-value ratio, and length of mortgage
term-considerable variation in loan origination fees and settlement
cost requirements. Frequently, these variations make it extremely
difficult for the homebuyer to determine which lender's financing
arrangements are the most favorable.
210. SsrLMENT ComS, supra note 195, at 5-7.
211. Id. at 5.
212. Id. at 7.
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The RESPA special information booklet contains a section on
comparing lender costs that illustrates how to convert front-end
costs, such as loan origination and settlement costs, into the equiva-
lent of interest over the life of the loan in order to determine which
lender offers the best terms."3 Unfortunately, however, by the time
the homebuyer receives this information under RESPA, he already
has made an application for a loan and, in many localities, he has
paid an application fee that typically ranges from $50 to $100 but
may reach as high as $150.211 At this point, the homebuyer will not
be eager to shop further, since any savings that could be realized
would be reduced by the additional application fee.
Furthermore, when a homebuyer selects a particular lender, or-
dinarily he will be required to pay for settlement services rendered
to the lender by a provider of services chosen by the lender. RESPA
does not prohibit the common practice of lender selection of various
settlement services providers, usually an attorney and a title insur-
ance company.
When the lender requires a particular attorney and title insur-
ance company, they represent the interest of the lender, not the inter-
est of the homebuyer, even though the work done by them may be of
some benefit to the homebuyer.11 The homebuyer, therefore, as a
condition of the mortgage loan, pays the cost of the lender's attorney
and title insurance company. The lender does not, as is sometimes
erroneously believed, require that the homebuyer employ a particular
attorney or title insurance company to represent the homebuyer's
own interest.26 As a practical matter, however, once the lender selects
its attorney and title insurance company, the lender has determined
a large percentage of the homebuyer's title related costs.
In a locality in which it is the custom for an attorney to examine
and certify title to a title insurance company, the lender's attorney
ordinarily performs three title related services: title examination and
certification, preparation of documents, and conduct of the settle-
213. Id. at 29-31.
214. These figures are based on a random telephone survey of lending institu-
tions conducted by one of the author's research assistants. Many large institutions in
New York, Philadelphia, and Miami, as well as some in Chicago and Los Angeles,
charge no application fee. Almost all other institutions surveyed charge fees ranging
from $50 to $100, with institutions in the Virginia and Maryland suburbs of Washing-
ton, D.C. typically charging $115. Two New Jersey institutions reported fees of $150.
215. See HUD-VA REPORT, supra note 8, at 10-11, reprinted in 1972 House Hear-
ings, supra note 8, at 746-47.
216. The regulations governing federally chartered savings and loan associations
prohibit these institutions from conditioning any mortgage loan on the borrower's
contracting with any specific person or organization for insurance services or legal
services. The regulations expressly recognize, however, that the institution may require
a homebuyer to reimburse the institution for legal services rendered to the institution
by its attorney. 12 C.F.R. § 563.25 (1978).
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ment. The title insurance company, based on the attorney's certifica-
tion, issues a title insurance policy insuring the lender's interest in
the property. The lender charges the homebuyer for the lender's at-
torney's fee and the lender's title insurance premium. Yet, the home-
buyer does not have any control over the amount of these costs once
he has selected the lender. Since they do not have to compete for the
homebuyer's business, the lender's attorney and title insurance com-
pany, have no incentive to reduce their fees.
In this situation, the homebuyer could not obtain any economic
advantage by selecting his own attorney and title insurance company.
If the homebuyer had his own attorney to represent his interests, the
lender's attorney would nevertheless examine title, prepare docu-
ments, and conduct the settlement. The protection of the home-
buyer's interest by his attorney would be limited to review of the
work performed by the lender's attorney and attendance at the set-
tlement. Since the presence of the homebuyer's attorney would not
change the tasks to be performed by the lender's attorney, there
would be no effect on the latter's fees. Notwithstanding the addi-
tional cost, it may, of course, be reasonable for the homebuyer to have
his own attorney to protect his interest.2 17
If the homebuyer wants a title policy insuring his interest in the
property as owner, he has no realistic choice but to obtain it from the
title insurance company selected by the lender. Otherwise, an addi-
tional title search and examination would be required, unless the
lender's attorney were willing to certify title to the buyer's title insur-
ance company, based on the attorney's completed title examination.
Even if he were willing to do so, the cost of a mortgagee's policy and
an owner's policy issued at the same time by the same title insurance
company is substantially less than the cost of the two policies issued
separately by different title insurance companies.2 18
The homebuyer cannot obtain any significant reduction in title
related costs unless he is able to select both the attorney who will
examine and certify title and the title insurance company that will
insure both the owner's and the lender's interest. RESPA does not
give the homebuyer this right. Instead, the regulations thereunder
expressly recognize the practice of lender specification of service
providers. They require only that, as part of the good faith estimates,
the lender identify the provider, estimate its costs, and state whether
or not such provider has a business relationship with the lender.219
Moreover, the homebuyer is not entitled to even this limited
217. See HUD-VA REPoirr, supra note 8, at 10-11, reprinted in 1972 House Hear-
ings, supra note 8, at 746-47.
218. See id. at 9, 1972 House Hearings, supra note 8, at 745.
219. The nature of any business relationship need not be disclosed. 24 C.F.R. §
3500.7(e) (1978).
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disclosure until after he has applied for the loan and thereby commit-
ted himself to paying the charges of the related provider. Even though
the special information booklet and good faith estimates might be of
some assistance to the homebuyer in shopping for settlement services
providers other than those required by the lender, to the extent that
the selection of a lender determines the providers to be used, such
disclosure comes too late to make shopping worthwhile. This same
criticism applies to the inadequate opportunity RESPA provides to
the homebuyer to evaluate any recommendations he receives as to a
mortgage lender or settlement services provider from the broker or
builder. The homebuyer does not obtain the special information
booklet and good faith estimates until he accepts the recommenda-
tions and applies for a loan.
RESPA is, therefore, inadequate to serve the third purpose of
disclosure regulation: It does not facilitate comparison shopping by
the homebuyer for a mortgage loan and only partially facilitates com-
parison shopping for other settlement service providers. Nor does it
adequately facilitate evaluation of any mortgage lender or settlement
service providers recommended by the real estate broker or builder
or of settlement service providers required by the mortgage lender.
RESPA should be amended to give the homebuyer the initial choice
of settlement service providers without sacrificing the mortgage
lender's legitimate interest in the security of its mortgage loan."'
The inadequacies of the special information booklet and the good
faith estimates as the means of disclosure are attributable to the
adoption of the concept of the federally related mortgage loan as the
basis upon which to exercise federal power over mortgage settlement
costs"'t and the consequent selection of the lender as the appropriate
participant in the settlement process to make the disclosures. Con-
gress adopted the concept of the federally related mortgage loan to
overcome objections to federal regulation of settlement costs by those
who argued that the purchase of a home is a local transaction that
cannot be constitutionally subjected to federal regulation. At the
time RESPA was originally under consideration, this view found sup-
port in the language of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.2 Although that decision dealt
specifically with attorneys' fees for title examination, the court dis-
cussed other aspects of the home purchase transaction as though each
aspect could be analyzed separately for purposes of determining
whether it constituted or had an effect upon interstate commerce.22
220. See text at pp. 445-49 infra.
221. See note 193 supra.
222. 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); see text accompanying
notes 58-69 supra.
223. For example, although the court conceded that a significant portion of the
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With that background, selection of the lender as the party upon
which to impose affirmative settlement cost disclosure obligations
undoubtedly was considered to be the federal regulatory format best
able to withstand any constitutional challenge. A large percentage of
home mortgage lenders have one or more of the requisite federal
connections enumerated in RESPA,24 so that making them subject
to additional federal requirements must have seemed reasonable. As
earlier discussed, however, selection of the lender as the party to
make settlement cost disclosures inevitably meant that the disclo-
sures would come too late in the settlement process to serve their
purposes. Now that the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Goldfarb makes it clear that the settlement process must be
treated as an integrated whole when determining the effect on inter-
state commerce of a single aspect of the process, 2 1 RESPA should be
amended to give the homebuyer the necessary estimated settlement
cost disclosures before he becomes bound. 6
As the time for settlement approaches, the homebuyer has no
further need for estimated settlement costs but must turn his atten-
tion to actual settlement costs. As the special information booklet
warns: "Once you have obtained these estimates from the lender be
aware that they are only estimates. The final costs may not be the
same. Estimates are subject to changing market conditions, and fees
may change . . . .Remember that the lender's estimate is not a
guarantee. 2 27 Yet, despite this recognition of the potential disparity
between estimated settlement costs and actual settlement costs,
RESPA makes no provision for disclosure to the homebuyer of all of
the actual settlement costs at any time prior to settlement. The only
presettlement disclosure of actual settlement costs to which the
homebuyer is entitled is the right to inspect the Uniform Settlement
Statement (HUD-1) on the business day immediately preceding the
day of settlement. At that point the statement need be completed
only to the extent of those costs known on such day to the person
conducting the settlement.2 8
Inspection of an incomplete settlement statement is of minimal
utility to a homebuyer who must know the precise amount of money
he will be required to pay on the following day. Even if the settlement
statement were required to be completed for inspection on the busi-
funds furnished for the purchasing of homes in Fairfax County came from outside the
State of Virginia, it said that the act of the borrower in securing money from an out of
state lender did not make the selling of the house an interstate activity. 497 F.2d at
17.
224. See 12 U.S.C. § 2603(b) (1976).
225. 421 U.S. at 785 (1975). See text accompanying notes 58-69 supra.
226. See text at pp. 435-43 infra.
227. SmrLENTr CosTs, supra note 195, at 12.
228. 12 U.S.C. § 2603(b) (1976); 24 C.F.R. § 3500 (1978).
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ness day immediately preceding settlement, the disclosure still would
be inadequate. The good faith estimates are not required to include
all settlement items that the homebuyer will be required to pay in
cash; hence, even if the estimates were accurate, the total cash re-
quired at settlement still could be significantly in excess of the good
faith estimates. Under such circumstances the buyer could have an
insufficient opportunity to obtain the funds necessary to complete the
transaction on time. This might cause the settlement to be post-
poned, with resulting inconvenience to all parties." RESPA is, there-
fore, inadequate to serve the fourth purpose of disclosure regulation:
it does not provide the buyer, reasonably in advance of settlement,
with accurate information as to the amount of actual settlement costs
he will be required to pay at settlement, nor does it contain a mecha-
nism that will facilitate the buyer's prompt completion of the trans-
action when the amount of actual settlement costs is significantly in
excess of the amount of the estimated settlement costs.
Deciding whether RESPA serves the fifth purpose of settlement
regulation-reduction of loan origination and settlement
costs-requires consideration of provisions of RESPA in addition to
the disclosure provisions. RESPA's disclosure provisions, as has been
seen, do little to stimulate price competition that would exert down-
ward pressure on loan origination and settlement costs. To the extent
that high loan origination and settlement costs are the result of ineffi-
cient and noncompetitive practices by mortgage lenders and settle-
ment service providers, RESPA fails to promote cost reduction.2O If
disclosure were required before the homebuyer selects a lender, mort-
gage lenders and settlement service providers would have more incen-
tive to compete by reducing their fees and charges.
The antikickback provision of RESPA is designed to eliminate
the high costs resulting from loan origination and settlement charges
that may be inflated in order to cover referral fees, kickbacks, re-
bates, commissions, and the like that are used as inducements to
those firms and individuals who direct the placement of business.23'
229. See, e.g., 1975 House Hearings, supra note 46, at 405 (testimony of Benny
L. Kass); 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 46, at 206 (same).
230. See text accompanying notes 213-20 supra.
231. See HUD-VA RIPoRT, supra note 8, at 4, reprinted in 1972 House Hear-
ings, supra note 8, at 740. It has been argued that prohibition of rebates increases the
cost of title insurance services to homebuyers and that the unregulated payment and
acceptance of rebates would drive profits to competitive levels and eliminate excess
capacity in the industry. Owen, Kickbacks, Specialization, Price Fixing, and Effi-
ciency in Residential Real Estate Markets, 29 STAN. L. RIv. 931, 932, 942, 949-55, 960-
61 (1977). Owen places the blame for high costs on anti-competitive practices of real
estate brokers. If brokers competed in price, he says, those receiving added revenue in
the form of rebates would lower their fees to homebuyers. Id. at 952. Owen, however,
fails to discuss how his theory is affected by the fact that the real estate broker's
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Section 8 of RESPA prohibits, in connection with a federally related
mortgage loan, the giving or accepting of anything of value for the
referral of business and the giving or accepting of any part of any
settlement services charge except for services actually performed. 2
This provision prohibits practices that directly or indirectly, ex-
pressly or impliedly, have the effect of conferring a benefit of any kind
on a person who, in connection with settlement of a federally related
mortgage loan, refers business or performs either no services or ser-
vices not commensurate with the benefit conferred.rn Furthermore,
the conferring and receipt of a benefit is prohibited even if it "does
not result in an increase in the charge made for the settlement service
by the payor" of the benefit.24
Although RESPA probably has eliminated most of the more
straightforward referral and unearned fee arrangements that existed
previously and perhaps some of the indirect arrangements as well, it
does not necessarily follow that homebuyers have benefitted from a
commensurate reduction in charges. There is nothing in either the
statute or the regulations to prevent a settlement service provider
who previously received referral or unearned fees from another partic-
ipant in the transaction from increasing his own fees to the buyer so
that his income attributable to each settlement remains the same as
it was prior to RESPA. If, for example, the custom is for the lawyer
to examine a commercially prepared abstract of the title records and
certify the state of the title to a title insurer, and prior to RESPA the
title insurer paid the lawyer a commission of a portion of the prem-
ium for each title insurance policy initiated by him, following RESPA
the lawyer may simply increase his fee for title examination by an
amount equal to the commission formerly received.
There also is nothing in either the statute or the regulations
requiring the title insurer to reduce its premium by the amount of the
commission it paid prior to RESPA. If, following RESPA, the attor-
ney increases his fee and the title insurer maintains its premium at
the same rate, the homebuyer's total title related costs will have
increased by the amount of commission previously paid, rather than
decreased. Elimination of kickbacks and unearned fees, however de-
sirable as a matter of public policy, cannot, in and of itself, lower
settlement costs.rn
commission ordinarily is the obligation of the seller. Presumably he believes that
sellers would pass their savings on to buyers by lowering selling prices.
232. 12 U.S.C. § 2607 (1976). Violation of this section subjects a person to crimi-
nal penalties of a fine of up to $10,000 or up to a one year imprisonment, as well as
civil liability for three times the amount paid or received plus costs and attorney's fees.
233. See S. REP. No. 866, supra note 2, at 6, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6546, 6550.
234. 24 C.F.R. §§ 3500.14(d), app. B (1978).
235. One form of referral arrangement that was common prior to RESPA was a
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To the extent that high settlement costs had been attributable
to excessive reserve deposit requirements imposed by mortgage lend-
ers, RESPA has been effective in reducing such costs. The HUD-VA
Report on Mortgage Settlement Costs revealed that there were sub-
stantial unexplained variations in mortgagee requirements for the
prepayment of real estate taxes at settlement."' In some localities,
mortgage lenders were requiring homebuyers at settlement to deposit
one year's property tax into the reserve account in addition to an
initial deposit that, together with monthly payments into the reserve
account, would enable the lender to pay the property tax when it
became due. Under this system, the amount in the reserve account
would never drop below one year's property tax. RESPA limits the
cushion in the reserve account to no more than one-sixth of the esti-
mated amount of yearly property tax. 7 In some jurisdictions, there-
fore, RESPA has dramatically lowered the buyer's cash outlay at
settlement by an amount equal to five-sixths of the yearly property
tax.
RESPA is, therefore, adequate to serve the fifth purpose of set-
tlement cost regulation in only one respect: it establishes a reasonable
limitation on the initial deposits that the lender may require the
homebuyer to put into reserve accounts at settlement. In other re-
spects, however, RESPA is inadequate to reduce loan origination and
settlement costs because it does not give mortgage lenders or settle-
requirement by owner-developers of new home developments that purchasers of homes
in their developments obtain title insurance from a particular title insurance company.
In a community in which the custom was that employees of the title insurance com-
pany search and examine the titles for which the company issued policies, the pre-
RESPA arrangement worked as follows: The developer would acquire an unimproved
tract of land that he intended to develop with single family homes. The title insurance
company, for a nominal charge, if any, would search and examine title to the entire
tract and issue a policy of title insurance to the developer. After the tract was devel-
oped and the homes were sold, the title insurance company would issue a title insur-
ance policy to each homebuyer, who would be required to pay the full rate for title
search, examination, and insurance even though the company already had searched
and examined the title in the hands of the developer. In effect, therefore, the title
insurance company collected multiple fees for the same title search and examination.
Section 9 of RESPA, 12 U.S.C. § 2608 (1976), now prohibits a seller of property that
will be financed with a federally related mortgage loan from requiring, as a condition
of selling the property, that title insurance be purchased by the buyer from any partic-
ular title company. This prohibition applies even if the title insurance company gives
nothing of value to the seller. This provision also may result in an increase in costs to
the homebuyer. Under the pre-RESPA arrangement, the builder's savings on title
related costs would have enabled him to reduce the price of his homes. Under section
9, however, the builder now must pay title related costs, which are included in the price
of his homes, and each homebuyer still has to pay his own title related costs.
236. HUD-VA REPORT, supra note 8, at 72, reprinted in 1972 House Hearings,
supra note 8, at 806.
237. 12 U.S.C. § 2609 (1976).
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ment service providers sufficient incentive to compete on the basis of
price. By the time a homebuyer has paid his loan application fee and
thereby has become entitled to receive the special information book-
let and the good faith estimates, it is too late for him to compare
lenders' loan origination costs and requirements for settlement ser-
vice providers. So long as the homebuyer does not have the right to
select either the attorney who will examine and certify title and pre-
pare documents or the title insurance company, he has no opportun-
ity to reduce his major title related costs. Finally, prohibition of
kickbacks and unearned fees will not cause providers who previously
paid such fees to reduce their charges to the homebuyer unless there
are economic reasons for them to do so. The RESPA scheme gives
them no such incentive.
VII. RESPA REVISED: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
RESPA's inadequacies, particularly with respect to its disclosure
provisions, require further congressional action if homebuyers are to
realize any benefits. This section contains recommendations for legis-
lation within the basic framework of RESPA that would serve, as
RESPA does not, the five purposes of regulation of home mortgage
settlement costs based upon the concept of disclosure.m The recom-
mendations would change RESPA in two ways. First, disclosure of
loan origination and settlement costs would be required prior to the
signing of the contract of sale. Second, lenders would be prohibited
from selecting settlement service providers.
A. DIsCLOSURE OF ESTIMATED SETTLEMENT COSTS
RESPA should be amended to impose upon the real estate broker
the obligation to disclose all loan origination and settlement costs
prior to the contract of sale. In the case of the sale by the builder of
a new home, the builder should have this obligation. Only in the case
of the sale of an existing home without the services of a real estate
broker should the present scheme of postcontract disclosure by the
mortgage lender continue to apply.
1. Real Estate Broker Precontract Disclosure
Approximately ninety percent of the sales of existing homes are
made by real estate brokers.2' Since loan origination and settlement
costs are as much an integral part of the purchase of a home as is the
238. See text at pp. 421-22 supra.
239. Kerin Interview, supra note 9 (figure based on local statistics submitted to
N.A.R. by local boards of realtors).
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purchase price, precontract disclosure of these costs properly is to be
considered an integral part of the real estate broker's presentation of
information to the homebuyer. It is reasonable to expect the real
estate broker to be knowledgeable about mortgage loan terms and
settlement costs in his community. Furthermore, of all the partici-
pants in the settlement process, the real estate broker is in the best
position to make precontract disclosure of the nature of the settle-
ment process and the accompanying loan origination and settlement
costs.
As to disclosure of the nature of the settlement process, section
5(a) of RESPA40 should be amended to require HUD to distribute the
special information booklet to all real estate brokers who are engaged
in the sale of one-to-four family homes, 4' in addition to all lenders
that make federally related mortgage loans. The real estate broker
should be required to give the prospective homebuyer a copy of the
special information booklet at their initial meeting. This is the most
logical time for the prospective homebuyer to obtain information
about the nature of the settlement process. After reading the booklet,
the homebuyer would have some idea as to whether he wants to hire
an attorney to represent him during the negotiation of the contract
of sale or whether he wants to conduct negotiations on his own.
Prior to the time that the real estate broker accepts from the
prospective homebuyer an offer to purchase a home, to be submitted
to the seller, the real estate broker should be required to disclose all
of the estimated loan origination and settlement costs that the pro-
spective homebuyer would have to pay in connection with the pur-
chase. This precontract disclosure should meet the following require-
ments:
(1) It should be made in a separate document;
(2) it should cover all loan origination and settlement costs,
including prepaid items, payments into reserve accounts,
and adjustments between buyer and seller; and,
(3) it should list actual interest rates and fees charged by
named mortgage lenders and other named providers of settle-
ment services doing business in the same locality as the real
estate broker.
This precontract disclosure of estimated settlement costs should
be made on the same settlement statement form now prescribed
under section 4 of RESPA.242 This would enable a prospective home-
240. 12 U.S.C. § 2604(a) (1976).
241. This could be done by making the booklets available to state licensing
authorities who would then provide them to all licensed real estate brokers in the state.
242. 12 U.S.C. § 2603 (1976). When used as a disclosure statement, the settle-
ment statement form should be signed by both the real estate broker and the home-
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buyer to compare the initial costs of acquiring various homes, even
if the homes were located in areas in which settlement service cus-
toms differ. It also would enable a homebuyer eventually to compare
actual settlement costs with estimated settlement costs.
The precontract disclosure should cover all loan origination and
settlement costs listed in section L, Settlement Charges, of the Uni-
form Settlement Statement (HUD-1),4 3 as well as all adjustments
listed in section J for items paid by the seller in advance and for items
unpaid by seller (adjustments between buyer and seller). Since the
size of the downpayment is an important consideration, the disclo-
sures made with respect to mortgage lenders should include the loan-
to-value ratio at which each lender customarily makes home mort-
gage loans.2" Calculation of items required by the lender to be paid
in advance, initial deposits into reserve accounts, and buyer-seller
adjustments should be based on an estimated settlement date stated
on the form.
It should not be burdensome for real estate brokers to make the
disclosures outlined above. Local real estate brokers' boards or asso-
ciations could assist their members in compiling local information as
to loan origination fees and other lender requirements, fees charged
by various settlement service providers, and government charges.
Once a real estate broker had this information, it would be a simple
matter to prepare a basic precontract disclosure statement for each
new listing. If the broker were a member of the local multiple listing
service, this basic precontract disclosure statement could become an
buyer and should contain a statement that the homebuyer has received a copy of the
special information booklet.
243. The precontract disclosure should not cover the real estate broker's commis-
sion (line 700 of section L) unless it is the obligation of the buyer. It should cover lines
800 through 1400, which are: items payable in connection with the loan, such as loan
origination fee, loan discount (points), appraisal fee, credit report, lender's inspection
fee, and mortgage insurance application fee; items required by the lender to be paid
in advance, such as interest from settlement to first regular monthly payment, mort-
gage insurance premium, and hazard insurance premium; initial deposits into reserve
accounts required by the lender for such things as hazard insurance, mortgage insur-
ance, property taxes, and assessments; title charges, such as settlement fee, abstract
or title search, title examination, title insurance, preparation of documents, and notary
fees; government recording and transfer charges; and additional settlement charges,
such as survey and pest inspection.
244. Factors in addition to loan-to-value ratio, loan otigination fees, and rate of
interest also are important to the homebuyer. These include length of the loan term
and rate of amortization, both of which affect the size of the monthly payment. Disclo-
sure of these items in the precontract disclosure statement would be too cumbersome
since the lender may have various plans available. Instead, the portions of the special
information booklet advising the homebuyer on the selection of a lender, SMTrLEMENT
CosTs, supra note 195, at 5-6, and on the comparison of lender costs, id. at 29-30,
should be revised to assist the homebuyer in evaluating the effect of these factors on
the monthly payment.
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integral part of the listing, available to all brokers who might sell the
property. Prospective homebuyers could see this information along
with the information about the property that traditionally is con-
tained in the multiple listing statement. When the prospective home-
buyer is prepared to make an offer to purchase a particular home, the
selling broker could prepare the statutorily required precontract dis-
closure form using the information from the listing. The only calcula-
tions necessary would be for items that change in amount depending
upon the date of settlement, such as deposits into reserve accounts
and adjustments between buyer and seller.
Although disclosure of estimated settlement costs is crucial in
order to enable a prospective homebuyer to determine whether he can
afford the initial costs of acquiring a home, it is insufficient to enable
him to comparison shop for a mortgage loan and settlement services
on the best available terms. In addition to precontract disclosure of
estimated settlement costs, therefore, RESPA should also require
that real estate brokers furnish prospective homebuyers with infor-
mation as to actual loan-to-value ratios, and interest rates and fees
charged by named mortgage lenders and other named providers of
settlement services doing business in the community. At least three
mortgage lenders and three providers of each type of settlement ser-
vice, whose fees are representative of the range of fees available in
the community, should be required to be named. Additional mort-
gage lenders and providers could be named at the option of the real
estate broker and should be required if the mortgage lender or pro-
vider furnished the real estate broker with a written request for a
listing containing a description of the mortgage lender's or provider's
services and fees. This recommendation would shift the responsi-
bility for comparison shopping from the homebuyer, who, because
of unfamiliarity with the community and with settlement customs
is least able to shop effectively, to the real estate broker, who, be-
cause of his 'special knowledge of the community and of settlement
customs, is best able to shop effectively. 45
245. Section 15 of RESPA, 12 U.S.C. § 2613 (1976), requires the Secretary of
HUD to prepare and include in the special information booklets statements of the
range of costs for specific settlement services in selected housing market areas. In its
interim report to Congress on the feasibility of preparing and including settlement cost
range statements for all housing market areas in the special information booklets for
such areas, HUD appears to have proceeded on the assumption that any range-of-cost
information would not identify any actual settlement service providers whose fees
comprised the range-of-costs. See INTERM REPORT, supra note 72. HUD also assumed,
as does section 15, that homebuyers would receive range information from lenders
immediately upon application for a loan, although it recognized that other means of
distribution, particularly distribution through real estate brokers, would be more effi-
cacious. Id. at 21. HUD's range-of-costs demonstration program, as proposed in the
Interim Report, id. at 26, is inadequate to provide comprehensive answers to all of the
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It is as reasonable to require real estate brokers to disclose actual
interest rates and fees charged by named mortgage lenders and settle-
ment service providers as it is to require them to disclose estimated
settlement costs, since both disclosures are based on the same infor-
mation. In addition to the likelihood that local real estate brokers'
boards or associations would assist their members in obtaining this
information, it also is likely that providers of settlement services
would be eager to furnish real estate brokers with information as to
their services and fees so as to be assured of being brought to the
attention of homebuyers. This would act as a check on brokers who
otherwise would prefer listing only their favored providers despite the
requirement that listings be representative of the available price
range.
The only settlement service provider as to which there might be
some problem in obtaining information is the attorney. Following the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Bates v. State Bar
of Arizona,216 however, such information should now be available
more readily than it previously has been. Attorneys, like other pro-
viders, now should be able to supply real estate brokers with an
accurate estimate of their legal fees for settlement services performed
in connection with a routine home purchase transaction. 4?
policy issues posed therein. Id. at 14. For example, in connection with the issue of what
impact range data has on consumer attitudes and behavior, the Interim Report poses
a series of questions designed in part to determine what types of information may help
consumers to shop more effectively. Yet, the Interim Report never suggests disclosure
of the information that would be most useful to the homebuyer-the identities of the
providers whose services are available at specific prices within the disclosed range-of-
costs. It seems apparent that homebuyers who have the names and prices of settlement
service providers are more likely to comparison shop than are those who are given a
price range and are told, in effect, to go see what they can find.
246. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
247. Prior to Bates, and the 1977 amendments to the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, an attorney who followed the recommendation that providers of settle-
ment services submit their names, description of settlement services, and fees to real
estate brokers for disclosure to homebuyers, might have faced disciplinary action on
the ground that he had engaged in advertising. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
REsPONSIBILrrY EC 2-9, 2-10; DR 2-101, 2-102 (1976) (current version in August 1978
edition). In Bates, the Supreme Court struck down, on first amendment grounds, the
total prohibition on attorney advertising, holding that a state may not prevent the
publication of a truthful advertisement concerning the availability and terms of rou-
tine legal services. 433 U.S. at 384. Representation of the buyer in connection with the
purchase of a single family home, including negotiation of the contract of sale, perform-
ance of title-related services customarily provided by attorneys in the community, and
conduct of the settlement, may not be as uncomplicated as the services involved in
Bates. Nevertheless, they may be described as sufficiently routine to permit an attor-
ney to set a fee for such services and submit a written statement of the services and
fee to a real estate broker for disclosure to homebuyers. Such "advertising," if specifi-
cally authorized by the proposed amendment to RESPA and defined by regulations
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So long as it is difficult for homebuyers to comparison shop for
mortgage lenders and settlement service providers because of un-
timely and inadequate disclosure of information about the nature and
cost of loan origination and settlement services, and so long as mort-
gage lenders and settlement service providers can continue to rely
on referrals of business by real estate brokers, even in the absence
of the payment of referral fees, there will be no incentive for mortgage
lenders and settlement service providers to compete on the basis of
lower costs to the homebuyer. The proposed amendment to RESPA
requiring real estate brokers to disclose actual loan origination and
settlement service fees charged by named mortgage lenders and set-
tlement service providers would not only facilitate comparison shop-
ping, but also would make it difficult for the real estate broker to
refer the homebuyer to a mortgage lender and to settlement service
providers without regard to cost. The proposed amendment would
thus provide an incentive for mortgage lenders and settlement service
providers to compete on the basis of lower costs to the homebuyer.
2. Builder Precontract Disclosure
Although a few builders of new homes use the services of real
estate brokers to sell their homes, most builders rely upon their own
employees to sell their homes.248 Many builders of new homes pay all
or a portion of their buyers' loan origination and title related costs,
presumably including these costs in the selling price. Other builders
do not pay any of these costs, so that their buyers pay the same loan
origination and settlement costs that they would have to pay in the
case of the purchase of an existing home. As part of the proposed
revision of RESPA, whenever a builder of new homes uses the ser-
vices of a real estate broker, the real estate broker would be subject
to all of the disclosure obligations set forth above,24 except that no
disclosure of providers would be required with respect to title related
services, the costs of which were borne by the builder. In the case of
the sale by the builder of a new home, RESPA should be amended
adopted by HUD, would be subject to safeguards sufficient to meet the Supreme
Court's concern that the consumer not be misled by legal advertising.
Shortly after the decision in Bates, the ABA amended its Code of Professional
Responsibility to provide guidelines for advertising. The amendment does not limit the
types of services for which advertising would be permitted to those routine services
involved in Bates. It deals principally with the form of the advertising. See ABA ConE
OF PROFESSIONAL RFsPONSMuLrrY DR 2-101 (as amended 1978). The Code now specifi-
cally authorizes the advertisement of "[flixed fees for specific legal services . . . . "
Id., DR 2-101(B)(25). The footnote to this subsection, however, notes that "[tihe
agency having jurisdiction under state law may desire to issue appropriate guidelines
defining 'specific legal services' ". Id. (emphasis deleted).
248. Kerin Interview, supra note 9.
249. See text accompanying notes 240-45 supra.
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to provide that the builder has the obligation to make these disclo-
sures.2 0
Requiring builders who sell their homes without the services of
a real estate broker to be responsible for obtaining information on
loan origination and settlement costs and disclosing it to homebuyers
would not be unreasonably burdensome. Builders who construct
homes in a particular community undoubtedly familiarize them-
selves with the costs of obtaining home mortgage financing in that
community as a matter of sound business planning. As to title related
settlement costs, when the builder is considering whether or not to
250. There can be little doubt that Congress has the power under the commerce
clause to impose this disclosure obligation on the builder. The construction of single
family homes by a builder, even if such construction occurs wholly within a single
state, is an integral part of, and substantially affects, interstate commerce.
With respect to the integral nature of the builder's activities with interstate com-
merce, the builder's position as the seller of a newly constructed house is, in many
ways, analogous to that of the real estate broker, whose constitutional amenability to
federal regulation has already been discussed. See text accompanying notes 70-91
supra. Just as an owner's decision to list an existing home for sale with a real estate
broker sets the settlement process in motion, so a builder's decision to construct single
family homes for sale by his employees sets that process in motion. The builder
seeks prospective purchasers in many of the same ways as does the real estate broker.
He may, for example, attempt to attract buyers from other states by advertising his
houses for sale in newspapers and magazines that are circulated outside the state. Like
the real estate broker, the builder's involvement in interstate commerce does not end
when he has found a buyer. Frequently, the builder arranges for a particular lending
institution to make mortgage loans to all purchasers from the builder, the funds for
which may come from outside the state. The builder also may pay some or all the costs
of title related services required by the lender, such as search, examination and assur-
ance of title; preparation of documents; and conduct of the settlement. It would be
artificial to separate the builder's activities from the interstate aspects of the home
purchase transaction, just as it would be artificial to so separate the real estate broker's
services, and just as it was held to be artificial in Goldfarb to so separate the attorney's
services, 421 U.S. 773, 785 (1975); see text accompanying notes 58-83 supra.
The builder's activities, both before and after the contract of sale, also substan-
tially affect interstate commerce. The health of the single family housing sector is an
important factor in the health of the national economy. Even a builder whose construc-
tion activities take place within a single state uses materials supplied by various
industries throughout the country. If the high initial costs of purchasing and financing
a new single family home deter large numbers of potential homebuyers, the consequent
decline in housing starts would affect the industries supplying construction materials
nationwide. To the extent that high loan origination and settlement costs contribute
to the high costs of acquiring a home, it is reasonable for Congress to enact legislation
imposing disclosure obligations on builders for the purpose of lowering such costs. Such
legislation would have a positive effect on interstate commerce by increasing the flow
of construction-related materials in interstate trade. Cf. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294 (1964) (application of federal civil rights legislation held constitutional under
the commerce clause where racial discrimination in small restaurant with an intrastate
clientele affected flow of food products in interstate commerce).
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"pay" these buyer costs by including them in the price of the home,
he would become aware of the identities of local settlement service
providers and could easily determine their costs. If the builder de-
cided to "pay" these costs, he would have no obligation to disclose
the identities and fees of any settlement service providers. If, on the
other hand, the builder decided that the buyer would have to bear
these costs directly, it is likely that settlement service providers
would be eager to furnish the builder with information about their
services and fees so that homebuyers could learn their identities.
Disclosure of information by builders to homebuyers would be a
simple matter. The builder could make the special information book-
let and the form containing estimated settlement costs available to
all prospective homebuyers, along with his promotional literature.
Prior to the time that the builder and the homebuyer enter into the
contract of sale, they both would be required to sign the precontract
disclosure statement and, if the buyer is to pay title related settle-
ment costs, the builder would be required to furnish the buyer with
the list of providers and their fees at the same time.
Precontract disclosure by the builder of loan origination and set-
tlement costs in connection with the purchase of a newly constructed
home is an important supplement to real estate broker precontract
disclosure. It would enable prospective homebuyers to compare the
initial costs of acquiring a new home as opposed to an existing home,
as well as enable them to compare the purchase arrangements avail-
able from various builders. It also would strengthen the pro-
competitive effect of precontract disclosure by ensuring that a sub-
stantial segment of the homebuying public has access to information
about the identities and costs of mortgage lenders and settlement
service providers.
3. Mortgage Lender Postcontract Disclosure
Under the proposed revision of RESPA, only the purchasers of
existing homes who buy directly from the owners would not be enti-
tled to precontract disclosure of loan origination and settlement
costs. As a practical matter, such disclosure could not be made prior
to the time of loan application. The present RESPA scheme of post-
contract disclosure by the mortgage lender should be retained in
order to provide such purchasers with information about loan origina-
tion and settlement costs.
The special information booklet and the disclosure of estimated
settlement costs still would come too late for the homebuyer to be
able to determine whether he could afford to buy a particular home
with the amount of cash he had available initially."' But if the pre-
251. See text accompAnying notes 206-07 supra.
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sent RESPA postcontract disclosure scheme supplemented a precon-
tract disclosure system, the untimeliness would be less likely to
harm the homebuyer as seriously as it does now. If the homebuyer
previously had looked at other existing homes with a real estate bro-
ker, he already would have received a copy of the special information
booklet and would have seen the basic estimated disclosure forms
accompanying the various listings of available properties. He would,
therefore, have obtained enough information to determine whether or
not to hire an attorney and would have a general idea of loan origina-
tion and settlement costs for houses in his price range.
The mortgage lender would determine whether or not it was
obligated to make postcontract disclosure by asking, on its loan ap-
plication, whether a real estate broker was involved in the transac-
tion. If so, the mortgage lender would have no further disclosure
obligation. It should not have to determine whether the real estate
broker's obligation under RESPA has been fulfilled, but should be
entitled to so assume.
Postcontract disclosure by the mortgage lender should be
strengthened by requiring the lender to make disclosures not now
required under RESPA,12 but which would be required of real estate
brokers and builders under the proposed precontract disclosure
amendments.3 To enable the homebuyer to comparison shop for
settlement service providers effectively, the mortgage lender also
should have the same obligation as the real estate broker and the
builder to disclose actual fees charged by named providers of settle-
ment services in the community.24 The mortgage lender should not,
however, be required to disclose interest rates and loan origination
fees charged by other mortgage lenders. Such disclosure would be of
little value because the homebuyer, by making a mortgage loan appli-
cation, already would have selected a lender. Failure to disclose in-
terest rates and loan origination fees would not be a prejudicial to a
homebuyer who purchased an existing home directly from the owner
as it would be in the case of a homebuyer who utilized the services of
a real estate broker, since the former is likely to have done some
comparison shopping for a loan prior to selecting a mortgage lender,
whereas the latter might well have been steered to the lender by a
real estate broker.
B. DISCLOSURE AND PAYMENT OF ACTUAL SETTLEMENT COSTS
Ultimately, the value to the homebuyer of disclosure of esti-
mated settlement costs depends on whether or not the estimates bear
252. See text at p. 426 supra.
253. See text accompanying notes 240-45, 249-50 supra.
254. See text at pp. 443-45 infra.
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a reasonable relation to actual settlement costs. If RESPA were
amended, as suggested, to include in the disclosure of estimated set-
tlement costs all items that the homebuyer would have to pay in cash
at settlement, disclosure of estimated settlement costs would be
much more useful to the homebuyer for financial planning purposes
than it is now. But, as settlement approaches, even the more com-
plete estimates proposed above should be superseded by a statement
of the actual amount that the homebuyer will need in order to com-
plete the transaction. The homebuyer should be given this informa-
tion sufficiently in advance of settlement to enable him to make the
necessary financial arrangements. If the actual settlement costs are
reasonably related to the estimated settlement costs, one week should
be adequate for this purpose. If, however, actual costs are signifi-
cantly in excess of estimated settlement costs, the homebuyer, who
should be entitled to rely on the estimated costs in his financial
planning, might not be able to raise the difference within that time.
Under those circumstances, neither the homebuyer nor the seller
should have his expectations disrupted by the postponement of the
settlement.
RESPA should, therefore, be amended to provide that the person
conducting the settlement shall make disclosure of actual settlement
costs not less than one week prior to the date of settlement. To facili-
tate comparison of actual settlement costs with estimated settlement
costs, both should be disclosed on the same form. If actual settlement
costs, including deposits into reserve accounts, prepaid items, and
buyer-seller adjustments, exceed estimated settlement costs by more
than ten percent, the person responsible for making the disclosure of
estimated settlement costs-the real estate broker, the builder, or the
mortgage lender-should be required under RESPA to advance to the
homebuyer the excess over ten percent in order to enable him to
complete the transaction as planned.25 The amount of the advance
should become payable by the homebuyer thirty days after settle-
ment.
In the event the person conducting the settlement is unable to
obtain this information on time, the homebuyer could be given the
255. A similar situation arises in the estimation of tariff charges by a motor
common carrier engaged in the transportation of household goods. The actual charges
for the transportation of such goods are based on the actual weight of the goods. At
the request of the shipper of the goods, the carrier is required to give the shipper an
estimate of the charges for proposed services. Ordinarily, the carrier requires payment
in full of actual charges upon delivery of the goods. Under a regulation promulgated
by the Interstate Commerce Commission, however, whenever the total actual charges
exceed the estimate of charges made by the carrier by more than ten percent, the
carrier must, upon request of the shipper, relinquish possession of the goods upon
payment of the amount of the estimated charges plus ten percent. See 49 C.F.R.
§ 1056.8(b) (1977).
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option of waiving his right to timely disclosure of actual costs or
postponing the settlement. The statute should, however, prohibit
waiver of the right to the advance of excess settlement costs. So long
as the homebuyer could not be required to pay at settlement an
amount in excess of ten percent over the estimated settlement costs,
he would not be prejudiced by waiving his right to timely disclosure
of actual costs.
The proposed compulsory advance of excess settlement costs is
designed to serve two important purposes: (1) to enable the home-
buyer to complete the transaction on time and (2) to encourage accu-
racy by the persons responsible for-making disclosure of estimated
settlement costs.
Timely settlement of the purchase of a home is important to the
buyer as well as other persons. If, as is often the case, the buyer of
an existing home also has sold his present home, postponement of the
buyer's settlement could disrupt not only the buyer's plans, but also
the plans of his seller and his buyer. Since settlements often are
timed to coincide with commencement of a new job or a new school
term, even a relatively short delay can cause serious inconvenience.
A homebuyer who has relied on the estimated settlement costs in his
financial planning should not have to suffer this inconvenience when
the actual costs exceed the estimated costs by more than ten percent.
This proposal would be an effective means of assuring that cost
estimates are kept accurate and current. To avoid having to make an
advance, the persons responsible for making the disclosure would be
careful not to underestimate the settlement costs. Overestimates also
would be discouraged because too high an estimate might deter a
prospective homebuyer from purchasing a home, even though he ac-
tually could afford it with the initial amount of cash he had available.
The inceiitive for accuracy that would result from the tension be-
tween the effects of underestimation and the effects of overestimation
should make unnecessary any other means of enforcing the proposed
precontract disclosure requirements.
C. RESTRICTIONS ON SELECTION BY MORTGAGE LENDERS OF SETTLE-
MENT SERVICE PROVIDERS
Many settlement services, such as title search, examination and
assurance, preparation of documents, and the conduct of the settle-
ment, whether in person or by the use of an escrow, are or could be
performed for the benefit of all three parties to the transaction-the
buyer, the seller, and the lender. To the extent that each of these
settlement services furthers the interest of the lender in assuring the
validity of its loan and mortgage or deed of trust, it is appropriate
for the lender to be concerned about the integrity and competence of
the providers of these services.
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The way in which lenders act upon this concern, however, in-
creases the buyer's settlement costs without any corresponding in-
crease in the protection afforded to the lender. Lenders, as a condi-
tion of making the mortgage loan, usually require that their attorney:
search and examine the title; certify it to the title insurance com-
pany; prepare the deed, note or bond, and mortgage or deed of trust;
and conduct the settlement. In addition, they require that a title
insurance company selected by the lender insure the lender's inter-
est in the property. These lenders then charge the homebuyer for
the fees of the attorney and title insurance company selected by the
lender to represent the lender's interest.
As noted earlier, once the lender has selected an attorney and a
title insurance company, most of the homebuyer's title related settle-
ment costs have been determined.27 Thus, legislation requiring dis-
closure of the names and fees of local mortgage lenders and settle-
ment service providers would be of limited use so long as lenders were
permitted to condition their mortgage loans on the above described
requirements. Comparison shopping effectively would be limited to
the selection of a lender. Attorneys and title insurance companies
who rely on a flow of business resulting from lender requirements im-
posed without regard to cost would continue to have little incentive
to compete on the basis of price. If settlement cost regulation based
upon the concept of disclosure is to be more fully effective in meeting
the objective of lowering settlement costs, it is necessary to impose
some restrictions on the selection of settlement service providers by
the mortgage lender.
RESPA should be amended to provide that the buyer has the
right to select the settlement service providers that will perform the
following functions: title search, examination and assurance; prepa-
ration of documents; and the conduct of the settlement, whether in
person or by the use of an escrow. Only one exception should be
recognized to the buyer's right of selection: in those communities in
which title assurance consists of the attorney's written opinion certi-
fying the state of the title, and that opinion is not supplemented by
title insurance, the lender should have the right to select the attorney
who will certify the state of the title to it. To protect the lender's
interest in the state of the title when title assurance is provided by a
policy of title insurance, the buyer's or seller's selection of a title
insurance company should be limited to a company that is on the
approved lists of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(FHLMC or Freddie Mac).2? Protection of the lender's interest in the
256. See HUD-VA REPORT, supra note 8, at 10-11, 15-16, reprinted in 1972 House
Hearings, supra note 8, at 746-47, 751-52.
257. See text accompanying notes 210-13 supra.
258. FHLMC, SELER'S GUIDES 9 (1977) (FHA-VA Mortgages § 3.202); id. at 125
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validity of its loan and mortgage or deed of trust should be effected
by permitting the lender to select an attorney to review the docu-
ments prepared by the buyer's attorney and to charge this attorney's
fee to the buyer.
The proposed amendment would affect three types of settlement
services providers: title insurance companies, attorneys, and escrow
companies."'
An analysis of the effect of the proposed amendment on title
insurance companies requires distinguishing between title insurance
companies that issue policies based upon a title search and examina-
tion conducted by their own employees and title insurance companies
that issue policies based upon an attorney's written certification of
title to the title insurance company.8
As part of the disclosure of named settlement service providers
required to be made by the real estate broker, builder, or lender, the
buyer would be given a list, of local title insurance companies and
statements concerning their fees for title insurance, whether an attor-
ney's opinion of title is required, and whether the insurance company
was approved by Freddie Mac. If the title insurance company used
its own employees to search and examine titles, the buyer would
simply select an approved company to insure his ownership interest
in the property. The lender would then be required to use the same
title insurance company to insure its interest in the property. The
buyer would thus be able to select the approved title insurance com-
pany that offered the lowest price." 1
If the title" insurance company relied on written opinions of title
by attorneys, the situation would be somewhat more complex. Such
a title insurance company should have the right to refuse to issue a
policy of title insurance based upon an opinion of title from an attor-
ney who ig unacceptable to it. There might, therefore, be some possi-
bility that title insurance companies, by refusing to accept opinions
from certain attorneys, would be able to restrict buyers in their choice
(Conventional Mortgages § 3.202); id. at 239-40 (appendix, exhibit W).
259. The proposed amendment might also affect an abstracting company if it is
customary in its locality for buyers or sellers to deal directly with such companies to
obtain an abstract of title. Ordinarily, however, the settlement service provider that
examines title obtains the abstract of title from the abstracting company.
260. In some states, all title insurance companies fall into the latter group be-
cause title examination is considered the practice of law and may be done only by an
attorney. See, e.g., VmGINIA STATE BAR COMM. ON THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAw
AND JUDIcIuL ETmIcs, OPINIONS, No. 17, at 239 (1965), cited in 421 U.S. at 775 n.1.
261. It would be unnecessary for the lender's attorney to review the title search,
examination, and certification to the title insurance company because once the title
insurance company issued a title insurance policy, the lender's interest in the title
would be protected. The lender's attorney could, of course, attend the settlement
conducted by the buyer's attorney.
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of attorneys to examine title. But a title insurance company that
would be unable to rely on a flow of business based on lender selection
of the title insurer might be hesitant to reject an attorney, since a
buyer whose attorney was disapproved could select another title in-
surance company. As a result, title insurance companies would have
little incentive to be overly restrictive in their acceptance of attor-
neys.
The attorneys who would be most affected by the proposed
amendment would be those who now act as attorneys for lenders
and who, in that capacity, search and examine title, render title
opinions to title insurance companies, prepare documents, and con-
duct settlements, since the buyer would have the right to select the
attorney to perform these functions. Attorneys who participated in
the settlement process only in the capacity of attorney for the lender
would, therefore, be limited to reviewing work performed by buyers'
attorneys."
If, after RESPA's amendment as proposed, an attorney who for-
merly had performed settlement services on behalf of the lender de-
sired to perform those same settlement services, he would have to be
selected by a buyer for those purposes. To bring himself to the atten-
tion of buyers, so that they would select him, he could, under the
amended RESPA disclosure scheme, give written notice to real estate
brokers, builders, and mortgage lenders in his community of his
name, the settlement services offered by him, and his fees for such
services. This information then would be given to buyers as part of
their precontract disclosure. Ufiless the attorney's fees were competi-
tive, however, a buyer would have no reason to select him over any
other attorney.6 3
262. Under the proposed amendment, the lender would be permitted to charge
this attorney's fee to the buyer as a cost of the settlement. As part of the required
disclosure of named mortgage lenders, the real estate broker or builder must give the
buyer a statement as to each lender's loan origination fees, including the fee it would
charge to the buyer for its attorney's review of documents prepared by the buyer's
attorney. Since the necessary documents-deed, note or bond, and mortgage or deed
of trust-ordinarily are standard printed forms, they are not difficult to prepare. The
attorney need only insert dates, names of the parties, legal descriptions of the property,
and terms of the loan. In addition, the forms of note or bond and mortgage or deed of
trust often are those adopted by the mortgage lender. Review by the lender's attorney
should, therefore, be a simple matter for which only a nominal fee should be charged.
263. Currently, many homebuyers are willing to permit the lender's attorney to
represent their interest as well. This is permissible so long as the attorney has complied
with the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility concerning dual repre-
sentation. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsIBiLITY Canon 5; EC 5-14 to 5-16, 5-19;
DR 5-105 (as amended 1978). Similarly, under the proposed revision of RESPA, many
lenders might well be willing to accept the buyer's attorney as their attorney and to
make no additional charge for review of documents prepared by an attorney
"approved" by the lender. This information could be made available to buyers as part
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Escrow companies would be affected by the proposed amend-
ment in those communities in which it is customary for a separate
company to handle the settlement, usually without a meeting of the
parties."4 The escrow company receives instructions from the buyer,
the seller, and the lender as to what documents and sums of money
to collect from and distribute to each party. When all of the docu-
ments and monies have been collected, the escrow company records
the deed in the name of the buyer and makes the necessary distribu-
tions in settlement of the transaction. Escrow companies may be
formed by real estate brokers, mortgage lenders, attorneys, or title
insurance companies to handle, for a separate fee, settlements of
home purchase transactions in which their creators otherwise are
involved as the providers of the mortgage loan or other settlement
services. To the extent that any of these participants in the settle-
ment process now requires use of its "captive" escrow company, the
buyer is unable to obtain the lowest price for this service. The pro-
posed amendment would give the buyer this freedom of choice.
VIII. EVALUATION OF DISCLOSURE PROPOSALS
A. ADVANTAGES OF DIsCLOSURE PROPOSALS
Of the five purposes to be served by requiring disclosure of home
mortgage settlement costs,"' the proposed amendments to RESPA
would directly serve the first four. Disclosure of the identities of and
fees charged by local mortgage lenders and settlement service provi-
ders has the potential for serving the fifth purpose-the reduction of
loan origination and settlement costs-to the extent that high costs
of their precoptract disclosure. Under such circumstances, buyers would have an incen-
tive to choose an attorney on the lender's "approved" list whenever that attorney's fee
was less than the combined fees of "a non-approved" attorney and the lender's review-
ing attorney. A buyer who did not have an attorney to represent him at the stages of
negotiating and drafting the contract of sale also might choose an attorney on the
lender's approved list simply because he did not know any of the attorneys who were
disclosed as having lower fees. Although one can sympathize with a homebuyer in this
situation, he is in no worse position than he would have been if he did not know which
attorneys were approved by the lender, since he does have an opportunity to make a
choice based on cost. The solution to the homebuyer's problem is to make him more
aware of the availability of legal services than can be done simply by the proposed
RESPA disclosure. Perhaps the decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350
(1977), will cause attorneys to make more information available to the public about
their services than they have done in the past. See note 247 supra.
264. Escrow practices and charges vary greatly throughout the country. In the
study made by HUD and VA, fewer than five percent of the cases along the eastern
seaboard reported escrow fees, but in the southwest and far west over seventy per-
cent of the cases showed a separate escrow fee. HUD-VA RMORT, supra note 8, at 12,
reprinted in 1972 House Hearings, supra note 8, at 748.
265. See text at pp. 421-22 supra.
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are the result of inefficient and noncompetitive practices.
Such disclosure may have less of an effect on loan origination
costs than on settlement costs because there may be less potential for
effective competition among mortgage lenders than among settle-
ment service providers. During periods of tight money it seems un-
likely that disclosure of mortgage interest rates and loan origination
fees would induce lenders to compete on the basis of price. During
periods when home mortgage money is more readily available, how-
ever, such disclosure would make it more difficult for real estate
brokers and builders to steer homebuyers to particular lenders with-
out regard to price. At least during these latter periods, if mortgage
lenders could not rely on the patronage of borrowers referred to them
and if, by notifying the real estate brokers and builders in their pri-
mary lending area of their interest rates and loan origination fees they
could have this information brought to the attention of homebuyers
in that area, they would have an incentive to engage in price competi-
tion.
As to title related settlement costs, there is no inherent struc-
tural reason analogous to the periodic shortages of home mortgage
money that occur in the home mortgage lending market that would
prevent the various settlement services markets from becoming more
competitive. Settlement service providers, unlike home mortgage
lenders.during periods of tight money, do not need to turn away
potential customers because of excess demand for services. On the
contrary, during periods of tight money, when fewer home mortgages
than usual are made, settlement service providers should be particu-
larly eager to attract what limited business is available. Settlement
service providers no longer may compete for such business by offering
inducements to real estate brokers and others for the referral of settle-
ment service business. Under the proposed amendment to RESPA,
attorneys and title insurance companies would not be able to rely on
business based on the lender's requirements that a specific attorney
examine title and that a specific title insurance company insure title.
Finally, settlement service providers no longer would be able to
rely on the ignorance of homebuyers about the nature of the settle-
ment process and the identities of and fees charged by various settle-
ment service providers, which ignorance otherwise would cause
homebuyers to accept unquestioningly the recommendations of pro-
viders made by real estate brokers-and builders. Under such circum-
stances, the climate for price competition among settlement service
providers should be improved. Settlement service providers should
be eager to inform real estate brokers, builders, and mortgage lenders
of their services and fees in order to assure that this information
would be brought to the attention of homebuyers.
Any reduction in settlement costs by virtue of increased competi-
tion among settlement service providers would inure directly to the
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homebuyer, since he would pay such costs directly to the providers.
The result under this system, therefore, would more probably be
beneficial to the homebuyer than would be the result under lender
pay. Under that proposal, any reduction in settlement costs would
inure first to the mortgage lender, which might or might not pass the
savings through to the homebuyer.
In addition to creating conditions under which settlement service
providers would be encouraged to engage in price competition, the
proposed amendments to RESPA also should encourage real estate
brokers and builders to support efforts to reduce settlement costs.
Real estate brokers and builders now have no incentive to support
such efforts because the homebuyer does not learn about the magni-
tude of the required loan origination and settlement costs until after
he is bound under the contract of sale. If real estate brokers and
builders were required to disclose the amounts of all loan origination
and settlement costs at the precontract stage, the existence of high
front-end costs would be likely to make it more difficult than it now
is to persuade a prospective homebuyer to enter into a contract of
sale. Under such circumstances, it would be in the interests of real
estate brokers and builders to support efforts to lower these costs.268
B. CRITICISMS OF DISCLOSURE REGULATION: COMPARISON OF PROPOSED
RESPA DISCLOSURES AND TRUTH-IN-LENDING
Many commentators have criticized the use of disclosure as a
technique for regulating consumer transactions on the ground that
such regulation has no effect on either consumer behavior or the
266. Such efforts might include attempts to reduce title search costs by modern-
izing local re-cording systems or attempts to eliminate real estate transfer taxes. The
real estate transfer tax ordinarily is a percentage of the price of the property assessed
against the buyer. In some localities, it may be the largest settlement cost paid by the
buyer, adding hundreds of dollars to the amount of cash required at settlement. See,
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 5402 (1974) (two percent apportioned equally between
grantor and grantee); MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 278A (Supp. 1978) (.05% state transfer
tax exclusive of local transfer taxes, which may be as high as 1.5% such as the tax
imposed by Baltimore City; see BALTimOR Crry CODE, art. 28, § 68 (1976), cited in VII
MARTMNDALE-HUBBEIL LAw Dm croRy 1126 (1979)); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3285 (1964)
(one percent state transfer tax exclusive, of local taxes, which generally are also one
percent). For a discussion of the Pennsylvania realty transfer tax, see Ominsky,
Adventures in the World of the Realty Transfer Tax-The Pennsylvania Experience,
44 TEMPLE L.Q. 73 (1970).
Prior to January 1, 1969, the federal government imposed a Documentary Stamp
Tax on transfers of real property at the rate of $.55 for each $500 of property value.
Excise Tax Reduction Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-44, § 401 (b), 79 Stat. 148 (1965)
(repealed 1968). Thereafter many states adopted a similar tax. The real estate transfer
tax, in some localities, may be the largest settlement cost paid by the buyer, adding
hundreds or even over a thousand dollars to the amount of cash required at settlement.
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substance of transactions."7 According to these commentators, pro-
ponents of disclosure regulation assume that such regulation will,
among other things, cause consumers to comparison shop for goods
or services so that sellers will be forced to compete concerning the
disclosed aspects of the transaction. Such assumptions are wrong, the
commentators say, because consumers do not learn the disclosed in-
formation or, if they do, they do not use it in making their purchase
decisions. 8 The bulk of this criticism has been in the context of
truth-in-lending, 9 but the value of disclosure also has been ques-
tioned in the context of settlement cost regulation. 70
With respect to truth-in-lending, Professor Whitford's compre-
hensive article"i evaluates the criticisms of disclosure regulation and
discusses "ways in which disclosure regulation might be formulated
so as to fulfill its potentially achievable purposes better than it gener-
ally has in the past." 272 An important aspect of Whitford's article is
his theory that the success of precontract disclosure regulation should
not necessarily be determined by whether, without further prompt-
ing, consumers actually use the disclosed information. According to
Whitford, precontract disclosure regulation is not based so much on
a prediction that consumers would use the disclosed information in
making their purchasing decisions as on the belief that consumers
should make use of the disclosed information, whether or not they
naturally are inclined to do so. On the assumption that it is possible
to persuade consumers to act in ways other than they would absent
the persuasion, the task of the policymakers is to formulate precon-
tract disclosure regulation so as to have persuasive impact, rather
than to formulate it as though consumers would search for and use
the disclosed information on their own.23
Whitford notes, however, that it is possible that disclosure regu-
lation providing for disclosure in the written contract or in a similarly
inadequate manner has little impact on shopping behavior, not be-
cause consumers do not want the disclosed information but because
267. See, e.g., Jordan & Warren, Disclosure of Finance Charges: A Rationale, 64
Micm. L. REv. 1285, 1320-22 (1966); Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit
Reform, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 1-11 (1969); Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A
Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUm. L. REv. 445, 455-69 (1968); Note, Truth in
Lending: The Impossible Dream, 22 CASE W. Ras. L. REv. 89 (1970).
268. See Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer Trans-
actions, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 400, 403-04.
269. Id. See also note 267 supra.
270. 1975 House Hearings, supra note 46, at 374-75, 377 (testimony of Dale
Whitman); 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 46, at 1-2 (opening remarks by Sen.
Proxmire), 232 (testimony of Dale Whitman); Berry, supra note 4, at 2, 11.
271. Whitford, supra note 268.
272. Id. at 404.
273. Id. at 423-27, 435-40.
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the costs to them of discovering that information exceed the value
to them of the information. On this assumption, if disclosure regula-
tion allowed consumers to obtain and use the information at little
cost to themselves, it would have substantial impact on shopping
behavior because it would make available to consumers information
that they want and would, therefore, use without further persua-
sion. 4
Professor Whitford's analysis provides a useful framework within
which to consider the potential effect on the home mortgage and
settlement service markets of loan origination and settlement cost
regulation based upon the concept of disclosure. When the disclosures
that would be required under the proposed amendments to RESPA
are compared with the disclosures required under truth-in-lending, it
is apparent that the proposed RESPA amendments would avoid
many of the weaknesses of truth-in-lending.
The basic strategy that Professor Whitford proposes for enhanc-
ing the persuasive impact of seller disclosure is to make the manner
and timing of disclosure such that it is as unlikely as possible that
consumers will reach purchase decisions without having the disclosed
information brought to their attention.25 The same basic strategy
would, of course, also apply if the disclosed information were infor-
mation that consumers themselves wanted rather than information
that consumers would have to be persuaded to use. In the latter case,
if only a few consumers previously had used such information because
it was disclosed in an inconvenient manner that made its discovery
and use difficult and time consuming, many more consumers could
be expected to use such information if it were more conveniently
disclosed, even without any persuasion.
The information that would be required to be disclosed under the
proposed amendments to RESPA is more likely to be information
that consumers want than is the information now required to be
disclosed under truth-in-lending. The basic truth-in-lending disclo-
sures required in the case of the purchase of a consumer item on
credit are the total amount of the finance charge and the finance
charge expressed as an annual percentage rate (APR).26 Studies have
shown, however, that consumers are much more concerned about the
size of the downpayment and monthly payments than they are about
interest ratesY7 The proposed RESPA disclosure of the identities of
274. Id. at 437 n.123.
275. Id. at 442.
276. Truth-in-Lending Act, § 128(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1638 (1976).
277. Day & Brandt, A Study of Consumer Credit Decisions: Implications for
Present and Prospective Legislation, in 1 TECINICAL STunizs 32 (U.S. Nat'l Commis-
sion on Consumer Finance Pub. 1973); F.T. Juster & R. Shay, Consumer Sensitivity
to Finance Rates: An Empirical and Analytical Investigation (Nat'l Bur. of Econ.
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and fees charged by mortgage lenders and settlement service provi-
ders would be analogous to disclosure of the downpayment, since
these fees must be paid in cash at settlement."' Furthermore, under
the proposed RESPA disclosure of the identities of and fees charged
by mortgage lenders, there would be no cost to homebuyers, in terms
of shopping time and effort, of obtaining the disclosed information
prior to making their purchase decisions. More homebuyers would,
therefore, be likely to use this information.
The identities of and fees charged by mortgage lenders and set-
tlement service providers also is information that homebuyers should
have before reaching their purchase decisions. If some homebuyers do
have to be persuaded to use this information, the special information
booklet is a form of disclosure that specifically is designed to have
persuasive impact. Since under the proposed RESPA amendments
real estate brokers and builders would give prospective homebuyers
the special information booklet at their first meeting, and since prior
to entering into the contract of sale both the homebuyer and the real
estate broker or builder would have to sign a disclosure form that
included a confirmation of receipt of the special information booklet,
it is extremely unlikely that most homebuyers would reach purchase
decisions without first having been given an opportunity to learn
fundamentals of effective homebuying.Y' Truth-in-lending disclo-
sures, by contrast, contain nothing designed to educate consumers as
to the most advantageous use of credit.
The manner and timing of the truth-in-lending disclosures also
contribute to the relative ineffectiveness of truth-in-lending in en-
couraging consumers to comparison shop for credit. Typically, truth-
in-lending disclosures are made in the contract to be signed by the
consumer and the consumer first sees this contract when he is told
to sign it in order to complete the transaction. This manner and
timing of disclosure is inadequate for three reasons: (1) it is unlikely
that the disclosed information will be called to the consumer's atten-
tion; (2) since the consumer has made his purchase decision, psychol-
ogically he feels committed to buy and is unlikely to be influenced
by the disclosed information; and (3) even if he might be inclined to
postpone buying in order to comparison shop, the time and effort
involved might be disproportionate to any potential savings.
Research, Occasional Paper No. 88, 1964, discussed in Whitford, supra note 268, at
422).
278. In selecting a home mortgage lender, a homebuyer also might be more
interested in loan-to-value ratio than in interest rate or loan origination fees.
279. Only homebuyers who purchased existing homes directly from their owners
would not receive precontract disclosure. See text accompanying notes 251-54 supra.
Even they, however, would receive disclosure of the identities of and fees charged by
settlement service providers from the lender before purchasing settlement services
from such providers.
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The proposed RESPA disclosures are designed to avoid these
inadequacies. The disclosed information would be called specifically
to the prospective homebuyer's attention because disclosure of esti-
mated settlement costs and of the services and fees of named mort-
gage lenders and settlement service providers would be made in a
separate document signed by both the person making the disclosures
and the prospective homebuyer.
As to whether the homebuyer already would have, in effect,
made his purchase decision and feel committed to buy at the time
disclosure is made, it is necessary to separate the decision to purchase
the home from the decisions to seek financing from a specific mort-
gage lender and settlement services from specific settlement service
providers. In the case of the decision to purchase the home, the rele-
vant disclosure is the disclosure of estimated loan origination and
settlement costs. It is likely that the homebuyer would have received
this information prior to having made his purchase decision. Under
the proposed revision of RESPA, loan origination and settlement cost
information easily could be incorporated into the listings for existing
homes and into the promotional literature for new homes.20 Further-
more, whenever the disclosures are required to be made by a real
estate broker, they would be made before the prospective homebuyer
submitted an offer to the seller. If the prospective homebuyer decided
that, based upon the disclosure of estimated loan origination and
settlement costs, he could not afford the particular home with the
amount of cash he had available, he would not feel psychologically
committed to the seller to make the offer because he would have had
no prior direct dealings with the seller. There might, however, be
some of this pressure when the disclosures were required to be made
by the builder, with whom the prospective homebuyer had been deal-
ing directly, although inclusion of the estimated loan origination and
settlement costs in the builder's promotional literature would alle-
viate this problem.
In the case of the decisions to seek financing from a specific
mortgage lender and settlement services from specific settlement
service providers, the relevant disclosure is the disclosure of the ser-
vices and fees of named mortgage lenders and settlement service pro-
viders. Since the prospective homebuyer would receive this informa-
tion prior to entering into the contract of sale, he would not yet have
dealt with any mortgage lenders or settlement service providers. He
would not, therefore, feel psychologically committed to a particular
lender or to particular settlement service providers before obtaining
information about their fees.
Based on the foregoing, traditional criticisms of disclosure regu-
280. See text at pp. 437-38 supra.
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lation, most of which have been made in the context of truth-in-
lending, do not provide a sound basis on which to judge the proposed
revisions to RESPA.
IX. CONCLUSION
Congress enacted RESPA because it found
that significant reforms in the real estate'settlement process are
needed to insure that consumers throughout the Nation are provided
with greater and more timely information on the nature and costs
of the settlement process and are protected from unnecessarily high
settlement charges caused by certain abusive practices that have
developed in some areas of the country.2'
More than four years and one modification later, however, prospec-
tive homebuyers still do not have adequate information about the
nature and costs of the settlement process at the time they need it
most-before they obligate themselves under a contract to purchase
a home. Although the prohibition of kickbacks and unearned fees
may have protected homebuyers from unnecessarily high settlement
charges caused by these abusive practices, homebuyers still must pay
unnecessarily high charges caused by the noncompetitive nature of
the settlement services industry.
The amendments to RESPA proposed in this Article would en-
sure that the vast majority of homebuyers, those who purchase new
or existing homes with the assistance of a real estate broker and those
who purchase newly constructed homes directly from the builder,
would have information about the settlement process and all loan
origination and settlement costs prior to becoming legally bound to
purchase a home. To the extent that high loan origination and settle-
ment costs are the result of inefficient and noncompetitive practices
by mortgage lenders and settlement service providers, the proposed
amendments would put an end to one of the most anticompetitive of
these practices, the selection by the mortgage lender of the settlement
services providers to search, examine, and insure title; prepare loan
and title documents; and conduct the settlement. By shifting the
burden of comparison shopping from the homebuyer to the persons
who would make disclosure and by requiring those persons to identify
local mortgage lenders and settlement service providers together with
their fees, the proposed amendments would give homebuyers the in-
formation they want and need in order to obtain home mortgage loans
and settlement services at the lowest possible cost.
281. 12 U.S.C. § 2601 (1976).
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